After restarting its fight for Rakhine State in late 2023, the Arakan Army is in the process of carving out a proto-state of over a million people on the Myanmar-Bangladesh border. Although the Myanmar military has countered with indiscriminate attacks and a blockade that is causing huge economic distress, the armed group, which draws support mainly from the state’s Rakhine Buddhist majority, has pushed on, reaching into northern townships where it is alleged to have attacked Muslim Rohingya civilians. Desperate to retain these areas and control of the border, the military has conscripted and collaborated with Rohingya and orchestrated the destruction of Rakhine homes. When the dust settles, the Arakan Army will likely emerge as Rakhine State’s de facto governing authority, and outside actors will have to decide how and whether to engage with it. To foster stability, the Arakan Army should mend relations with the Rohingya, support an independent investigation of alleged abuses, and reach out to Dhaka and donors, which should find ways to work with the group on shared humanitarian and security objectives.
In just a few months, the Arakan Army has created the largest area in Myanmar under the control of a non-state armed group – in terms of both size and population – and is now on the verge of securing almost all of Rakhine. The cost of its success has been high, not least for civilians in the state. Hundreds of thousands from both the Rakhine and Rohingya communities have been displaced. The regime carries out deadly airstrikes on a daily basis, and both it and the Arakan Army are credibly alleged to be committing serious abuses against civilians. In late May, in one of the worst atrocities since the 2021 coup, regime forces were accused of massacring scores of Rakhine civilians in a village on the outskirts of the state capital, Sittwe. More recently, the Arakan Army is widely reported to have been responsible for the deaths of as many as 200 Rohingya civilians while assaulting Maungdaw town in the northern part of the state.
While the Arakan Army is likely to complete its rout of the military, it is less clear whether its political wing, the United League of Arakan, has the resources and capability to govern the territory and people who come under its rule, much less bring stability to the region. Strong support among the majority Rakhine will buy the group time to address difficult living conditions – including the lack of electricity and internet, the loss of essential services and an economy destroyed by conflict – but it is uncertain how long the public’s resilience will last.
The Arakan Army is also struggling to manage difficult ethnic relations within Rakhine, a state that since 1942 has been wracked by recurrent outbreaks of communal violence between the majority Rakhine, who are mainly Buddhist, and the Muslim Rohingya, who are a minority at the state level but dominate northern Rakhine. Since February, the military regime in Naypyitaw has fanned the flames, including by pressing Rohingya into service fighting the Arakan Army and cooperating with Rohingya armed groups that it had previously labelled terrorists. These groups have also forcibly recruited young men and boys from Rohingya refugee camps across the border in Bangladesh, either for their own ranks or to hand over to the military as conscripts.
While many Rohingya have been forced to enlist, some have also volunteered and been implicated in attacks on Rakhine civilians and mass arson campaigns, infuriating the Arakan Army, and prompting incendiary remarks from the group’s leaders, which have further fuelled worsening intercommunal tensions. As fighting has intensified in two mainly Rohingya townships in northern Rakhine State, Maungdaw and Buthidaung, Arakan Army forces have been accused of serious human rights abuses against the Rohingya, including the attack on 5 August, for which the group denies responsibility.
Rakhine State remains at a perilous juncture, requiring leaders of both the Rakhine and Rohingya communities to rise above their historical animosity and defuse tensions. They should avoid toxic rhetoric, establish a dialogue aimed at preventing further violence and spurn the regime’s efforts to pit them against each other. The Arakan Army, for its part, needs to ensure that its forces protect civilians and respect their human rights. It should also incorporate more Rohingya into its administration and commit to supporting an independent investigation into allegations of abuses against civilians, which should begin as soon as practicable.
For all the challenges it is facing domestically, Bangladesh also has a key role in Rakhine State, as do other outside actors. The emergence on its border of a de facto statelet that aspires to permanent autonomy will require the new interim government in Dhaka to expand the scope of its engagement with the Arakan Army, whatever its views of those ambitions. While strengthening ties with the group, Bangladeshi envoys should emphasise the importance of treating the Rohingya humanely and with dignity. To stabilise the borderlands, and address drivers of irregular migration, Dhaka should also allow for more humanitarian aid to the area and trade across the frontier. Finally, Dhaka should improve security in the refugee camps, reduce the influence of armed groups there and allow a genuine Rohingya civil society movement to emerge. Other foreign governments should explore how they can work with the Arakan Army and neighbouring states to improve humanitarian access and expand assistance for all ethnic communities affected by conflict in central and northern Rakhine State.
For neighbouring states and other outside actors, the emerging situation in Rakhine State creates quandaries – not least the question of how to work with a de facto authority like the Arakan Army amid an international system that for legal and practical reasons privileges relationships with nation-states. Despite these dilemmas, as Crisis Group has noted elsewhere, neighbours and donors will likely find that the greatest potential for positive humanitarian and security impact lies in working with Rakhine State’s de facto administrators toward mutual goals – mindful of human rights, conflict and legal risks and constraints that may present themselves.
The Arakan Army now faces a stiff test. Having made major battlefield gains over the Myanmar military, it needs to show it can bring stability to a neglected corner of the country and govern in the interests of all the people living there.
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