The Annual Report: Digital Rights in Southeast Asia 2025

This report summarizes the development of digital rights in Southeast Asia from January to December 2025. It covers the digital rights situation in eight Southeast Asian countries: Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam, which are DigitalReach’s target countries.

The purpose of this report is to provide an overview of digital rights developments in 2025. These developments help deepen understanding of both the local context in each country and the broader regional context, based on the trends and issues they share. The report also serves as a foundational source of information to support the design and implementation of initiatives that are responsive to these contexts.

The report has been reformatted from its previous 2023 version. The format of this 2025 report is based on DigitalReach’s revised organizational strategies. Under these new strategies, the organization’s work is divided into three main areas: Control of Information, Platform Accountability, and Digital Security.

In 2025, digital rights remain under threat in all Southeast Asian countries covered in this report. Governments and regimes across the region are intensifying efforts to control information, compelling social media platforms to comply with censorship directives, and tightening control over telecommunications, thereby increasing risks to the digital security of dissidents.

Myanmar

A. Political Situations

Since 2021, Myanmar has been in a state of civil war following a coup d’état led by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing on February 1, 2021. The coup overthrew the government led by the National League for Democracy (NLD), which had won a majority of votes in the November 2020 election. The junta claimed election fraud as justification for staging the coup, a claim observers have found baseless.

The National Unity Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (NUG), formed by elected lawmakers and parliamentary members ousted in the coup, was subsequently established. The NUG later created the People’s Defense Force as its armed wing. Over time, the military has struggled to gain full control of the country, leading to widespread clashes between military forces and resistance groups.

In July 2025, the military enacted an election law that imposes penalties of up to the death sentence on anyone who opposes or disrupts the election. In the same month, it also enacted the Military Secrets Protection Law, which criminalizes the disclosure of military secrets. This law is intended to prevent the release of military-related information and to deter defection.

On August 1, 2025, the junta formed an interim government after ending a state of emergency that had lasted more than four years. Min Aung Hlaing assumed the presidency while remaining the head of the military. Following the formation of the interim government, the junta announced on August 18, 2025, that it would hold the first phase of a multi-stage election on December 28, outlining a roadmap for the first national polls since the coup. On October 29, the junta announced January 11, 2026, as the date for the second phase of the election. According to an announcement on December 26, 2025, January 25, 2026, will be the final phase of the election.

The junta claimed that the election must be held in multiple phases due to security concerns. However, observers believe that deep political and social divisions in the country make it nearly impossible to hold a genuine nationwide election. Some areas are dominated by resistance forces. Of Myanmar’s 330 townships, the three-phase election reportedly covers 265, including areas where the junta does not have full control.
In what has been widely described as a sham election, only six parties will contest nationwide. Aung San Suu Kyi’s NLD was dissolved in 2023 after it refused to comply with the Political Parties Registration Law imposed by the military. In July 2025, the military amended this law, allowing for the dissolution of any party accused of electoral fraud or unlawful conduct during voting.

The six parties include the military’s proxy, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), which contested the election as the largest party with the greatest number of candidates. Aside from the primary motive of gaining legitimacy, it has also been reported that China pressured the military to hold the vote due to political instability affecting China’s interests. The vote is reportedly the result of an agreement between Min Aung Hlaing and Chinese President Xi Jinping.

In the lead-up to the election, more than 200 people have reportedly been arrested and charged under the election law for allegedly sabotaging the electoral process. According to media reports, those charged include filmmakers, an actor, a comedian, children, members of the People’s Defense Forces, and members of ethnic armed groups fighting the army.

B. Key Digital Rights Situations in 2025

Following the 2021 military coup, the suppression of digital rights has intensified, as shown by laws specifically targeting the digital space, efforts to control information, and expanded surveillance.

In 2025, the Cybersecurity Law took effect on July 30, after being enacted on January 1. It regulates the use of virtual private network (VPN) services in the country, as the junta claims VPNs can bypass censorship and make internet activity more difficult to surveil.

Under the law, establishing or providing VPN services without approval is a crime. Individuals who violate the law face imprisonment of one to six months, a fine of 1-10 million Myanmar kyat (approximately USD 470 – 4,700), or both, in addition to the confiscation of evidence. For companies or organizations, the minimum fine is ten million kyat, and all proceeds from the violation are confiscated.

Residents have reported random phone checks by the military, during which soldiers search for social media use and VPN apps. After the 2021 coup, the junta banned access to Facebook, WhatsApp, and Instagram in Myanmar, prompting people to use VPNs to regain access. Facebook, in particular, has long been one of the most popular social media platforms in the country, with 13.1 million users in Myanmar as early as 2025.
Under the Cybersecurity Law, digital platform service providers are required to collect users’ names and data for up to three years and disclose this information to authorities upon request. The law also penalizes those who read, store, or share articles from media outlets or groups that the military has banned or designated as terrorist. It further grants authorities the power to shut down online services for reasons of national security and the “public good,” and enables actions against Myanmar citizens outside the country’s borders.

Despite this repressive environment, media have reported that Facebook has been used extensively by the junta’s proxy Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) for election campaigns. USDP Facebook pages reportedly published five to seven posts daily during the campaign period, focusing on rallies, speeches, and campaign promises. The USDP also campaigned on TikTok, Telegram, and YouTube.

Many USDP figures, including its chairperson Khin Yi, are reportedly among the most active users on social media. Media reports indicate that he has increased his social media activity since September 2025, posting three to four video clips a day in which he answers pre-arranged questions and highlights his “experience” and “service to the nation.” However, many of the accounts engaging with his content were reportedly newly created, suggesting a coordinated network of inauthentic accounts.

In Myanmar, observers have documented coordinated social media campaigns favoring the military over the years. Following Facebook’s 2018 ban on military-affiliated accounts, the military shifted to other social media platforms to disseminate propaganda and disinformation248. Pro-military social media accounts have also harassed and doxed those considered to be on the opposite side, leading to their arrests.

In 2025, Myanmar Now reported a pro-military coordinated campaign on Facebook. According to the report, the tactics used involved organized “comment campaigns” to influence public opinion. Fake accounts reportedly flooded posts critical of the military with comments, specifically targeting the channels of independent media outlets, including Myanmar Now, The Irrawaddy, and Mizzima.

The Myanmar Internet Project also reported in 2025 that TikTok has become a favored platform for spreading military propaganda. This platform has likewise been used for election campaigns by pro-military figures in the sham election. As of early 2025, TikTok reportedly had 19.6 million users in Myanmar.

Following the 2021 coup, the military intensified its crackdown on independent media to dominate the information space with its propaganda. This led to a shrinking supply of factual reporting that could counter pro-military narratives, while pro-junta media thrived in the tightly controlled environment.

In October 2025, ahead of the 47th Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Summit in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, pro-junta media and Telegram channels claimed that Min Aung Hlaing would attend the summit after Malaysian outlet New Straits Times listed his name among attendees. It was later confirmed that the junta leader had not been invited.

In 2025, Justice For Myanmar, an organization working to expose the military, reported that Facebook, YouTube, Twitch, and MediaFire removed several pro-military channels and accounts after it sent letters to the platforms.

According to the organization, Twitch, owned by Amazon, took down accounts that were livestreaming Myanmar Radio and Television (MRTV) and Myanmar Radio channels on its website and mobile apps available in the Google and Apple app stores. Additionally, Twitch reportedly removed the Myanmar International TV (MITV) livestream embedded on the MITV website. All these channels—MITV, MRTV, and Myanmar Radio—are operated by the military’s Ministry of Information.

Facebook reportedly removed the pages of MITV and the Yadanabon Newspaper, which is linked to the pro-junta Myawaddy Newspaper. Yadanabon’s MediaFire account, where it stored some newspaper files shared on social media, was reportedly removed as well. Justice For Myanmar further reported that YouTube refused to delete the MITV account but did remove an account belonging to the Ministry of Information.

In terms of surveillance, Justice For Myanmar revealed in September 2025 that Geedge Network, a Chinese company linked to the Chinese government, has helped the military expand its monitoring capabilities. According to the report, the company’s technology enables tracking of network traffic at the individual level and can identify the geographic location of mobile subscribers in real time by linking users’ activity to specific cell identifiers. The technology allegedly gives the junta access to the online activities of 33.4 million internet users in the country.

The report followed Justice For Myanmar’s 2024 findings that the junta had adopted a new surveillance and censorship system, implemented by Geedge Network, starting in late May 2024, to tighten control of the internet. According to the 2024 report, the system uses Tiangou Secure Gateway (TSG) and Cyber Narrator. TSG is an internet surveillance and censorship product that can analyze users’ online behavior, while Cyber Narrator is a network intelligence platform designed to monitor and analyze internet traffic, including flagging the use of VPNs.

In May 2025, Myanmar Now and Finance Uncovered also published a joint investigation revealing that Frontiir, an internet service provider in Myanmar, had installed intercept technology from Geedge Network. According to the investigation, this technology enabled Frontiir to assist the military by tracking individuals online, blocking websites, and preventing users from accessing VPNs.

Following the 2021 coup, telecommunications and internet service providers in Myanmar were ordered to install intercept technology to allow the army to eavesdrop on citizens’ communications. Justice For Myanmar reported that technology from Geedge Network was deployed with the cooperation of telecommunications companies and related service providers in the country, including ATOM (formerly Telenor Myanmar), Mytel, Myanmar Posts and Telecommunications (MPT), Ooredoo Myanmar, Frontiir, StreamNet, Golden TMH Telecom, Internet Maekhong Network (IM-Net), Myanmar Broadband Telecom (MBT), Myanmar Telecommunication Network (MTN), Campana, Global Technology Group, and China Unicom.

Shortly after the coup, one of the country’s four telecommunications service providers, Telenor, a Norway-based company, sold its business to a military-linked firm in 2021. The company said it would otherwise have been required to help the military regime conduct surveillance on its clients in order to continue operating. The move was controversial, as many raised concerns about the company’s accountability.

Although the decision to exit appeared well-intentioned, the Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation (NRK) revealed in August 2025 that Telenor had repeatedly complied with military requests to hand over user data, putting its customers at risk hundreds of times after the coup. The data shared included names, addresses, call logs, last known locations, and national ID numbers, which the junta could use to identify and arrest dissidents. According to NRK, at least 1,300 customers had their data handed over or had their phones blocked at the junta’s request, and Telenor’s own analysis showed that nearly 500 customers may have been at risk of arrest if their data was shared.

The revelations prompted a lawsuit against the company in October 2025. The lawsuit was filed by Defend Myanmar Democracy and the Myanmar Internet Project, together with Tha Zin, whose husband, Zay Yar Thaw—a pro-democracy activist and opposition politician—was arrested and executed by the junta after Telenor allegedly shared his call log. As Telenor is a Norwegian majority state-owned company, Norway’s parliament launched a probe against the company in December 2025.

As the military has tightened its surveillance efforts, it has also relied on the Person Scrutinization and Monitoring System (PSMS), which integrates facial recognition, AI, and digital IDs to identify civilians. The PSMS is reportedly developed with support from Huawei and uses artificial intelligence and facial recognition to monitor individuals. The system enables authorities to cross-check national registration numbers against criminal records at checkpoints, hotels, and ticketing counters. Media reports indicate that its use has intensified in the lead-up to the sham election.

C. Implications of the Situations on Human Rights and Democracy

The most pressing concern, in light of developments in 2025, is the military’s attempt to establish itself as the legitimate government of Myanmar. Such an act would further endanger all aspects of digital rights in the country, despite the already critical situation. The coup d’état carried out by the junta has been widely condemned, and any effort to legitimize this action through a fabricated election should not be internationally recognized as establishing the military as the legitimate head of state.

Events in 2025 continue to underscore the absence of the rule of law and democratic governance in Myanmar. Since the coup, digital strategies have become a pivotal instrument for the military to seize and maintain power, including internet restrictions, the suppression of independent media, censorship, and the deployment of cyber armies to dox and harass critics online. Moreover, Myanmar has transformed into a surveillance state, where the junta can readily monitor the online activities of its citizens. These conditions are likely to persist as long as the junta remains in power.

The political context also severely restricts the work of civil society, particularly advocacy within the country. Nonetheless, there are civil society groups that continue to document human rights violations and advocate for the restoration of human rights and democracy in Myanmar. This raises the question of how these communities can be empowered and their work recognized, given the extremely challenging environment they experience.

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