Unpacking Junta’s Electoral Build-up from Digital Rights Perspective in Myanmar

Introduction

While the junta proclaims it will hold a general election in 2025, it is evident that the political climate of Myanmar has become more complex and dangerous than in the past. In addition, the country not only faces daily armed conflicts, but nationwide stability has also not yet been achieved.

In the 21st century, whether an election is considered free and fair depends on more than just the electoral process. It is essential that the election is conducted in an environment where every citizen is guaranteed their basic human rights, including digital rights. Only when fundamental digital rights – such as the (1) Right to Access Information, (2) Right to Freedom of Expression Online, and (3) Right to Privacy – are fully guaranteed, can individuals’ genuine voices and opinions flow freely to influence the electoral process.

Nevertheless, if the election that the junta plans to hold in late 2025 or early 2026 is examined from the perspective of digital rights, it will be clearly seen as nothing more than a political drama in which the digital rights of the people are systematically trampled in an attempt to legitimize an authoritarian regime. Events of digital repression that have occurred since 2021 provide clear evidence of that situation.

Erosion of the Right to Access Information: Collapse of the First Pillar of Digital Freedom

The first requirement of a free and fair election is the “Rights to know”. Only if citizens get enough information about the candidates, political parties, and their policies, can they make the right decision. After the coup, the junta’s opinions and repressions in the digital sphere hindered the public’s “right to know.”

Absence of the “Right to Know”, Difficulty of Choice 

Starting from the 2021 coup period to 2025, we have seen monthly news reports of internet shutdowns. An analysis of these internet shutdowns reveals that this is not a temporary situation. It is a long-term strategy to control and penalize regions that resist the regime’s rule. 

It was found that regions and states where the revolution is strong – such as Sagaing, Magway, Kachin, Kayin, Kayinni, and Rakhine – are facing long-term internet and mobile phone connection shutdowns. In other words, communication shutdowns are targeted at regions that are not under their administration’s influence. According to data collected by the Myanmar Internet Project (MIP), there have been around 400 incidents of internet shutdowns throughout Myanmar. This connectivity shutdown situation is greatly affected by the election. A voter living in an internet shutdown area such as a village in the Sagaing region, how can they study the policies of political parties? A candidate from Rakhine State, how can he or she engage and mobilize the people in his or her constituency? In such a situation, how can a voter make the right decision with a limited “Right to Know”?

Declining the All Inclusive

Moreover, the junta said that elections will be held in 267 out of 330 townships. This means that not only is there a lack of territorial control in certain areas, but the people living in those areas are also excluded from the election. In other words, citizens have been divided into two groups: one group living in junta-controlled areas where elections will be held, and the other living in conflict areas who will lose their voting rights. How can the election be accepted as free and fair when it is held under violations of the right to information and with a significant number of citizens losing their voting rights? 

Failing of Information, and Answerless Questions 

How will the people access news through online media? On the voting day, how will the election results be transparently monitored? Who will monitor the elections and in which channels will be used to directly report to the public about the electoral suspicion and irregularities? In an age where information about candidates, political parties, and their policies should be available at the click of a button or the swipe of a screen, internet shutdowns have pushed that equal opportunity for knowledge further away. An uneven playing field for the “right to know” among a country’s populace undermines the principles of a free and fair election. 

In other words, the collapse of the first pillar of digital rights,  the “Right to Access Information”,  is far removed from the notion of a free and fair election. 

Silencing of Right to Freedom of Expression Online: Collapse of the Second Pillar of Digital Freedom

The heart of democracy is the freedom to criticize the government and the actions of the authorities. Its lifeblood was cut off by the February 2021 coup. The junta repressed criticism in the digital sphere by treating it as a criminal offense. 

Criminalized by a Click: The Price of Pressing ‘Enter’

The relentless arrests for social media activity since the coup are an ugly reflection of the nation’s diminished freedom of expression. According to data that were collected by MIP based on  the news from the junta’s telegram Channel, from 2021 to 2025 July, 1,790 individuals were arrested due to their online posts and shares that criticized the junta activities. This number highlights that the freedom of expression of the urban population living in areas with internet access is being suppressed.

Moreover, the fact that people were added to arrest lists simply for posting online birthday wishes for Daw Aung San Suu Kyi highlights the junta’s attitude on the freedom of expression, and its intolerance of any dissent. 

The long prison sentences imposed on critics – including reporters, artists, and a former minister from the U Thein Sein government—under various laws like the Telecommunications Law and the Counter-Terrorism Law, create a climate of fear that discourages citizens from participating in politics.

Silencing Through Fear 

The incidents of people being arrested and imprisoned for expressing their opinions online, including posting birthday wishes, directly instill a chilling effect in the minds of the entire population: the fear that anyone can be arrested at any time.

Moreover, according to Section 6 of the Law on the Protection of Elections from Interference, which was arbitrarily drafted by the junta, intensive action can be taken against individuals who criticize the elections. It was enacted on July 29, 2025. 

Furthermore, on July 30, 2025, the junta brought  into force the cybersecurity law which had been enacted on January 1, 2025. According to the law, individuals who establish a Virtual Private Network (VPN) may face imprisonment for one to six months, a fine of MMK 1–10 million, or both. Following its enforcement, the junta’s security forces have been arresting VPN users. Based on the text of the law, one can conclude that these actions are beyond the law’s scope, since VPN users are not the same as VPN establishers.

Nevertheless, based on the situation on the ground, the act of installing and using a VPN on their phones instills fear in internet users that they could face legal action. When the social media platform is blocked, it is an action to reduce the number of social media users through fear. 

Since these provisions were enacted during the junta’s election plan, it is clear they were preparations for repression in the lead-up to the election. In such an environment, political parties competing in the election will face the limitations for their online campaigns. Criticizing the junta’s current actions will disappear. The public will no longer dare to express their difficulties online.

An election held without freedom of expression and robust debate does not reflect the public’s voice, but will merely be a ceremony to approve whatever those in power have said.

Losing of Right to Privacy: Collapse of the Third Pillar of Digital Freedom

The individual’s right to privacy was being threatened by the junta’s mass surveillance system, which uses advanced technology.

Attempting to Control the People via the Biometric Data Collection

After the coup, the junta launched a full-scale effort to collect individuals’ personal data, including iris scans and fingerprints. Under the banner of “Building a Modern Nation,” it is the implementation of a while collecting the biometric data, to get it accurate, they also pressured to register the sim card. By doing so ,the junta will be able to cross-check information from both databases and verify its accuracy.

Implementation the People Surveillance and Management System (PSMS) 

Once its biometric data collection was successful, the junta added the data to its People Surveillance Management System (PSMS) and used it to track wanted political activists and individuals who participated in the Civil Disobedience Movement. From March to May 2025, according to the junta’s police department in Mandalay Region, 1,657 individuals were arrested nationwide using the PSMS system. The Ministry of Information’s website officially reported that in Myittha Township, authorities are conducting checks using the PSMS application. 

It not only hinders the people’s freedom of movement but also significantly threatens political movements. Under such circumstances, the fairness of the election to be held is in no way acceptable  from the perspective of digital rights.

Suppression Under Legal Cover 

It is evident that the junta carries out mass surveillance of the public by enforcing and applying laws that they have arbitrarily crafted to suit their own interests. It has been found that the provisions of the Cybersecurity Law, which was enacted to take effect on July 30, include clauses that allow the authorities to arbitrarily demand user data from digital service providers.

Furthermore, the so-called “State Security and Peace Commission,” which was renamed and formed by the State Administration Council(SAC), continued to decree the suspension of Sections 5, 7, and 8 of the Law Protecting the Privacy and Security of Citizens. 

According to that decree, the protections afforded by Section 8 of the law, which can be considered digital protections for citizens, such as protection against intercepting or disturbing communications and against demanding or obtaining personal data from telecom operators, were lost. The “State Security and Peace Commission,” which was formed for the purpose of holding an election, clearly shows its alignment with the SAC’s position. Therefore, it can be concluded that this is merely a change in name, not in principle.

Due to the above surveillance mechanisms, the public always experiences the psychological pressure of “we are always being watched.” In such a situation, citizens cannot freely express their political opinions. Consequently, the belief that one can vote freely has also disappeared, along with the right to privacy, a key pillar of digital rights. 

Conclusion

In summary, the 2025 election being prepared by the State Security and Peace Commission is not a process that aligns with democratic standards. Under circumstances where digital rights have been systematically suppressed and dismantled, it will become nothing more than a political maneuver aimed at legitimizing their grip on power.

The right  to access information has been violated through internet shutdowns. The right to freedom of expression has been suppressed through arrests and repressive laws. The right to privacy has been systematically controlled through comprehensive surveillance technologies. 

Any election held in a situation where the three key pillars of digital rights have collapsed is meaningless. It is not possible to solve the current political crisis, and it will only deepen the conflicts. 

The genuine road to democracy cannot be navigated through the digital dark age. It can only start rebuilding the foundation of a free and fair society that guarantees basic digital rights for all people.

It is urged that the international community and all stakeholders look beyond the mere surface of the election and instead properly assess the legitimacy of a process being prepared amidst the systematic repression of digital rights.

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