Myanmar’s military regime is discovering new diplomatic opportunities as global and regional politics shift. China’s recent moves to prevent the junta’s collapse, diminishing Western interest, chaotic U.S. foreign policy and regional fatigue with a protracted conflict are reshaping the international environment. These trends have led to a gradual thaw in relations between many Asian countries and Naypyitaw, even as the regime continues to lose ground in the post-2021 coup conflict and humanitarian conditions worsen. Elections planned for late in the year will not resolve the political impasse and will likely be violent, but they may offer a convenient pretext for some governments to deepen engagement with the junta. Instead of rushing to recognise the country’s military rulers, foreign powers should preserve what limited space remains for coordinated diplomacy on Myanmar, particularly at the UN Security Council and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), standing ready to seek a peaceful settlement if the opening arises but not conferring unwarranted legitimacy on the forthcoming polls.
Over four years after the 2021 coup that plunged Myanmar deeper into civil war, the military continues to lose territory to its foes, in particular some of the country’s larger ethnic armed groups. Despite some limited counteroffensives, regime forces remain overstretched and under pressure on several fronts. Meanwhile, humanitarian conditions are deteriorating, compounded by the devastating earthquake that struck the north of the country in March. As the number of civilians requiring humanitarian assistance keeps increasing, international funding is falling far short of needs, especially now that global aid budgets have tightened following U.S. President Donald Trump’s decision to abolish USAID. Some of Myanmar’s most vulnerable populations are receiving little or no assistance, particularly in areas controlled by ethnic armed groups.
Despite adversities on the battlefield and public hardship, the military regime’s prospects appear brighter – in large part because of China’s more assertive role. After a series of successful military offensives by opposition forces, Beijing intervened in August 2024 to stabilise the regime, boosting its diplomatic and military support and restraining some of Naypyitaw’s enemies. Other neighbouring states took China’s backstop as their cue to boost high-level contacts with Naypyitaw on the assumption that it would make the military rulers less likely to fall. Eroding U.S. leadership on democracy and human rights has also helped reduce the political cost for regional powers seeking to normalise ties with the junta. Many now see little to gain from prolonged diplomatic isolation of the regime. They are likely to re-establish normal relations with whatever administration emerges from the elections the junta plans to hold at year’s end.
But the fundamentals remain unchanged. The planned elections, which will not be credible, will not resolve Myanmar’s political crisis or reduce the intensity of the armed conflict. Instead, they are likely to harden political divisions, and they could well trigger new waves of violence as the regime tries to ensure secure conditions for voting while resistance forces fight back. At the same time, Myanmar’s state failure is generating risks that extend beyond the country. These include border instability and migrant and refugee flows, the resurgence of communicable diseases – including HIV, tuberculosis and malaria – and a boom in illicit activities by transnational organised crime syndicates that have established themselves in the country, as well as environmental degradation linked to unchecked natural resource exploitation.
Diplomatic efforts should focus on preserving what space for multilateral coordination on Myanmar remains – particularly at the UN Security Council – and on avoiding steps that would confer undeserved legitimacy on a flawed electoral process. A coordinated approach would enable the Council to respond more decisively to any future deterioration in Myanmar, whether involving violence around the elections or increased regime attacks on civilians, as well as to capitalise on any future opportunities to promote an inclusive political process. China, the country with the most influence in Myanmar, should jettison its go-it-alone approach – which has not helped achieve its objectives of stability and security for its border or investments – and engage more actively with other governments on the Council as well as regional forums. For its part, ASEAN, whose chair rotates annually, should strive for greater policy continuity. Appointing a multi-year envoy could be a useful first step toward more sustained, consistent engagement that can bridge the pre- and post-election periods.
Given the population’s immense needs, donors should also ensure that aid reaches the civilians affected by Asia’s most deadly conflict. To do so, they should look beyond dwindling traditional aid allocations and use innovative approaches to sustain critical programming. Expanding the role of international financial institutions in aid delivery and leveraging their resources, as in other conflict settings, is one avenue to explore. Tapping non-aid budgets – for example, to address transnational crime or better understand the links between Myanmar’s political and conflict dynamics and critical minerals supply chains – is another. At a time of shrinking resources, high-impact, low-cost interventions are essential: funding for community health, education and vernacular media, as well as technical support for non-state governance structures emerging in various parts of the country, can deliver tangible benefits at modest expense. Instead of succumbing to frustration, foreign powers should stand ready to respond to the humanitarian emergency and seize any diplomatic opportunity to prise open Myanmar’s deadlock.
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