As the failure of ASEAN’s approach and the 5PC points to the bloc’s selective engagement with the military junta and ambivalent recognition of authority, the bloc must leverage its platforms and partnerships — including with ASEAN-Plus and Dialogue Partners — with a priority to end the escalating horrendous violence. For effective implementation of the 5PC, this position paper proposes ASEAN to urgently review and reframe its current approach to the Myanmar crisis.

• Point 1 on civilian protection and cessation of violence: ASEAN must set an immediate action plan to stop the military’s violence and atrocity crimes, with a minimum benchmark to end the airstrikes as a matter of urgency. In this regard, ASEAN must coordinate an ASEAN-Plus approach involving governments in the region and impose arms embargoes. ASEAN must support the imposition of a global arms embargo, and targeted sanctions. It should further take action to support a referral of the situation in Myanmar to the International Criminal Court or an establishment of an ad-hoc tribunal through a UNSC resolution under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
• Point 2 on inclusive dialogue of all parties: For an inclusive and constructive dialogue among all relevant stakeholders to the ongoing crisis in Myanmar, the 5PC must be amended to be holistic, comprehensive, and consistent with the will of the people of Myanmar. First and foremost, ASEAN must initiate formal engagements in meaningful consultation with key stakeholders of Myanmar, including the NUG, the NUCC, the CRPH, EROs and civil society. An implementation plan must be developed at the ASEAN Summit following the bloc’s decision in November 2022. In this plan of action, ASEAN must secure an enabling environment where federal democracy forces and stakeholders are guaranteed agency, respect, and security. This includes an immediate cession of the junta’s violence, persecution of and attacks on democracy forces and collective punishment against the population. ASEAN must also ensure engagements with all parties at all levels in equal terms.
• Point 3 on ASEAN Special Envoy: The mandate should serve ASEAN as a whole, answering to all ASEAN leaders and foreign ministers, instead of solely the incumbent chair. ASEAN leaders must set up a clear mandate grounded in principles of human rights and do no harm, and justice and accountability. The term should be extended to three years. The mandate must be a full-time position and hold authority and independence to take actions unencumbered by the delay of infrequent ASEAN high-level meetings. Lastly, ASEAN must ensure that the mandate has adequate authority and resources to constructively engage with all stakeholders, including the resources to ensure the ability of Myanmar democracy stakeholders to travel safely.
• Point 4 on ASEAN’s humanitarian assistance through the AHA Centre: ASEAN should restrategise its humanitarian support plan to ensure the discontinuation of the military junta’s representation in the AHA Centre’s Governing Board. Myanmar’s frontline local responders, including border-based civil society and ethnic community-based organisations — who have proven track records of effective aid delivery, must be placed at the centre of the solution. This could be done by encouraging big aid donors to increase their provision of assistance to or minimise burdensome reporting requirements for Myanmar and regional CSOs. ASEAN must pivot to deliver aid through a people-to-people solidarity approach, particularly channeling through Myanmar’s ethnic border regions. While ASEAN realigns its humanitarian operations, it is also paramount that the bloc assumes the responsibility to protect vulnerable groups seeking refuge. ASEAN leaders must ensure asylum and legal protection are granted to those fleeing from Myanmar until they are safe to return home.
• Point 5 on the Special Envoy’s visits to Myanmar: The mandate must cut ties with the military junta who continues to commit atrocity crimes. The mandate should immediately open formal communications, and must truly engage with key stakeholders which are the NUG, the NUCC, EROs, the CRPH, and CSOs of Myanmar’s Spring Revolution. If the Special Envoy is unable to access Myanmar, then it must engage with these stakeholders by making available and creating all channels in other ASEAN countries.

Conclusion

If ASEAN is unable to deliver on the above mentioned points within three months from the ASEAN Summit on 9 – 11 May 2023, the people of Myanmar will have to determine whether Myanmar’s ASEAN membership is still in their best interest and in line with their struggle for federal democracy. This could potentially lead to Myanmar initiating the process of removing itself from ASEAN.

The intensifying crisis in Myanmar caused by the military junta has not only caused the lack of human security for the Myanmar people, but also wide-ranging implications for regional stability, socio-economic prosperity, and peace. Such problems now extend beyond the country’s borders. Given more self-reflection, ASEAN’s policy framework could be more strategic. Its current approach to the Myanmar crisis needs to be revamped in order to align with the aspirations of the Myanmar people. ASEAN must also acknowledge that the military lacks legitimacy and legality, and does not have control on the ground.

Further, ASEAN must recognise that the military’s attempted coup of 1 February 2021 has failed after two years. It is in the best interest of ASEAN to be decisive in its actions towards Myanmar. ASEAN must seek with no delay concrete coordination and cooperation from the international community. Particularly, ASEAN must urge the UNSC to adopt a resolution on Myanmar under Chapter VII of UN Charter to stop the military’s violence. Such action is a minimum benchmark for the bloc to gain trust from the people of Myanmar and prove that ASEAN is capable of solving the Myanmar crisis and saving people’s lives on the ground.

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The position paper is open to signatories from all Myanmar, regional and international organisations until the next ASEAN Summit in September 2023 and will be updated regularly here: https://progressivevoicemyanmar.org/2023/05/05/civil-society-position-paper-reviewing-and-reframing-the-aseans-five-point-consensus/. To sign on to the position paper, please send your organisation’s endorsement to: [email protected]

As of 3 July 2023, the below organisations have signed the position paper.

Signed by Myanmar organisations

1. 8888 Generation (New Zealand)
2. Action Against Myanmar Military Coup (Sydney)
3. Action Committee for Democracy Development (coalition of 12 activist networks)
4. Active Youths Kalaymyo
5. Ah Nah Podcast – Conversations with Myanmar
6. All Burma Democratic Front in New Zealand
7. Association for Human Rights Defenders and Promoters
8. Athan – Freedom of Expression Activist Organization
9. Auckland Zomi Community
10. Auckland Kachin Community NZ
11. Blood Money Campaign
12. Blooming Padauk
13. Burma Support
14. Burmese American Democratic Alliance
15. Burmese Canadian Network
16. Burmese Community Group (Manawatu, NZ)
17. Burmese Rohingya Organisation UK
18. Burmese Rohingya Welfare Organisation New Zealand
19. Chin Human Rights Organization
20. Chin Community of Auckland
21. Creative Home
22. CRPH Funding Ireland
23. CRPH, NUG Support Team Germany-Deutschland
24. CRPH & NUG Supporters Ireland
25. Democracy, Peace and Women’s Organization
26. Democratic Youth Council
27. Educational Initiatives Myanmar
28. Equality Myanmar
29. Federal FM – Mandalay
30. Federal Myanmar Benevolence Group (NZ)
31. Freedom and Labor Action Group (coalition of 3 labour activist groups)
32. Future Thanlwin
33. Generation Wave
34. Global Myanmar Spring Revolution
35. Grass-root People
36. Help Myanmar (USA)
37. Human Rights Educators’ Network
38. International Association, Myanmar-Switzerland
39. Justice For Myanmar
40. Karen Human Rights Group
41. Karen Swedish Community
42. Karenni Society New Zealand
43. Keng Tung Youth
44. Kings N Queens
45. Kyaukse University Students’ Union
46. Latsinu Women Agency
47. Mandalay Regional Youth Association (MRYA)
48. Mon State Development Center
49. Myanmar anti-military coup movement in New Zealand
50. Myanmar Campaign Network
51. Myanmar Community Group Christchurch New Zealand
52. Myanmar Community Group Dunedin New Zealand
53. Myanmar Emergency Fund (Canada)
54. Myanmar Engineers – New Zealand
55. Myanmar Gonye (New Zealand)
56. Myanmar Students’ Union in New Zealand
57. Nelson Myanmar Community Group New Zealand
58. New Zealand Doctors for NUG
59. New Zealand Karen Association
60. New Zealand Zo Community Inc.
61. Olive Organization
62. Overseas Mon Association. New Zealand
63. Rvwang Community Association New Zealand
64. Padauk
65. Progressive Voice
66. Pyithu Gonye (New Zealand)
67. Save and Care Organization for Women at Ethnic Border Areas
68. Save Myanmar Fundraising Group (New Zealand)
69. Shan Community (New Zealand)
70. Shan MATA
71. Southern Dragon Myanmar
72. Southern Youth Development Organization
    Tanintharyi MATA
73. Suomi – Myanmar Seura and Myanmar Diaspora Group of Finland
74. Support group for Democracy in Myanmar (The Netherlands)
75. Ta’ang Women’s Organization
76. The Ladies
77. Women Activists Myanmar
78. Women Advocacy Coalition – Myanmar
79. Women’s League of Burma
80. –

Supported in solidarity by regional and international organisations

1. ALTSEAN-Burma
2. ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights – APHR
3. Association Suisse-Birmanie
4. Asia Justice and Rights (AJAR)
5. Asia Pacific Solidarity Coalition
6. Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA)
7. Burma Action Ireland
8. Burma Campaign UK
9. Campaign for a New Myanmar
10. Central European Institute of Asian Studies
11. Clean Clothes Campaign South East Asia Coalition
12. CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation
13. Free Burma Campaign (South Africa)
14. German Solidarity with Myanmar Democracy
15. Info Birmanie
16. Initiatives for International Dialogue
17. Institute for Asian Democracy
18. International Campaign for the Rohingya
19. Myanmar Accountability Project
20. Myanmar Action Group Denmark
21. Netherlands – Myanmar Solidarity Platform
22. No Business With Genocide
23. SEA Junction
24. Social Action for Community and Development
25. Special Advisory Council for Myanmar
26. Swedish Foundation for Human Rights
27. Thai Action Committee for Democracy in Burma
28. S. Campaign for Burma
29. Union for Civil Liberty
30. Women’s Network for Unity
31. YAPPIKA (Indonesia)
32. _

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