Introduction

Since the 2021 coup, citizens of Myanmar have been experiencing various types of internet shutdowns. These include nationwide internet shutdowns, partial internet shutdowns, time-limited internet shutdowns such as internet curfews, speed/bandwidth limitations, blocking of social media sites, and preventing direct access to websites used by the news media, among others.

The internet shutdowns caused by direct instructions from the State Administration Council (SAC) have occurred at least 275 times from the 2021 coup period to the present. On the other hand, some mention that there have been internet blackouts as a result of damage to internet connectivity infrastructure.

This study will specifically focus on the infrastructural damages to the internet connectivity that occurred after the coup and the situations of internet shutdowns in different regions of Myanmar.

Background Information

After the enactment of the Telecommunications Law (2013), foreign investments from companies like Telenor and Ooredoo flowed into Myanmar’s telecommunications sector, leading to rapid growth prior to the 2021 coup. In this situation, as a state-owned corporation, MPT, which had a monopoly in the Myanmar telecom sector for many years, partnered with KDDI, one of the Japanese telecommunication companies, and was also reformed to maintain its market share(DVB, 2014).

From 2013 to 2021, before the military coup, overview of the status of the Myanmar Telecommunication sector, some laws such as section 66 (D) of the  Telecommunications Law, although negatively affected on users from the human rights perspective, Myanmar Telecommunication sector was undergoing a positive change.

In February 2021, after the coup, all of the positive changes seen in the telecom sector were dramatically reversed.he military junta, imposed nationwide internet shutdowns (6) times and disconnected internet access in specific locations more than 275 times (Myanmar Internet Project, 2024).

Before the coup, Myanmar’s telecommunications sector was dominated by four leading businesses: Telenor, Ooredoo, Mytel, and MPT. MPT was a former state-owned telecommunications corporation and changed to a joint venture with KDDI, while Mytel is a military-owned telecommunications company. After the coup, it is expected that the mobile users of these military linked companies’ services  immediately faced direct surveillance by the SAC Due to pressure from the coup military council to install interception capabilities, Telenor sold its assets at an undervalued price to the Shwe Phyu Group of companies, a conglomerate with military ties(Mcpherson & Potkin, 2022), and subsequently left the country, followed by the sale of Ooredoo to the Link Family based in Thailand. As a result, Myanmar’s telecommunications sector, previously somewhat transparent with private investments, has now come under the overall control of the Military’s State Administrative Council(SAC).

On one hand, the quantity of internet shutdowns is sharply increasing due to pressure from the military junta. On the other hand, attacks on telecom towers continue in an effort to disrupt the SAC’s cash flow. “On December 3, 2021, Reuters reported that, according to SAC media, 409 towers were destroyed, noting that 88% of them were owned by Mytel, a partially army-controlled firm. In September 2021, Mytel, owned by the Military Council, denounced that approximately 700,000 people lost their internet connection due to attacks and destruction of towers”(Reuters, 2021).

From the data that we collected, there were 209 tower damage incidents in 2021. Compared with the tower damage reported by the SAC, around half of the tower damage incidents were confirmed and usable.

Tower damage and destruction occurred the most in 2021, and in collecting data for this research, we were able to study based on the data of the number of (305) towers that were destroyed in the three-year period from 2021 to 2023.

Data Collection

For this study, data on telecom infrastructure damage and related facts from 2021 to 2023 were mainly collected using twenty-two news media websites, social media pages, and nine hyperlocal telegram channels in addition to the  study by MIP regarding internet restrictions conditions.

While collecting the data, relevant search tools including Google and searching tools that were embedded by the relevant services and analysis tools like “CrowdTangle” were also used. In addition, to figure out the real situation of the region, interviews were conducted with 2 individuals who are conducting telecom related activities in Karenni (Kayah) and Rakhine regions.

Limitations for Data Collection

During data collection, discrepancies in linguistic spelling rules and technical challenges in connecting between search engines and various platforms may result in some information being left. Under-reporting by the media and difficulties in confirming on the ground situation.

Status of Internet Shutdown During the Coup (2021-2023)

According to data reported by the Myanmar Internet Project (MIP), from the February 2021 to December 2023, at least 245 internet shutdowns occurred in various regions and states across Myanmar.

To disrupt the flow of information, interfere with activities related to the democratic movement, and maintain secrecy over their military actions, the State Administration Council (SAC) implemented numerous regional internet shutdowns during the coup period.

Between 2021 and 2023, the state of internet shutdown by region and state

The SAC  imposed more shutdowns in conflict areas involving ethnic armed forces and revolutionary groups. From February 2021 to December 2023, 33% of the internet shutdown incidents were accounted for in Sagaing Region where there were intense fights with the revolutionary forces . After the coup, within three years, the resistance of the revolutionaries, especially in the three states of Chin, Kachin, and Karenni, has been fierce against the SAC and 30% of the internet shutdown has been experienced there. The state with the highest number of internet shutdowns was Kachin State, where there were at least 30 recorded incidents, constituting 12.2% by percentage.

Between 2021 and 2023, the internet shutdown percentage by regions and states
Therefore, populations in areas with intense armed conflict suffer more from communication disruptions than those in other regions.
According to an interview with a technology expert living in an ethnic state,the SAC has been consistently shutting down the internet throughout the coup but is now attempting to use it for mass mobilization. One interviewee mentioned that the military junta, which has been shutting down internet access in Karenni (Kayah), is using the restoration of internet access as a mass mobilization strategy. He said, “In the past, they shut down the internet. Now they use it for mass mobilization. Mobile towers and electricity are in their control areas, such as Loikaw. They are camping in mobile towers to establish control in these areas.”

The Status of Mobile Tower Damage within Coup Period (2021-2023)

According to the data on mobile tower destruction between February 2021 and December 2023, 35.74% of the incidents occurred in the Sagaing Region, and 18.36% occurred in Mandalay, making it the second most affected area. The total number of tower destruction cases in all states constitutes one-fifth of the total incidents.

Between 2021 and 2023, mobile tower damage status by regions and states

In Kachin and Chin States, which are areas of intense conflict with ethnic armed forces, mobile tower damage is only 1.97% each. In Karenni State, it is 0.33%, and in Kayin State, it is 1.13%. In the Ayeyarwady Region, where armed conflict incidents are rare, the mobile tower damage percentage is 8.52% and in the Yangon Region, it is 5.57%.

According to the interviewee who is working the Technical related work in Kayah State,some towers were mistakenly destroyed instead of Mytel’s. He said, “Some towers shared infrastructure with Mytel, and those towers were mistakenly destroyed. Previously, there was an internet connection in Sebu Township, but there is none because the internet fiber cable has been interrupted.” Currently, mobile communication is available only in the surrounding areas of Loikaw within Kayinni(Kayah) State. “If the oil runs out or something breaks down in the tower, there’s no one available to fix it. In some areas, batteries installed to power the tower have been stolen. Generators installed in mobile towers are also reused elsewhere. These factors contribute to increasing mobile connection outages and worsening conditions” he added.

Map illustrating dominance and conflict across Myanmar

from February 2021 to February 2023 (ISP Myanmar)

Comparative Study of Tower Destruction and Internet Shutdown

Comparing the incidents of mobile tower destruction and Internet shutdowns between the February 2021 coup and December 2023, it was found that 35.74% of mobile tower destruction events and 33.33% of internet shutdown events occurred in the Sagaing Region. In the Mandalay Region, it was found that 18.36% of mobile tower destruction events occurred, whereas incidents of internet shutdown were approximately 3.66%.

Comparison of tower destruction and internet outages

In Rakhine State, almost no tower damage was reported, but it was found that 4.88% of internet shutdown events occurred. This rate exceeds that of the Mandalay Region, which had the second highest number of tower destruction incidents.
During the 3 years of the coup period 12.2% of total internet shutdown events in Kachin State while the tower destruction there was only 2%.
In Yangon and Ayeyarwady Regions, internet shutdown events were  2.44% each, while tower destruction occurred at rates of 5.57% in Yangon Region and 8.52% in Ayeyarwady Region.

Graph comparing tower destruction and internet outages

According to our documentation and Athan’s report in February 2024, at least 80 townships in Myanmar have experienced internet shutdowns. TheSagaing Region has twenty-seven townships affected, followed by Rakhine State with seventeen townships affected, despite having the least number of tower destruction incidents.

It was found that tower destruction across all states was only around 20%, but the internet shutdown of all states imposed by SAC was found to be almost half of all cases.

Yearly Internet Shutdown and Tower Destruction

Observing tower destruction from 2021 and 2023, 70% of the total tower destruction occurred in 2021, 20% occurred in 2022.  And only 10% in 2023.. This shows a significant year-by-year decrease in infrastructure destruction.
Regarding the internet shutdowns in the same period, 40.46% of the total shutdown events occurred in 2021. In 2022, shutdowns accounted for 32.82% of the total, marking a decrease of 7.5%. In 2023, shutdown represented  26.72% of the total, a further  decrease of 6.1% compared to 2022.

Comparison of yearly tower damage and internet shutdown

According to the findings, infrastructure destruction such as tower damage is  decreasing year by year, while internet shutdown events are only slightly decreasing.
A technology expert based in Rakhine explained, “There is no destruction of towers in Rakhine. However, when bridges and roads were destroyed, fiber cables were also damaged. The scarcity of gas to run generators for the towers is also a main factor contributing to internet blackouts. In some places, the cost can be as high as 25,000 kyats per liter of gas.” Additionally, companies like Huawei, Atom and ZTE which manage local towers and internet fiber lines were facing difficulties repairing infrastructure in war-torn areas. “They want to repair the fiber cable damage, but they are not allowed to do so. MPT has deliberately banned the ports,” he added.

Tower Destruction Status of Each Telecom Operator

According to the collected data,  95% of the total destroyed towers belong to Mytel. The tower damage condition for other telecom operators is as follows: Atom (previously Telenor Myanmar) 1.21%, Ooredoo 1.19%, MPT 0.98%, and unverified tower damage is 0.33%.

Figure depicting tower damage across various mobile service companies (2021 – 2023)

According to the findings, the attacks on the towers primarily targeted the military-backed operator Mytel.
Due to the circumstances of the tower destructions, the SAC has been ordered to take security measures for the Mytel and MPT towers. The military council has been instructed to prioritize the safety of the towers of these two telecommunications operators, as they are directly related to their interests. In HlaingBwe township, Kayin State, village administrators have collected money for the Border Guard Force (BGF), an armed group allied with the Military Council, to ensure the security of Mytel towers and prevent their destruction.

Announcement by SAC to provide security in the event of the destruction of the towers (Shwe Phee Myay News Agency)

In Myaing Township, Magway Region, local residents reported witnessing military council security forces planting landmines near the premises of the Mytel tower, which is associated with the interests of the coup leader’s family. On September 24, 2021, around 12:00 pm, in Muse Township, Mai Yu (105) Mai village group, near the Mytel tower close to Nam Hue Village, a worker tasked with repairing the tower tragically lost his leg after stepping on a landmine. In response to the incidents, Telenor Myanmar issued a public safety advisory urging people to avoid approaching the mobile communication towers due to the injuries sustained in their vicinity.

Organizations that Carried Out Demolition

Organizations primarily responsible for the destruction of the towers

The primary forces responsible for the destruction of telecom towers were the People’s Defense Force (PDF) and various Local Revolutionary Forces. According to reports from various news agencies, approximately three-quarters of the telecom tower destruction incidents were primarily carried out by the People’s Defense Force (PDF) and local revolutionary forces. The remaining 25% of the incidents remain unverified, with no group claiming responsibility.

The destruction of telecom towers by revolutionary forces, particularly those belonging to Mytel, a military-affiliated operator, appears to be strategically motivated. Analysis of these incidents indicates that the primary objectives were twofold: first, to dismantle a significant source of revenue for the military, thereby weakening its financial stability; and second, to repurpose materials obtained from the towers to support the armament needs of the revolutionary forces during the initial stages of the conflict when weapons were scarce.

Internet Shutdown and their Impact on Community

Internet technology has become an essential component of daily life, and internet outages have significant impacts on the public.  Consequences of an internet shutdown is the disruption of banking services, including deposits and withdrawals, which has caused substantial inconvenience for individuals and businesses. One interviewee said, “In Rakhine, bank deposits and withdrawals are also inconvenient. Due to fiber cable damage, money cannot be deposited or withdrawn. Cash is scarce. Business activities are not convenient. Consequently, prices have risen.” Interviewee said that since the internet was cut off in the Rakhine region for the past five months, along with disruptions to trade flows, the local population has been facing a significant crisis.

A war relief aid provider said, “With the roads blocked, we cannot deliver donations like food and blankets. If we try to transfer money through K-pay or Wave Money for donations, the internet shutdown prevents it. The entire northern part of the state is a war zone, everyone is fleeing the conflict. Now the banks are closed, so money can’t be withdrawn. That is why it is difficult to help refugees. People fleeing the war are also suffering.”

A person currently in Kayah State added, “People are facing a lack of information. They don’t even know what is happening or where it is happening. They don’t know where the battles are. They are losing contact with family members, leading to missing persons. Some have been arrested and disappeared at SAC gates. This situation also occurs at gates controlled by revolutionary forces. People are arrested and disappear without the ability to contact anyone by phone to verify their identity”.

In response to internet shutdowns, the public is employing various strategies to cope with the lack of connectivity. One respondent noted that in areas where the internet has been cut off, people have reverted to listening to the radio to stay informed. Additionally, in some regions, efforts are being made to utilize the StarLink internet service to establish local internet connections. A person currently in Kayah State said, “There are many StarLink internet cafes where I have to pay 500 to 1000 kyat per hour for internet services. Some restaurants offer free internet if you are a customer. As far as I know, there are about five such shops”.
In Chin State, the “Team ZNET” group has been utilizing satellite internet technology to establish and maintain an internet network, providing essential connectivity to revolutionary groups for more than a year.

A technology expert based in Rakhine suggested that coordinating fiber connections through neighboring countries in ethnic areas where internet access is disrupted could lead to a substantial improvement in the current situation of internet shutdowns. He noted that the State Administration Council (SAC) may implement stricter internet bans aiming to keep information in local data centers and route websites locally. “They will enforce this strictly. They will try their best to isolate. We must strive to prevent them from achieving their goals,” he added.

Finding

The following points summarize the compilation of cases of internet shutdowns and infrastructure destruction that occurred after the coup.

• Internet Shutdown in Conflict Affected Areas
  • In conflict-affected areas involving Ethnic armed forces, Revolutionary forces, and junta troops, the State Administration Council (SAC) has imposed internet shutdowns. This restriction significantly affects individuals residing in these regions, leading to severe communication limitations.
  • The shutdowns make access to online financial services  challenging, exacerbating socio-economic consequences such as cash shortages and increased commodity prices. These disruptions highlight the broader impacts of internet shutdowns on daily life, economic activities, and social stability in conflict zones.
• Destruction on Telecom Towers
  • The destruction of telecom towers have predominantly been attributed to revolutionary forces aiming at disrupting a significant revenue stream for the military and repurposing the fragments of these towers as makeshift weapons during the initial stages of the revolution.
  • The destruction of telecom towers has decreased year by year. However, regional communication outages continue to be exacerbated by factors such as electricity outages, high fuel prices, and the logistical danger involved in accessing towers for maintenance and refueling.

During conflicts, alongside damage to roads and bridges, interruptions to the fiber network and security challenges in repairing these connections exacerbate internet outages.The primary victims of the destruction of communication infrastructure and internet interruptions are the local residents.

Recommendations

The following recommendations are suggested to mitigate and protect local communities from harm caused by communication outage problems:

• In military emergencies, to minimize damage to infrastructure such as fiber optic lines, even in situations where communication channels are inevitably affected, proactive measures should be taken.
• To ensure the public receives accurate information, it is essential to explore and adopt new communication methods with the expertise of technical professionals to effectively  prepare for emergency situations.
• To establish and utilize internet fiber connections in border areas, it is crucial for key stakeholders, including international organizations, to coordinate and explore all feasible avenues.
• Internet shutdowns should never be imposed, as they inflict more harm than benefit.

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