TO:
H.E. Mr. Suharso Monoarfa, Co-Chair, GPEDC
H.E. Mrs. Judith Suminwa Tuluka, Co-Chair, GPEDC
Ms. Marie Ottosson, Co-Chair, GPEDC
Mr. Vitalice Meja, Non-Executive Co-Chair, GPEDC
Yuko Suzuki Naab, Development Cooperation Effectiveness Group, UNDP
Wouter Coussement, Development Co-operation Directorate, OECD
Thomas Boehler, Joint Support Team Contact
Yumna Rathore, Joint Support Team Contact
Park Jin, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea
29 November 2023
Subject: Request to revoke 2023 Busan Global Partnership Forum invitation to Myanmar military junta member
Dear GPEDC leadership,
We are writing this open letter to you on behalf of Myanmar regional and international civil society organisations working together to protect Myanmar people’s right to democratic representation internationally. We call on you to revoke the invitation to the Myanmar military junta member for the upcoming 2023 Busan Global Partnership Forum and publicly affirm your support for the people of Myanmar.
It has recently been brought to our attention that the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC) has invited a representative of the illegal Myanmar military junta to your 2023 Busan Global Partnership Forum which will be held on December 5 and 6 in Seoul, Republic of Korea. The GPEDC and the Korean Government Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent an invitation to the military junta-controlled Ministry of Investment and Foreign Economic Relations, which is led by the junta’s ‘minister’, Kan Zaw, who has recently been sanctioned by the European Union[i] and the United States.[ii] The sanctions are in response to his role in facilitating the flow of foreign funds to the military junta that is responsible for the attempted coup and ongoing atrocities against the people of Myanmar.
We would like to draw your attention to the current political situation in Myanmar. As you are likely to be aware, a democratic general election was held in Myanmar on November 8, 2020. In a landslide victory, the voters elected a government led by the incumbent National League for Democracy party. Independent national and international election observers unanimously concluded[iii] [iv] [v] that the election was free and fair, and the result represented the will of the Myanmar people.
Yet, on February 1, 2021, the Myanmar military launched an illegal coup attempt. Since then, an illegal and illegitimate military junta has seized multiple institutions of government, including domestic ministries and overseas embassies, and attempted to pose as the government of Myanmar. The junta refers to itself as the ‘State Administrative Council’ (SAC), even though it has neither the authority to hold government office nor effective control over the majority of Myanmar’s territories, which are under the administration of the democratic resistance movement and ethnic administration bodies.[vi]
Under the guise of the SAC, the military junta has launched a nationwide campaign of heinous crimes against the people of Myanmar in an attempt to suppress and control them. Since the attempted coup, the military has killed 4,202 people and imprisoned 19,721 more.[vii] The military has committed massacres, indiscriminate airstrikes, artillery shelling, torture, sexual and gender-based violence and mass arson. As a result of these crimes, almost 2 million people have been forced to flee their homes[viii] since the attempted coup began and tens of thousands more have been forced to flee to neighboring countries. Such atrocities amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity, and these have been committed by the same military that stands accused of genocide and other gross crimes against the Rohingya before the International Court of Justice, the International Criminal Court and in the universal jurisdiction case in Argentina. Thus, it would be an affront to democracy and the people of Myanmar to include a military junta member as an international representative of Myanmar.
The Myanmar military junta’s ability to gain and retain power depends on violence, coercion, access to funds, arms and other resources, and importantly, the blanket impunity it has enjoyed through the absence of overdue justice and accountability. Further, when foreign governments and public institutions engage with the military junta as though it were a government, this risks significant harms for the people of Myanmar, including:
Further, the Myanmar military junta is a criminal organisation which is involved in widespread systemic corruption. During the rule of the previous military junta, the military consolidated its control over Myanmar’s key industries through a vast network of state-owned and military-controlled business entities operating in energy, raw materials, food, beverages, alcohol, tobacco, banking, construction, logistics, agriculture, real estate and international trade markets.[ix] These provide billions in revenue from across the economy, enabling the military junta to corruptly fund its campaign of terror against the people of Myanmar. The major business entities controlled by the Myanmar military are all currently subject to sanctions from one or more governments of the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, Australia and the European Union.[x]
The planned venue of the 2023 Busan Global Partnership Forum, Lotte Hotel in Seoul, is owned by Lotte Corporation,[xi] a company which is implicated in the Myanmar military’s corrupt business network through a joint enterprise.[xii] Research by civil society organisations found that Lotte Corporation is also an investor in the Lotte Hotel and Serviced Apartments complex in Yangon, Myanmar. This complex is built on land leased from the Myanmar Army’s Office of the Quartermaster General of the Commander-in-Chief, under a build-operate-transfer agreement. Under this agreement, the military will take control of the complex following a maximum 70-year lease. Meanwhile, investors in the Lotte Hotel complex are paying millions of US dollars in fees to the Office of the Quartermaster General.[xiii] Lotte Corporation is a co-investor in the complex alongside Spirit Paradise Services which is owned by Ne Aung, the brother of the Commander-in-Chief of the Myanmar Navy, Moe Aung and a longtime Myanmar military crony. Ne Aung is also an owner of the conglomerate, IGE, which was sanctioned by the European Union in February 2022 for providing financial support to companies linked to the Myanmar military and for their genocide against the Rohingya in 2017.[xiv] [xv] Thus, holding the 2023 Busan Global Partnership Forum in the Lotte Hotel will provide financial support to a company that is supporting and benefiting from the Myanmar military’s corrupt business network.[xvi] This would involve acting in contradiction to the recommendations of the United Nations’ Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar[xvii], the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights[xviii] and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.[xix]
In addition, serious questions remain over the military junta’s use of international development assistance and emergency funds. For example, in 2021 following the junta’s attempted coup, US$171 million went missing from a large loan that the International Monetary Fund had provided to help Myanmar combat the COVID-19 virus.[xx] The UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar has warned the international community about the risk of the military junta weaponising aid.[xxi] To invite a military junta member to take part in an international meeting under the theme “Delivering Better Together to Drive Action at the Country Level: Leveraging Effective Development Cooperation to Tackle Current Crises” while the military junta is itself engaged in mass-scale corruption, which may involve misappropriation of crisis funding, is both contradictory and egregious.
In consideration of the above, we kindly request that you ensure that the 2023 Busan Global Partnership Forum does not provide political support and false legitimacy to the Myanmar military junta.
Specifically, we are seeking your support and confirmation that for this event and all other GPEDC meetings and events:
This request echoes the recommendation of the United Nations Special Rapporteur for the situation of human rights in Myanmar[xxii] who urges that “Member States who support human rights, democracy, and the aspirations of the people of Myanmar publicly reject the SAC’s false claim as a legitimate government and instead recognize the NUG as the legitimate representative of the people of Myanmar.”
It is also in line with the recommendations of the United Nations Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar which conducted an in-depth analysis of businesses linked to the Myanmar military. The Mission found that real estate is a major revenue stream for the Myanmar military and strongly advised against entering into or remaining in a business relationship of any kind with the Myanmar military.[xxiii]
Your decision to ensure that the people of Myanmar are represented by their democratically elected government, not the illegal military junta, would be consistent with the decision of your Swiss colleagues who organised the 2022 Effective Development Cooperation Summit and revoked an invitation that arrived to Myanmar military junta members. Further, it would also be in line with the United Nations’ decision to avoid allowing military junta members to represent Myanmar in the General Assembly,[xxiv] as well as some recent decisions of ASEAN not to invite representatives of the military junta to high-level meetings.[xxv] [xxvi]
The democratically elected National Unity Government can be contacted via the details provided on their official website. The National Unity Government’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs also has a representative in Korea, U Yan Naing Htun, who can be contacted via his official Facebook page. We encourage you to formulate a relationship with him, if you have not done so already. If you require further information about the current situation in Myanmar, and/or assistance in distinguishing legitimate government representatives of Myanmar from illegal military junta members, we remain at your disposal to assist in this process.
We look forward to your positive response and will continue to monitor whether your actions support the people of Myanmar or the brutal and illegitimate military junta.
Sincerely,
This letter is endorsed by 660 organisations representing Myanmar regional and international civil society, including the 388 organisations listed below and 272 organisations which have chosen not to disclose their names.
List of organisations:
[i] Official Journal of the European Union, Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/2177 of 8 November 2022 implementing Regulation (EU) No 401/2013 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Myanmar/Burma, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=OJ:L:2022:286I:FULL
[ii] US Department of the Treasury – Office of Foreign Assets Control, Burma-related Designations; Counter Narcotics Designations Removals; Issuance of Burma-related Directive 1 and Frequently Asked Questions, 31 October 2023, https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20231031
[iii] Domestic Election Observer Organizations, Joint Statement by Domestic Election Observer Organizations, 29 January 2021, https://drive.google.com/file/d/1eLc0m-nFWorVCbucKBa8E9E2IsZo4_uW/preview
[iv] Reiner M. Antiquerra, John; Buenaobra, Maribel; Chung Lun, Lee & Vier, Amaël, The 2020 Myanmar General Elections: Democracy Under Attack – ANFREL International Election Observer Mission Report, Asian Network for Free Elections, 2021, https://anfrel.org/anfrel-releases-2020-myanmar-general-elections-final-observation-mission-report/
[v] The Carter Center, Election observation mission, Myanmar, general election, November 8, 2020, Preliminary Statement, 10 November 2020, https://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/news/peace_publications/election_reports/myanmar-preliminary-statement-112020.pdf
[vi] Briefing Paper: Effective Control in Myanmar, Special Advisory Council for Myanmar, 5 September 2022, https://specialadvisorycouncil.org/2022/09/briefing-effective-control-myanmar/
[vii] Assistance Association For Political Prisoners (Burma), Daily briefing, 27 November 2023, https://aappb.org/?p=26812
[viii] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Myanmar Emergency Overview Map: Number of people displaced since Feb 2021 and remain displaced (as of 20 Nov 2023), 23 November 2023, https://reliefweb.int/map/myanmar/myanmar-emergency-overview-map-number-people-displaced-feb-2021-and-remain-displaced-20-nov-2023
[ix] United Nations, The economic interests of the Myanmar military – Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar, (report addressed to the 42nd session of the United Nations Human Rights Council), August 5 2019, https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/FFMMyanmar/EconomicInterestsMyanmarMilitary/A_HRC_42_CRP_3.pdf
[x] United Nations, The Billion Dollar Death Trade: The International Arms Networks that Enable Human Rights Violations in Myanmar, (Conference room paper of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human
rights in Myanmar), 17 May 2023, https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/myanmar/crp-sr-myanmar-2023-05-17.pdf
[xi] Lotte Corporation, Tourism/Service/Finance – Lotte Hotel, 2023, https://www.lotte.co.kr/global/en/business/compDetail.do?compCd=L423#none
[xii] Reporters Without Borders, ‘Stop funding Myanmar’s generals, RSF tells 10 multinationals’, 8 April 2021, https://rsf.org/en/stop-funding-myanmar-s-generals-rsf-tells-10-multinationals
[xiii] Justice For Myanmar, Developing a Dictatorship – how governments and international organisations are supporting the illegal Myanmar military junta – and what must be done to stop this, January 2023, https://www.justiceformyanmar.org/stories/developing-a-dictatorship
[xiv] European Union, Council implementing regulation (EU) 2022/239 of 21 February 2022 implementing Regulation (EU) No 401/2013 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Myanmar/Burma, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.L_.2022.040.01.0010.01.ENG&toc=OJ%3AL%3A2022%3A040%3AFULL
[xv] European Union, Council implementing regulation (EU) 2022/243 of 21 February 2022 amending Decision 2013/184/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Myanmar/Burma, Official Journal of the European Union, Volume 65, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.L_.2022.040.01.0028.01.ENG&toc=OJ%3AL%3A2022%3A040%3AFULL
[xvi] International Entrepreneur Group, Our Management, 2022, https://www.ige.com.mm/our-management
[xvii] United Nations, The economic interests of the Myanmar military – Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar (report addressed to the 42nd session of the United Nations Human Rights Council), 5 August 2019, https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/FFM-Myanmar/EconomicInterestsMyanmarMilitary/A_HRC_42_CRP_3.pdf
[xviii] United Nations, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, 2011, https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf
[xix] Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD Guidelines
for Multinational Enterprises – 2011 edition, https://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/48004323.pdf
[xx] Visser, Anrike, ‘Myanmar’s Missing Millions’, The Diplomat, 3 November 2021, [accessed online], https://thediplomat.com/2021/11/myanmars-missing-millions/
[xxi] Thomas Andrews, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Thomas H. Andrews, [Advance unedited version of the report to the 49th session of the United Nations Human Rights Council, A/HRC/49/76], April 2022, https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G22/378/17/PDF/G2237817.pdf?OpenElement
[xxii] Thomas Andrews, Illegal and Illegitimate: Examining the Myanmar military’s claim as the Government of Myanmar and the international response Conference room paper of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar (A/HRC/52/CRP.2), 31 January 2023, https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/mm/2023-01-27/crp-sr-myanmar-2023-01-31.pdf
[xxiii] United Nations, The economic interests of the Myanmar military – Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar (report addressed to the 42nd session of the United Nations Human Rights Council), 5 August 2019, https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/FFM-Myanmar/EconomicInterestsMyanmarMilitary/A_HRC_42_CRP_3.pdf
[xxiv] United Nations, General Assembly defers decision on Afghanistan and Myanmar seats, 6 December 2021, https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/12/1107262
[xxv] Radio Free Asia, Cambodia Postpones First ASEAN Meeting Amid Differences Among Members, Voice of America, 13 January 2022, https://www.voanews.com/a/cambodia-postpones-first-asean-meeting-amid-differencesamong-members-/6395847.html
[xxvi] The Straits Times/Asia News Network, Myanmar junta snubbed at Asean defense chiefs’ meet, The Inquirer, 23 November 2022, https://globalnation.inquirer.net/208753/myanmar-junta-snubbed-at-asean-defense-chiefsmeet