

Summary of Monthly Situation Update for April 2026



May 12, 2026

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
6. Policy Recommendations

Every month BHRN provides a summary of situation update for the previous month's important event in Burma. More detailed information for each paragraph contained in the update is available in more details upon request.

Methodology

This report is based on primary and secondary sources, including on-the-ground documentation by BHRN and other human rights groups and media reports from trusted national and international outlets. It provides a detailed analysis of key events during the month, situating them within international legal frameworks and offers policy recommendations to guide international responses, humanitarian action, and justice efforts.


For more information about any of the incidents documented in this report, or to request interviews or supporting materials, please contact Kyaw Win, Executive Director of BHRN at kyawwin@bhrn.org.uk.




Short Video for Summary of Situation Update - April 2026



1. Info-graphs of BHRN's Report







Monthly Situation Update

April 2026


Total Killed in April, 2026




Total Killed - Gender Ratio (April, 2026)




Total Killed - Gender Ratio (Feb, 2021 - Apr, 2026)



Total Killed in Feb, 2021 - April, 2026






Monthly Situation Update

April 2026

Torture & Extra Judicial Killing



This data were estimated based on information from local medias and local networks




Monthly Situation Update


April 2026





Arson attack on civilians in different Regions(April, 2026)



Arson attack on civilians in different Regions(Sep, 2021 - Apr, 2026)





• This data were estimated based on information from local networks and local medias



Monthly Situation Update

April 2026

Rohingya arrested for travelling without official permission

Arrested in April

11 persons



7



4

Arrested in Feb, 2021 - Apr, 2026

5166 persons




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



1946

Arrested in Feb 2021 - Apr. 2026

The number of Rohingya being arrested





This Month in Myanmar - April 2026

2. News Summary and Analysis

In April, accused war criminal Min Aung Hlaing was [sworn in as president](#) following fraudulent elections that the United Nations, ASEAN, and the European Union rejected as failing to meet any democratic standard. Within days, he [imposed martial law across 60 townships](#) in six states and three regions, authorising military tribunals to try and execute civilians. A new Anti-Money Laundering Law granted the Ministry of Home Affairs warrantless powers of interception, arrest, and asset seizure. His 100-day peace plan, which required resistance forces to surrender as a precondition for talks, was [immediately rejected](#) by the Karen National Union, Chin National Front, and National Unity Government. Internationally, the European Union [extended its sanctions](#) through April 2027, while Thailand declared its intention to

reintegrate the junta into ASEAN despite five years of non-compliance with the Five-Point Consensus. A genocide complaint was filed against Min Aung Hlaing in Indonesia under universal jurisdiction, joining proceedings at the ICJ, ICC, and in Argentina and Timor-Leste. On 30 March, the [Steering Council for the Emergence of a Federal Democratic Union](#) was announced, bringing together the NUG, CRPH, KNU, KIO, KNPP, and CNF under a joint political and military framework.

Throughout April, junta forces bombed, shelled, and burned civilian areas across Rakhine, Sagaing, Mandalay, Karenni, Karen, Chin, and Kachin, killing and injuring civilians including children. BHRN documented two incidents through primary witness testimony: a gyrocopter attack on a displacement site in Monywa Township that killed 15 civilians with no armed groups present, and the overnight detention and abuse of 15 Muslim Kaman civilians at an Arakan Army checkpoint in Taungup District on grounds of religion alone, the third such incident since January 2026. More than [250 Rohingya and Bangladeshi nationals were feared dead](#) after a trawler capsized in the Andaman Sea. On the military front, junta forces recaptured Falam in Chin State after a six-month offensive. Resistance forces seized the Kabawtu base in Hpapun District, Karen State, ending nearly 30 years of junta control, and ambushed a junta column in Myingyan Township killing at least 25 soldiers. Defections from junta ranks continued across multiple fronts.

3. Political, Legal, and International Developments Affecting Myanmar

1. Min Aung Hlaing Assumes the Presidency: Military Rule in Civilian Clothing

On 10 April, accused war criminal Min Aung Hlaing was [sworn in as Myanmar's president](#) following fraudulent elections in December 2025 and January 2026 that the United Nations, ASEAN, the European Union, and the governments of numerous states rejected as failing to meet any international standard for democratic legitimacy. He was voted into office by a junta-controlled parliament in which the military and its proxy, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), hold 505 of 586 seats. That supermajority was engineered through five years of mass atrocities, the forced dissolution of the National League for Democracy, the imprisonment of its leadership, and the exclusion of parties that had won 90 percent of seats in the last genuine election in 2020. The ANFREL and Special Advisory Council for Myanmar concluded in their [joint April 2026 report](#) that the elections were 'a means to entrench military control over the levers of state' and not a democratic opening.

The [cabinet Min Aung Hlaing formed on 10 April](#) is dominated by recently retired military officers. The three ministers who hold automatic seats on the National Defence and Security Council, Defence, Home Affairs, and Foreign Affairs, are all

serving or recently retired military figures. Min Aung Hlaing also proposed expanding the government to 31 ministries led by 30 ministers, up from 25 under the democratically elected NLD administration. The Pyidaungsu Hluttaw approved the restructuring on 7 April. Six new portfolios were created, including Women Affairs, Youth Affairs, Digital Development and Communications, and a second President's Office ministry, extending the military's patronage network and creating new administrative instruments for political control.

Overseeing the military, Min Aung Hlaing no longer officially commands is [Ye Win Oo, elevated to Commander-in-Chief on 30 March](#). He led the military's intelligence apparatus and is the [first intelligence chief in Myanmar's history to hold the post](#), having graduated from the Officers Training School rather than the Defence Services Academy. He personally directed the arrests of State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi and President Win Myint on 1 February 2021. The [Myanmar Defence and Security Institute described Ye Win Oo](#) as an officer with a documented record of dismantling opposition networks through torture and human rights violations at military interrogation centres.

Why It Matters:

Min Aung Hlaing holds the presidency, chairs the Union Consultative Council that sits above every branch of the state, and the military retains constitutional authority over defence, home affairs, and border affairs regardless of which civilian titles its officers now carry. States that engage with or confer recognition on this administration are not engaging with a civilian government. They are legitimising the military dictatorship responsible for the deaths of more than 8,000 civilians since the 2021 coup.

2. Martial Law Imposed Across 60 Townships

On 23 April, Min Aung Hlaing issued [Ordinance 2/2026, imposing martial law across 60 townships](#) in Kachin, Kayah, Kayin, Chin, Shan, and Rakhine States and in Sagaing, Magway, and Mandalay Regions for 90 days. The 15 Shan State townships covered by the ordinance include Namtu, Mabein, Kutkai, Namkham, Hsenwi, Kunlong, Namhsan, Manton, Hopang, Laukkai, Konkyan, Momeik, Kyaukme, Hsipaw, and Mongla. The ordinances transfer all executive and judicial authority to Commander-in-Chief Ye Win Oo and authorise military tribunals to try civilians with sentences up to and including the death penalty. The affected townships include areas under the control of the Arakan Army, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, and the Ta'ang National Liberation Army, including groups that had signed ceasefire understandings with the junta. The official justification of ending 'armed terrorism' and restoring 'the rule of law' inverts reality. The townships named are those where the junta has lost effective control, and the ordinances create a legal mechanism to

assert authority that the military cannot establish through military means alone.

Why It Matters:

Martial law in 60 townships strips civilians of any remaining judicial protection at the moment they are most exposed to military violence. The pattern documented across Sagaing, Chin, Rakhine, and Karen States in this monthly report, including airstrikes on civilian villages, arson campaigns, and arbitrary killing, already operates without meaningful domestic legal constraint. These ordinances remove even the formal requirement for military commanders to answer to civilian courts. Military tribunals operating in active conflict zones, with death penalty authority over civilians and without independent oversight, are instruments of terror. The first major legislative act of Min Aung Hlaing's presidency is the formalisation of impunity.

3. Anti-Money Laundering Law: Financial Controls Weaponised Against Political Opponents

The [Anti-Money Laundering Law \(2026\)](#), enacted by the National Defence and Security Council on 11 March and published in English translation on 20 April, is one of at least 22 laws amended or enacted by the junta in the first three and a half months of 2026 ahead of Min Aung Hlaing's assumption of the presidency. The law authorises the Ministry of Home Affairs to conduct investigations, intercept communications, and execute arrests and asset seizures without a court warrant, including in cases designated as having a political dimension. It explicitly permits the investigation and prosecution of current political officeholders and civil servants. It also empowers the Ministry to apply these powers to the assets of Ethnic Armed Organisations and resistance forces on the basis that they engage in money laundering.

The junta has presented the law as a compliance measure aligned with Financial Action Task Force recommendations. [Myanmar has been on the FATF blacklist since October 2022](#), and the framing is designed to project regulatory credibility to international financial institutions. In practice, [ISP-Myanmar's analysis](#) identifies three distinct operational purposes. The first is positioning for potential removal from the FATF blacklist to ease international financial restrictions on the regime. The second is targeting the financial assets and infrastructure of Ethnic Armed Organisations and People's Defence Forces. The third is creating a legal instrument for Min Aung Hlaing to discipline or eliminate rival power centres within his own administration.

Why It Matters:

A law that authorises warrantless interception, arrest, and seizure wherever authorities designate a political dimension gives the Ministry of Home Affairs, headed by a military officer on the National Defence and Security Council, unrestricted power to target any individual or organisation the junta chooses to frame as a money laundering threat. The explicit inclusion of political officeholders as subjects of investigation is not an administrative oversight. It is a mechanism to discipline individuals within the new pseudo-civilian framework who fall out of favour with Min Aung Hlaing. The [FATF February 2026 plenary](#) stated explicitly that if Myanmar makes no further progress by June 2026, countermeasures, the most severe tool in FATF's framework, currently applied only to Iran and North Korea, will be considered. States and institutions considering Myanmar's removal from the FATF blacklist on the basis of this law should scrutinise its provisions carefully. Treating a warrantless surveillance and asset seizure law as a credible counter-money laundering reform rewards the legal architecture the junta is deploying against its own people, and risks providing grounds to relieve the financial pressure that FATF's blacklisting maintains.

4. Forced Conscription Institutionalised Under the New Presidency

The People's Military Service Law of 2010, reactivated by the junta in February 2024, continued to be enforced and expanded throughout April under Min Aung Hlaing's presidency. The junta has now conducted more than 20 conscription training batches. [ISP-Myanmar and the Shan Herald Agency for News estimate approximately 100,000 people have been forcibly conscripted](#) since the law came into force. The first cohort to complete its initial service period did so in April 2026 and a replacement batch was immediately ordered, confirming that forced conscription is no longer an emergency measure but a permanent feature of the junta's military structure. The junta's own population data records more than 1.12 million Myanmar nationals currently living abroad, a figure that reflects in significant part the scale of flight driven by conscription avoidance.

The law subjects men aged 18 to 35 and women aged 18 to 27 to compulsory military service, with evasion punishable by up to five years' imprisonment. A [NUG Ministry of Human Rights report](#) documented the mechanisms of forced recruitment in practice, including abductions from streets, markets, and public transport, coercion of local administrators to compile draft lists under threat of punishment, and extortion of families unable to pay bribes to secure exemptions. Conscripts are deployed to active conflict fronts where the junta has a documented record of committing war crimes against civilian populations.

Why It Matters:

Forced conscription violates the international prohibition on forced labour. Where conscripts are compelled to participate in attacks on civilian populations, criminal liability extends to those who designed and enforce the programme. The institutionalisation of a second conscription cycle under the new presidency signals that the scale of these violations will increase. It also places the junta's neighbours in a direct accountability relationship. [Fortify Rights documented](#) that Thailand forcibly returned approximately 3,500 Myanmar nationals into conscription and torture systems between February 2024 and November 2025. Regional governments that treat this as a domestic Myanmar matter, while their own border management practices actively feed the programme's operation cannot credibly distance themselves from its consequences.

5. The 100-Day 'Peace' Plan

On 11 April, one day after assuming the presidency, Min Aung Hlaing established the National Solidarity and Peace-making Central Committee, a 15-member body he chairs himself, and invited signatories and non-signatories of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement to [join peace talks by 31 July 2026](#). On 20 April, he told his cabinet that 43 constitutional amendments agreed with Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement signatories would be submitted to parliament. He simultaneously demanded that People's Defence Force units return to the 'legal fold' within the same period as a precondition for participation. That condition requires resistance forces to place themselves under the jurisdiction of a military administration that has killed more than 8,000 civilians since the 2021 coup, accept the authority of a constitution designed to guarantee military supremacy, and abandon the political mandate for which they are fighting. It is a demand for unconditional surrender presented as a negotiating invitation.

The Karen National Union, the Chin National Front, and the National Unity Government [all rejected the overture immediately](#). KNU spokesperson Saw Taw Nee stated that the organisation had withdrawn from the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement since the 2021 coup and had no plans to return to negotiations under that framework. CNF spokesperson Salai Htet Ni said his organisation sought a federal democratic system free of military dictatorship. China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited Naypyidaw on 19 April, lending diplomatic backing to the initiative, consistent with Beijing's longstanding preference for a settlement that preserves the junta's central role while stabilising border trade routes and infrastructure investment.

Why It Matters:

The 100-day plan was announced while the junta was expanding its military offensive in Chin State, imposing martial law across 60 townships, and conducting

ongoing airstrikes on civilian populations across Sagaing, Magway, and Rakhine. A peace overture issued under those conditions is not a good-faith process. The Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement framework Min Aung Hlaing invoked was designed for a pre-coup context in which a nominal civilian government existed. Applying it now requires armed resistance groups to negotiate with the entity that destroyed that government. International actors who treat the 31 July deadline as a genuine diplomatic process should understand that doing so provides political cover for ongoing atrocity crimes without requiring the junta to reduce the violence that makes genuine dialogue impossible.

6. Accountability: Universal Jurisdiction Advances as Impunity Continues

On 6 April, three days after pro-military lawmakers voted him president, Min Aung Hlaing was confronted with a [criminal complaint filed against him in Jakarta](#) by the Myanmar Accountability Project and Rohingya genocide survivor Yasmin Ullah, co-founder of the Rohingya Maiyafuinor Collaborative Network. The complaint was filed under universal jurisdiction, alleging Min Aung Hlaing committed genocidal acts against the Rohingya. 'I urge the Indonesian authorities to uphold the rule of law and hold the Myanmar dictatorship to account. The junta has become a regional embarrassment and this genocide case sends a powerful signal that impunity for the crime of crimes must end,' Ullah [said](#). The Indonesia case joins [The Gambia's genocide case before the International Court of Justice](#), the International Criminal Court, where [Prosecutor Karim Khan requested an arrest warrant for Min Aung Hlaing](#) in November 2024 for crimes against humanity against the Rohingya, and universal jurisdiction cases in Argentina and Timor-Leste. In the United Kingdom, [11 Members of Parliament signed Early Day Motion 526](#), formally supporting the ICC prosecutor's warrant request.

On 9 April, [Fortify Rights called on the ICC to expand its Myanmar investigation](#) to include new evidence of a massacre of Rohingya civilians by the Arakan Army in Hoyyar Siri, Buthidaung Township, Rakhine State, on 2 May 2024. Fortify Rights interviewed 15 survivors and eyewitnesses between March and November 2025. Multiple witnesses described Arakan Army forces stopping hundreds of fleeing Rohingya civilians on a road toward downtown Buthidaung and opening fire on them after an order was given in the Rakhine language to 'kill them all.' Scores were killed. Survivors described Arakan Army soldiers returning to shoot those still alive, and Arakan Army officers subsequently forcing survivors to attribute the killings to the junta's military. The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights independently documented the same massacre in an August 2025 report. Fortify Rights also called on UN member states to impose targeted sanctions on the Arakan Army and commanders implicated in serious human rights violations.

On 28 April, outgoing UN Special Rapporteur on Myanmar Tom Andrews published his [final report, From Impunity to Justice](#). The report called on the international community to broaden the ICC investigation, expand universal jurisdiction prosecutions, establish a reparations fund for victims, and prepare for the implementation of the forthcoming ICJ judgment in *The Gambia v. Myanmar*. Andrews documented how decades of military impunity created the conditions for the 2021 coup and the escalation of violence that followed, and urged states to treat accountability as an immediate operational priority.

Why It Matters:

The filing in Indonesia is significant in two respects. Indonesia is an ASEAN member and the world's largest Muslim-majority country, and its engagement with the Rohingya genocide as a legal matter, rather than a diplomatic abstraction, is a direct counterweight to Thailand's simultaneous push for junta reintegration into the bloc. The Fortify Rights documentation of the Hoyyar Siri massacre reinforces that the ICC's existing jurisdiction, rooted in the forced deportation of Rohingya to Bangladesh, can be used to pursue accountability for Arakan Army crimes as well as junta crimes. Accountability cannot be selective. The body of proceedings now advancing across five jurisdictions represents growing legal pressure on the junta's new administration, and it must be matched by the political will to enforce outcomes when courts issue their findings.

7. EU Renews Sanctions; Thailand Moves to Rehabilitate the Junta Within ASEAN

On 27 April, the European Union [extended its restrictive measures against Myanmar](#) through 30 April 2027, maintaining asset freezes and travel bans on 105 individuals and 22 entities, an arms embargo, and export bans on dual-use goods and surveillance technology. One deceased individual was removed from the list as part of the annual review, bringing the total from 106 to 105. The Council cited 'the continuing grave situation in Myanmar, including actions undermining democracy, as well as serious human rights violations.' The measures have been in place since February 2021.

Thailand moved in the opposite direction. On 22 April, [Thai Foreign Minister Sihasak Phuangketkeow visited Naypyidaw](#) and declared that Bangkok wanted to serve as a bridge for Myanmar's return to ASEAN, framing that would extend regional institutional legitimacy to an entity responsible for five years of atrocity crimes and non-compliance with the Five-Point Consensus Min Aung Hlaing agreed to in April 2021 and never implemented. The Philippines, as 2026 ASEAN Chair, stated it would continue engaging relevant authorities and stakeholders in Myanmar through Special Envoy Theresa Lazaro, stopping short of recognition while maintaining

contact. China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited Naypyidaw on 19 April. Beijing remains one of the very few governments to have publicly congratulated Min Aung Hlaing on the election outcome and continues to serve as the junta's primary arms supplier and diplomatic shield at the UN Security Council.

Military sources and resistance groups [reported in early April](#) that advanced Chinese-manufactured VTOL fixed-wing UAVs arrived at Myanmar's Northwestern Regional Military Command. The drones are equipped with thermal imaging, have an operational range of approximately 200 miles, and are capable of carrying out aerial bombing missions in addition to surveillance. The Myanmar military already uses Chinese-made DJI surveillance drones across multiple conflict zones. [BNI-Myanmar Peace Monitor documented 26 junta drone attacks](#) on civilian villages, displacement camps, hospitals, and schools between January and late February 2026 alone, killing 11 civilians and injuring 24 others.

Why It Matters:

The EU renewed existing measures without expanding them in a month when Min Aung Hlaing assumed the presidency, martial law was imposed across 60 townships, and advanced Chinese drone technology with bombing capability arrived at a junta military command. The EU's arms embargo and export restrictions contain no explicit provision covering aviation fuel, the supply of which enables the Burma Air Force to conduct the sustained airstrike campaigns documented across Sagaing, Chin, Rakhine, and Karen States in this report. Closing that gap is a precondition for any sanctions framework that takes civilian protection seriously. ASEAN reintegration on current terms would hand the junta the regional legitimacy it has spent five years committing mass atrocities to obtain. The delivery of advanced UAV technology underscores the urgent need for secondary measures targeting the full supply chain of weapons, aviation fuel, and military technology reaching the junta.

4. Resistance Updates

[Junta forces recaptured Falam in Chin State on 25 April](#) after a six-month offensive. Resistance forces seized a junta outpost in Karen State's Hpapun Township, ambushed a junta column in Mandalay Region, and recorded ongoing People's Defence Force operations across Sagaing. On 30 March, the Steering Council for the Emergence of a Federal Democratic Union was announced, bringing together the NUG, the CRPH, the Karen National Union, the Kachin Independence Organisation, the Karenni National Progressive Party, and the Chin National Front under a joint political and military framework.

Chin State: Falam Falls After Six-Month Junta Offensive

[Junta forces recaptured Falam on 25 April, ending a year of Chin Brotherhood control.](#) Falam is Chin State's second largest town after the capital Hakha, located 66 kilometres to the north. The junta launched its offensive in October 2025 and conducted more than 100 ground engagements over six months, supported by daily airstrikes from jet fighters, Y-8 and Y-12 aircraft, and Mi-35 helicopters. [Chin World reported that Surbung Airport, adjacent to Falam, also fell on 25 April,](#) restoring the junta's capacity to airlift reinforcements and supplies into northern Chin State. Fighting in Falam Township continued after the town fell. Clashes were reported in the villages of Laizo, Lungpi, and Rial Tii on 26 April as junta forces advanced along the Falam-Hakha road.

On 14 April, the Chin National Defence Force seized a junta forward camp in Falam Township, capturing weapons and ammunition. The camp had served as a staging position for regime forces advancing on the town.

On 29 April, Chin People's Army and Chin People's Union General Secretary Salai Yaw Man [stated that resistance forces in southern Chin State were prepared to defend Mindat.](#) He reported that the force assembled for Mindat's defence was larger than the one that originally captured the town. Resistance forces warned civilians not to use the Kyantaw-Kankyi-Yayshin road and urged households to prepare bomb shelters. Approximately 200 junta troops were reported at Kangyi village in Saw Township, Magway Region, approximately 19 kilometres from Mindat. On 30 April, five junta fighter jets from the Tada-U, Magway, and Aela air bases [conducted at least ten bombing runs over the area between Mindat and Kyaukhtu.](#)

Why It Matters:

Falam sits on the road connecting the junta's Regional Operations Command in Kalay to the Chin State capital of Hakha. Its recapture, combined with the restoration of Surbung Airport, gives the junta a supply corridor through northern Chin State and a platform for ongoing operations toward Hakha and Tedim. Junta forces have since recaptured Kennedy Peak in Tedim Township and are advancing along the Falam-Hakha road. [MoeMaKa analysis](#) published in May 2026 concluded that junta control over central Myanmar's road networks could weaken coordination between resistance fronts in the north, northeast, and west. The junta's recapture of Falam followed the pattern documented elsewhere: months of sustained aerial bombardment against resistance positions that lack air defences. Resistance forces can seize and hold ground against junta infantry. They cannot hold urban positions against that tempo of air attack without countermeasures that have not been provided.

Karen State: Outpost Seized, Seven Junta Positions Besieged

The Karen National Liberation Army [seized the junta's Kabawtu outpost in Hpapun Township, Karen State, on 25 April.](#) Hpapun is in Karen National Union Brigade 5 territory approximately 177 kilometres north of the state capital Hpa-An. KNU Brigade 5 spokesperson Kler Doh confirmed the seizure and stated that seven junta outposts remained in Brigade 5 territory with KNLA and allied forces holding positions around each. Junta forces inside those positions were being resupplied exclusively by Burma Air Force airdrop, indicating they could not be reached by road. Kler Doh reported that resistance forces faced daily Burma Air Force strikes across northern Karen State. Min Aung Hlaing placed Kawkaik and Kyainseikgyi townships in Karen State under martial law on 23 April.

On 22 April, combined Karen National Defence Organisation, Karen National Liberation Army, and Karen National Defence Force units [attacked junta forces near Aung Chan Thar Ywar Thit Monastery in Lewe Township, Naypyidaw Union Territory, killing 10 soldiers.](#)

Sagaing and Mandalay: Ambush on Junta Column

On 30 April, resistance forces in Myingyan Township, Mandalay Region, [ambushed a junta column that had been burning villages and looting civilian property.](#) Resistance sources reported at least 25 soldiers killed and three military vehicles destroyed, including a vehicle transporting drone equipment. The attack followed weeks of documented junta operations across Pale, Yinmabin, and Myingyan townships in which approximately 600 regime troops conducted raids and arson attacks, burning scores of houses and displacing more than 10,000 residents.

People's Defence Force units maintained siege positions around junta-held Indaw town in northern Sagaing throughout April. Junta troops in Indaw were confined to a fortified hill position and resupplied only by air. Clashes continued in Katha Township as junta troops conducted reconnaissance from the town. Junta forces subsequently recaptured Indaw in early May 2026.

Defections and Prisoner of War Captures

[Five soldiers from Pakokku Division 101 defected with their weapons in late April.](#)

People's Goal documented 16 police and military personnel joining resistance-aligned forces and 14 captured as prisoners of war during the third week of April. In Bokpyin Township, Tanintharyi Region, [a conscripted soldier from Light Infantry Battalion 224 defected with his weapons](#) to Kawthaung District Battalion 1. Armed defections by conscripts were recorded across multiple fronts throughout the month.

Spring Revolution Alliance Forces: Fifth Anniversary and SCEF Formation

On 27 April, the Spring Revolution Alliance Forces marked their fifth anniversary at their central headquarters. The SAF reported more than 100 clashes, five base captures, 50 prisoners of war taken, and 35 Civil Disobedience Movement personnel received into its ranks over five years. At the anniversary ceremony the SAF released 11 detainees and reduced the punishments of others in custody. The organisation announced it would extend operations into the central plains to target junta arms factories, alongside continuing guerrilla, drone, and rocket operations in Upper Myanmar and Sagaing Region.

On 30 March, the [Steering Council for the Emergence of a Federal Democratic Union was formally announced](#). The SCEF comprises the National Unity Government, the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, the Karen National Union, the Kachin Independence Organisation, the Karenni National Progressive Party, and the Chin National Front. The founding statement established the body on three pillars: representation of states and federal units, representation of Ethnic Revolutionary Organisations and the public, and representation of women. Its six political objectives include removing the military from politics, abolishing the 2008 Constitution, drafting a new federal democratic constitution, and implementing transitional justice. [The Special Advisory Council for Myanmar described the SCEF](#) as the most significant formal alliance between legacy Ethnic Revolutionary Organisations and federal democratic entities since the 2021 coup. The SCEF is the first framework to establish a joint command structure across these actors. Several major armed organisations, including the Arakan Army, the United Wa State Army, the MNDA, and the TNLA, are not among the founding members.

Why It Matters:

How the SCEF functions in practice will determine its significance. The NUG and ethnic armed organisations have coordinated militarily since Operation 1027 in 2023 while governing their respective territories independently. The SCEF addresses a documented coordination gap by establishing a formal joint structure. [Analysis published in April 2026](#) identified the key challenges as defining the role of the National Unity Consultative Council within the new framework, persuading organisations outside the founding membership, particularly the Arakan Army, to join, and building administrative and service-delivery capacity across member territories. Whether the SCEF produces operational unity or remains a political statement will become apparent over the coming months, particularly if junta offensives force rapid decisions about reinforcement and resource-sharing across fronts.

5. On the Ground: Escalating Violence and Human Rights Violations

In April, junta forces carried out airstrikes, gyrocopter attacks, artillery bombardments, drone strikes, naval shelling, arson operations, and arbitrary killings across Rakhine, Sagaing, Mandalay, Karenni, Karen, Chin, and Kachin States and Regions. Civilian sites attacked during the month included IDP shelters, monasteries, villages, a mining community, and a fundraising rally. Children were among the dead in multiple incidents. The Arakan Army detained 15 Muslim civilians at a checkpoint, abducted a Rohingya religious leader, and subjected more than 350 Rohingya to forced conscription in Rakhine State. As of 29 April, 30,917 people had been arrested since the 2021 coup and 22,047 remained detained. These incidents reflect ongoing violations of international humanitarian and human rights law, including potential war crimes and crimes against humanity under the Rome Statute.

1. Targeted attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure

Under international humanitarian law, civilians must never be the object of attack. Article 8(2)(e)(i) of the Rome Statute prohibits attacks intentionally directed against civilians in non-international armed conflicts. When such attacks form part of a widespread or systematic campaign against the civilian population, they may amount to crimes against humanity under Article 7(1), including murder (Art. 7(1)(a)), persecution (Art. 7(1)(h)), and other inhumane acts (Art. 7(1)(k)).

- **1 April - Thandwe Township, Rakhine State:** At approximately 10:00 a.m., four junta fighter jets dropped bombs near the No. 55 Infantry Battalion at Ngapali Beach, while a junta naval vessel fired heavy artillery into the township. A family of four displaced from Kyauktaw Township was killed, including a 2-year-old girl and a 7-year-old girl, along with two women. A 3-year-old girl, a 28-year-old woman from Kyeintali town in Gwa Township, and an 8-year-old girl from Thandwe Township were also injured.
- **3 April - Myingyan Township, Mandalay Region:** Junta forces killed seven civilians using drones and gunfire in a village in the township.
- **6 April - Sinin village, Shwebo Township, Sagaing Region:** Burma Air Force airstrikes killed a 38-year-old Buddhist monk and two women aged 60. Eight civilians, including two girls, were injured at the monastery. Two pagodas, ten homes, a school, and an unknown number of shelters inside the monastery were destroyed.
- **7 to 9 April - Palauk Town, Myeik District, Tanintharyi Region:** Approximately 1,000 combined KNU/KNLA and PDF forces encircled Palauk town beginning 7 April, surrounding a junta artillery base. The junta conducted airstrikes on Pyitkya and Myitkyun Su villages near the town, forcing civilians to flee and leaving many homes abandoned. Fighting was ongoing as of 9 April. Palauk is home to a Muslim community, including one mosque and a madrasa. The Palauk-Myeik section of the Union Highway was closed due to the conflict. Casualties on either side had not

been confirmed. - BHRN

- **9 April - Andaman Sea:** More than 250 Rohingya and Bangladeshi nationals were feared dead after a trawler travelling from Teknaf, Bangladesh, to Malaysia capsized in heavy seas. The International Organization for Migration linked the disaster to declining humanitarian aid in Cox's Bazar and the deteriorating conditions for Rohingya in Rakhine State.
- **Early April - Pale and Yinmabin Townships, Sagaing Region:** Approximately 600 junta troops conducted raids across both townships, burning scores of houses and displacing more than 10,000 civilians.
- **13 April - Seik Hkun village, Shwebo Township, Sagaing Region, and Tan Zin and Ponnagyun villages, Rakhine State:** Junta jets struck a monastery in Seik Hkun village and two villages in Rakhine State on Thingyan eve, killing two novice monks and injuring eight civilians. Paramotor and gyrocopter strikes were also reported in Shwebo, Ayadaw, and Salingyi townships. A gyrocopter killed an infant in Weikwe village, Salingyi Township.
- **13 April - North Lukan village, Pakokku Township, Mandalay Region:** Junta forces torched the village on Thingyan eve. Nearly 200 homes were destroyed.
- **Mid-April - Talokemyo village tract and Nat Gyi village, Ngazun Township, Mandalay Region:** Junta forces bombed and torched homes in Talokemyo and bulldozed civilian property. Jets bombed a fundraising rally in Nat Gyi village, killing a 15-year-old girl and injuring a dozen civilians.
- **16 April - Kyauk Kar (South) village, Monywa Township, Sagaing Region:** Two gyrocopters from the Northwestern Regional Military Command headquarters dropped two bombs on sites where displaced civilians from Kyauk Kar (South) and Kyauk Kar (North) villages were sheltering in the forest and beside a stream. Fifteen people were killed: eight from Kyauk Kar (South) and seven from Kyauk Kar (North), including at least four children, one of whom was approximately 10 months old. Approximately 20 others were injured. Named victims from Kyauk Kar (South) include Daw Htay (over 60), Daw Than Aye (approximately 47), Daw Moe Thae (approximately 27), Daw Zin Nwe (approximately 25 to 27), Khant Nyein Aung (19 to 20), Maung Htike (19 to 20), Maung Nann (approximately 27), and Maung Zaw Htet Khaing (approximately 23). Named victims also include Ma Hla Aye, Ma Than Aye, Saw Min Aung, Nga Nann, and Nga Phite. No armed groups, People's Defence Forces, or local defence forces were present at the site. There were no clashes in the area before or during the attack. Junta forces had occupied the village for more than nine months and restricted all civilian movement. Villagers who attempted to return to retrieve their belongings were arrested and beaten. Three houses where displaced persons were staying were burned in the attack. The village had been struck approximately five or six times previously by heavy weapons and paramotors.
- (*BHRN documentation: Interviews_01_Myonywa_Sagaing/16Apr26*)
- **16 April - Myothit ward, Dawei, Tanintharyi Region:** A 38-year-old Muslim businessman, Michael (also known as Kyaw Myo Tun), was shot dead in an attack

reported to have been carried out by People's Defence Force members. He was initially struck by a vehicle and, while attempting to flee back to his home with injuries, was pursued and shot inside the house. He died at the scene. His 18-year-old daughter sustained a leg wound. The victim was alleged by local residents to have had ties to the military and to have acted as an informant. Local residents had reportedly submitted complaints about him to the PDF prior to the attack. No arrests were made. - **BHRN**

- **[17 April](#) - Kyet Yoe Pyin village, Maungdaw Township, Rakhine State:** Arakan Army intelligence officers from Boli Bazar abducted Rohingya cleric Maulana Mohamed Kawbir. This was a re-arrest following a previous detention of seven to eight months. His whereabouts remain unknown.
- **[19 April](#) - Wetlet Township, Sagaing Region:** Burma Air Force airstrikes killed one civilian and critically injured two others.
- **[19 April](#) - Ponnagyun, Kyauktaw, and Mrauk-U Townships, Rakhine State:** Two to five regime jets conducted separate airstrikes across all three townships, injuring at least ten civilians in a single day. Security analyst Anthony Davis reported that the Burma Air Force adopted a time-on-target tactic from 30 March under Commander-in-Chief Ye Win Oo, deploying multiple aircraft against a single target simultaneously. He stated the tactic was being used against non-military targets across fourteen Rakhine townships and Chin State's Paletwa Township to spread fear among the civilian population.
- **[20 April](#) - Falam Township, Chin State:** Twin airstrikes destroyed homes in a Falam Township village.
- **[21 to 23 April](#) - West of Sittwe, Rakhine State:** Junta forces deployed heavy weapons and troops across seven locations west of Sittwe, including Sanpya Basa Village Camp, Thae Chaung, Sat Yoke, Ohn Taw Chey/Gyi, Pallin Pyin, Aung Taing, and Ye Chan Pyin. These sites include and immediately surround Rohingya IDP camps holding approximately 150,000 confined Rohingya civilians.
- **[23 to 24 April](#) - Ngapali town, Thandwe Township, Rakhine State:** Burma Air Force airstrikes killed three civilians.
- **[23 and 25 April](#) - Nanmekhon Township, Karenni State:** Junta drone and artillery attacks killed four civilians and injured two others.
- **26 April - Lamu checkpoint, Taungup District, Rakhine State:** Arakan Army police officers detained 13 Muslim Kaman civilians from Thandwe Township who were returning from a 25-day meditation retreat in Kyauk Ni Maw Village, Ramree Township, carrying complete travel documentation issued by ward, township, and district authorities of the Arakan People's Revolutionary Government. Two additional Muslim women who bought food and water for the detainees were also arrested. A Buddhist woman in the same vehicle was released immediately. All 15 were held overnight at the Lamu Sub-township police station. Interrogations were conducted from approximately 8:00 p.m. on 26 April until 2:00 a.m. on 27 April by the station commander, deputy commander, and sergeant, with four to five officers

questioning each detainee individually. No food was provided. Detainees were not permitted to sleep. Some officers appeared intoxicated. Officers repeatedly used the slur Kalar, made degrading religious insults, and threatened detainees with shooting, beating, and imprisonment. Elderly detainees over 80 years of age were cursed at when they could not hear questions clearly. Officers stated they were acting on orders from above but did not identify the source. When asked what crime had been committed, no answer was given. The group was released at approximately 8:00 a.m. on 27 April. - (*BHRN documentation: Interviews_02_Thandwe_Rakhine/26Apr26*)

- [25 April](#) - **Falam Township, Chin State**: Heavy airstrikes, sustained artillery, and Y-8, Y-12, and Mi-35 helicopter operations accompanied the junta's six-month offensive to retake Falam, destroying homes and displacing thousands of civilians.
- [29 April](#) - **Maw Taung, Thandaunggyi, and Waw Lay, Rakhine State**: Junta airstrikes killed nearly 30 civilians in a single day of operations.
- [29 April](#) - **Payathonsu Township, Karen State**: A Y-12 aircraft conducted two sorties dropping 12 bombs on a mining site and a nearby village approximately 15 kilometres from the Thai border, injuring 12 civilians.
- [Late April](#) - **Kyindwe, Rakhine State**: A single junta airstrike killed nine civilians.
- [30 April](#) - **Phyu Township, Taungoo District, Bago Region**: Junta gunfire killed a 7-year-old child.
- [30 April](#) - **Namma, Mohnyin District, Kachin State**: Junta artillery killed one child and one man.

II. Attacks on Religious and Cultural Sites

Under Article 8(2)(e)(iv) of the Rome Statute, intentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to religion or education constitutes a war crime, unless they are being used for military purposes.

- [3 April](#) - **Wawlay village, Myawaddy Township, Karen State**: Burma Air Force airstrikes destroyed a Buddhist monastery.
- [6 April](#) - **Sinin village, Shwebo Township, Sagaing Region**: Burma Air Force airstrikes struck the monastery, killing a 38-year-old Buddhist monk and two women aged 60 and destroying two pagodas, ten homes, a school, and shelters inside the compound.
- [13 April](#) - **Seik Hkun village, Shwebo Township, Sagaing Region**: A Burma Air Force airstrike struck a monastery on Thingyan eve, killing two novice monks and injuring eight civilians.

III. Abduction and Forced Recruitment

Forced recruitment of civilians violates Article 8(2)(e)(vii) of the Rome Statute. The

abduction of civilians in a non-international armed conflict may also constitute the war crime of taking hostages under Article 8(2)(c)(iii) and, where it forms part of a widespread or systematic attack, a crime against humanity under Article 7(1).

- [April](#) - **Rakhine State:** Reports documented more than 300 Rohingya boys and 50 girls subjected to 45 days of forced training by the Arakan Army before being permitted brief family visits.

IV. Arbitrary Detention and Press Freedom

Arbitrary detention and the persecution of journalists violate Article 7(1)(e) and Article 7(1)(h) of the Rome Statute when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population.

- [April:](#) The junta banned three media outlets, Khonumthung, Chin World, and Myatmaukkhith, under martial law provisions. More than 40 journalists remained in detention. The Committee to Protect Journalists reported that journalists associated with banned outlets had gone into hiding. Reports emerged of the abuse of detained journalist Myat Thu Kyaw at Insein Prison.
- [29 April:](#) The Assistance Association for Political Prisoners recorded 30,917 people arrested since the 2021 coup, with 22,047 still detained or sentenced and more than 8,000 killed by the junta. The 17 April amnesty, which announced the release of 4,335 prisoners, was verified by AAPP as having released fewer than 3 percent of those named. Aung San Suu Kyi was transferred to undisclosed house arrest on 30 April with no independent confirmation of her location or condition. Former President Win Myint was released on 17 April.

6. Policy Recommendations

1. Withhold Recognition from the Junta's Pseudo-Civilian Administration

States must not extend diplomatic recognition to Min Aung Hlaing's presidency, cabinet, or the parliament that installed him. The ANFREL and Special Advisory Council for Myanmar concluded in April 2026 that the elections were designed to entrench military control, not transfer it, and the Union Consultative Council Min Aung Hlaing chairs sits above every branch of the new government. States should direct all political engagement toward the National Unity Government, the SCEF, and ethnic armed organisations and interim administrations that represent the democratic mandate of the Myanmar people.

2. Counter Thailand's Normalisation Drive and Hold ASEAN to Its Own Five-Point Consensus

Thailand's Foreign Minister declared in April that Bangkok intends to serve as a bridge for the junta's return to ASEAN, despite five years of complete non-compliance with the Five-Point Consensus, the imposition of martial law across 60 townships, and ongoing mass atrocity crimes. States with bilateral influence over Thailand, including the United States, the European Union, Australia, and Japan, should make clear that normalisation of the junta contradicts their shared commitments and will affect the terms of those bilateral relationships. The Philippines, as 2026 ASEAN chair, should be pressed to hold the line against premature reintegration and to recognise Indonesia's universal jurisdiction genocide complaint as the appropriate ASEAN-member model.

1. Expand Sanctions and Target the Full Military Supply Chain

The EU's April renewal of existing measures against 105 individuals and 22 entities does not address the supply chain enabling the junta's aerial attacks against civilians, including the advanced Chinese-manufactured VTOL UAVs with bombing capability delivered to the Northwestern Regional Military Command in April, aviation fuel, aircraft components, and drone technology. States should expand designations to cover additional presidential administration officials, commanders of operations documented in this report, and the manufacturers, logistics companies, and state entities involved in the April UAV delivery. Secondary sanctions should be imposed on financial institutions and trading companies facilitating evasion of existing measures.

4. Oppose Myanmar's Removal from the FATF Blacklist

The junta's Anti-Money Laundering Law (2026) authorises warrantless interception, arrest, and asset seizure with a political dimension carve-out, and is being presented to international financial institutions as a counter-money laundering reform consistent with FATF recommendations. The FATF February 2026 plenary set June 2026 as the deadline by which Myanmar must show genuine progress or face countermeasures currently applied only to Iran and North Korea. States represented on the FATF should make clear to fellow members that this law does not constitute genuine progress, and that removing Myanmar from the blacklist on its basis would directly relieve financial pressure on the junta at the moment it is most needed.

5. Advance Accountability Proceedings and Apply Equal Standards to All Parties

States should increase funding to the IIMM, provide prosecutors in active universal jurisdiction cases in Indonesia, Argentina, and Timor-Leste with secure access to evidence held by diplomatic missions, and publicly commit to cooperating with any

ICC arrest warrant issued for Min Aung Hlaing. Accountability must apply without exception to all parties: Fortify Rights documented the Arakan Army's massacre of Rohingya civilians at Hoyyar Siri, its forced conscription of more than 350 Rohingya boys and girls, and BHRN documented overnight checkpoint detention and abuse of Muslim Kaman civilians in Taungup District on grounds of religion alone. States should support expansion of the ICC investigation to cover Arakan Army crimes and impose targeted sanctions on AA commanders implicated in documented violations.

6. Close the Aviation Fuel Gap in the Arms Embargo

The junta's air campaign is the decisive factor in civilian casualties across every front documented this month. Gyrocopters killed 17 in Monywa and 15 displaced civilians at Kyauk Kar, jet fighters struck IDP shelters, monasteries, and a fundraising rally, and sustained aerial bombardment retook Falam after six months. The EU's arms embargo and export restrictions contain no explicit provision covering aviation fuel, which supplies the Burma Air Force's sustained airstrike campaigns. States and the EU should extend existing embargo provisions to explicitly cover aviation fuel, aircraft maintenance contracts, spare parts, and drone components, and press regional states through whose territories these supplies transit to Myanmar, including Singapore and Thailand, to enforce supply chain controls.

Background on the Burma Human Rights Network (BHRN)

Burma Human Rights Network (BHRN) is based in London, operates across Burma/Myanmar and works for human rights, minority rights and religious freedom in Burma. BHRN has played a crucial role in advocating for human rights and religious freedom with politicians and world leaders.

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