

# Civil Society Position Paper

## Addressing ASEAN's Goal of a "Myanmar-Owned and -Led Solution"

### Summary of Recommendations

- (1) Move beyond the Five-Point Consensus to achieve a Myanmar people-led and people-centered solution to the crisis in Myanmar. ASEAN's "Myanmar-owned and -led" approach must be backed by genuine political will that aligns with and supports the collective aspirations of the people of Myanmar.
- (2) Cease all pressure on Myanmar's revolutionary forces and civil society to join any processes to engage or compromise with the illegitimate military junta, and support a locally led political consultation process that entirely excludes the junta.
- (3) End all engagements, including economic and military engagements, with the military junta, and engage formally with the legitimate representatives of Myanmar.
- (4) Publicly denounce and end all support for, or plans to support, the military junta's sham election.
- (5) Provide humanitarian aid for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in collaboration with legitimate stakeholders and civil society groups through cross-border channels.
- (6) Join the ongoing international and Myanmar people's efforts to hold the Myanmar military accountable under international law for its commission of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide.

### Analysis of ASEAN Leaders' Recent Decision on the Five-Point Consensus

ASEAN's Five-Point Consensus (5PC) has proven extremely harmful to the Myanmar people in its futile attempt to address the junta-caused crisis in Myanmar. Nevertheless, on 9 October 2024, ASEAN leaders announced their decision to continue with this failed approach. This decision blatantly ignores the repeated and united calls of the Myanmar people for ASEAN to move beyond the 5PC and support the people's collective aspirations to fully dismantle the military and establish an inclusive federal democracy. Despite claims of "ASEAN's commitment to assisting Myanmar in finding a peaceful and durable solution to the ongoing crisis,"<sup>1</sup> ASEAN's decision to "[m]aintain the 5PC as the main reference to address the political crisis in Myanmar"<sup>2</sup> will surely fail "to achieve an inclusive and durable peaceful resolution that is Myanmar-owned and -led"<sup>3</sup> as long as the people's calls and aspirations go unsupported.

**Since the creation of the 5PC, not only has ASEAN utterly failed to stop the military junta's violence and save people's lives, but it has also become complicit in the junta's crimes against the people.** By reaffirming their sole reliance on the failed 5PC, in spite of the junta's blatant disregard thereof, ASEAN leaders are fueling the junta's violence and further abandoning the Myanmar people to be terrorized, bombed, tortured, and murdered with complete impunity by the military junta.

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<sup>1</sup> "ASEAN Leaders' Review and Decision on the Implementation of the Five-Point Consensus," ASEAN, para. 3, 9 October 2024, [https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/4-Final\\_Review-and-Decision-of-the-ASEAN-LEADERS-on-the-5PC-2024.pdf](https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/4-Final_Review-and-Decision-of-the-ASEAN-LEADERS-on-the-5PC-2024.pdf).

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* at para. 12.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*

Over the past year, the military junta has severely escalated its mass atrocity crimes in retaliation against the people’s ongoing resolute and collective defiance against its illegal coup attempt and for its major territorial losses to the democratic resistance movement. In the first eight months of 2024, the military junta conducted an average of seven airstrikes per day—totaling at least 1,639, amounting to nearly 50% of its total airstrikes since the coup attempt.<sup>4</sup> To this day, the military junta continues to conduct violent ground raids and an unprecedented number of aerial attacks targeting civilians and civilian infrastructure—including schools, religious buildings, medical facilities, and internally displaced person camps—as a form of collective punishment. Since February 2024, the junta has further escalated its violence against civilians through forced conscription, driving mass displacement within Myanmar and across borders. According to the United Nations, as of 9 December 2024, the military’s violence has internally displaced more than 3.4 million people in Myanmar<sup>5</sup>—likely a gross underestimation of the actual magnitude of displacement. As of 31 October 2024, since the failed coup in February 2021, approximately 52,100 people have been displaced to Thailand, 12,200 to Malaysia, and 3,400 to Indonesia.<sup>6</sup>

At present, the Myanmar military is facing allegations of atrocity crimes at the International Criminal Court, the International Court of Justice, and in Argentina. Furthermore, the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar “has collected significant volumes of credible evidence and information indicating the commission of war crimes in connection with armed conflict and crimes against humanity as part of a widespread and systematic attack against the civilian population” by the Myanmar military junta and affiliated militias since the failed coup.<sup>7</sup>

Instead of acting to end the criminal junta’s atrocity crimes as laid out in the 5PC, ASEAN has only deepened its complicity therein,<sup>8</sup> with some of its member states aiding and abetting these crimes by harboring the junta’s financial assets and facilitating the supply of arms and aviation fuel—all while lending the junta false legitimacy through state and regional level engagements.<sup>9</sup> According to the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, from April 2023 to March 2024, the junta imported more than USD 120 million in weapons and military supplies from Thailand-registered suppliers—a 100% increase from the previous year—and more than USD 10 million from Singapore-based suppliers.<sup>10</sup> In January 2024, Amnesty International reported that the junta has been importing aviation fuel through Vietnam, evading sanctions to continue its airstrikes on civilians.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> “Aerial Attacks Carried Out by the Military Council (5),” Nyan Lynn Thit Analytica, 9 October 2024, <https://progressivevoicemyanmar.org/2024/10/09/aerial-attacks-carried-out-by-the-military-council-5/>.

<sup>5</sup> Operational Data Portal, “Myanmar Situation,” UNHCR, <https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/myanmar>, last accessed 13 December 2024.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>7</sup> “Report of the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar,” Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar, U.N. Doc. No. A/HRC/57/18, para. 19, 11 July 2024.

<sup>8</sup> “ASEAN Deepening Complicity with Illegal and Illegitimate Military Junta Through its Appointment as Coordinator of Russia-ASEAN Relations,” Justice For Myanmar, 1 March 2024, <https://www.justicemyanmar.org/press-releases/asean-deepening-complicity-with-illegal-and-illegitimate-myanmar-junta-through-its-appointment-as-coordinator-of-russia-asean-relations>.

<sup>9</sup> “Revealed: The ASEAN Governments and Companies Financing and Arming the Myanmar Military,” Justice For Myanmar, 17 February 2022, <https://www.justicemyanmar.org/press-releases/revealed-the-asean-governments-and-companies-financing-and-arming-the-myanmar-military>.

<sup>10</sup> “Rights expert urges banks to stop financing Myanmar junta weapons trade, UN News, 26 June 2024, <https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/06/1151541>; “Banking on the Death Trade: How Banks and Governments Enable the Military Junta in Myanmar,” Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, U.N. Doc. No. A/HRC/56/CRP.7, 26 June 2024.

<sup>11</sup> “Myanmar: New data suggests military still importing fuel for deadly air strikes despite sanctions,” Amnesty International, 31 January 2024, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2024/01/myanmar-new-data-suggests-military-still-importing-fuel-for-deadly-air-strikes-despite-sanctions/>.

ASEAN must take full responsibility for its role in exacerbating the crisis in Myanmar, particularly its complicity in—and its members’ aiding and abetting of—the junta’s atrocity crimes.

**ASEAN puts its hypocrisy on full display by claiming that its goal is “to help the people of Myanmar to achieve an inclusive and durable peaceful resolution that is Myanmar-owned and -led.”**<sup>12</sup> In its recent decision, ASEAN once again failed to align its efforts with the Myanmar people’s demands for ASEAN to cut all ties with the military junta.<sup>13</sup> If ASEAN truly wants to pursue “a Myanmar-owned and -led solution” to “help the people” as it has repeatedly stated,<sup>14</sup> ASEAN must ensure that the military junta is barred from representing Myanmar in any capacity across all platforms.

Any “Myanmar-owned and -led solution” that is also “inclusive and durable” must align with the will and aspirations of the Myanmar people and must only involve legitimate stakeholders working to dismantle the military junta. ASEAN’s insistence on “inclusive national dialogue”<sup>15</sup> that involves the junta blatantly ignores the will of the Myanmar people—who are fending for their lives, liberty, and democracy—by bringing to the table the very perpetrators of atrocity crimes against them and ignoring the military’s undeniable role as the root cause and exacerbator of decades-long violence and instability in Myanmar.

**ASEAN’s engagements with the junta severely exacerbate Myanmar’s crisis and contravene ASEAN’s goals by emboldening the junta, not representing the Myanmar people, and eroding any trust thereof.** By continuing to attend junta-hosted conferences, invite the junta to represent Myanmar, and hold talks with junta representatives, ASEAN emphasizes its own susceptibility to the military junta’s political manipulation and propaganda. Furthermore, through these engagements, ASEAN is not only stroking the ego of and lending false legitimacy to the illegal, illegitimate, and criminal military junta—which weaponizes humanitarian aid and lacks any legal authority to hold an election in Myanmar—but ASEAN is also blatantly undermining the Myanmar people’s immense sacrifices and efforts to build a peaceful Myanmar.

In October 2024, ASEAN welcomed the junta to represent Myanmar at its 44th and 45th Summits while only informally engaging with the people’s legitimate representatives, such as the National Unity Government (NUG), the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC), and Ethnic Resistance Organizations (EROs). Furthermore, ASEAN member states allowed the junta to host the 42nd ASEANAPOL Conference in Naypyidaw from 21–25 October, with officials from every member state in attendance. On 7 November 2024, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam allowed junta leader Min Aung Hlaing to assume the chairmanship of the Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy.

ASEAN has an obligation to represent the Myanmar people and respect their sovereignty. The people have resoundingly rejected the illegal and illegitimate junta as their government. By allowing any junta personnel to represent Myanmar, ASEAN has clearly breached its duty to the Myanmar people and their well-being. ASEAN must remember: Without the people, there would be no Myanmar. Going forward, ASEAN must stand with the Myanmar people and support—through its decisions and its platforms—their political aspirations for federal democracy and protection of human rights.

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<sup>12</sup> ASEAN, *supra* note 1, para. 12.

<sup>13</sup> 601 organizations, “ASEAN: Halt Plans for ‘Inclusive Dialogue’ and Act to Hold the Military Junta to Account,” *Progressive Voice*, 1 December 2023, <https://progressivevoicemyanmar.org/2023/12/01/asean-halt-plans-for-inclusive-dialogue-and-act-to-hold-the-military-junta-to-account/>.

<sup>14</sup> “Press Statement By the Chair of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Retreat,” ASEAN, paras. 22-23, 29 January 2024, <https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Press-Statement-by-the-Chair-of-the-AMM-Retreat-29-Jan-2024.-Final.pdf>.

<sup>15</sup> ASEAN, *supra* note 1, para. 2.

Moreover, ASEAN’s engagements with the junta can never and will never serve as “a crucial step to building trust and bridging differences among different stakeholders.”<sup>16</sup> Letting the junta take Myanmar’s seat has only caused further loss of the Myanmar people’s trust in ASEAN. With a massive trust deficit between ASEAN and the Myanmar people, ASEAN—because of its own failure—cannot and should not expect any tangible or sustainable outcomes from its so-called “Myanmar-owned and -led” approach.

**ASEAN’s decision to “[e]xpedite” its misguided approach through “informal consultation[s]”<sup>17</sup> clearly aims to impose quick-fix solutions for its state-centric approach to stability, which will only keep Myanmar trapped in a cycle of violence and military tyranny.**<sup>18</sup> It is of grave concern that, with this decision, ASEAN is likely to put pressure on revolutionary forces and civil society to engage or compromise with the military junta, with the alleged goal of “restoring peace, stability, [and] democracy.”<sup>19</sup> But this rush to stability—without the protection of human rights and without justice and accountability—will only enable the recurrence of military dictatorship in Myanmar, precluding any hope for a durable peace and genuine stability.<sup>20</sup>

“An inclusive and durable peaceful resolution”<sup>21</sup> can only be achieved in Myanmar by completely dismantling the criminal military institution and establishing a civilian-led federal democracy that guarantees human rights for all communities in Myanmar. Thus, for regional peace, security, and stability, it is in ASEAN’s best interest to fully support the establishment of a federal democratic Myanmar free from military tyranny. ASEAN’s idea of peace—defined by returning to “business as usual”—ignores the lessons from Myanmar’s past decade. ASEAN must learn those lessons and change its approach accordingly: During the previous so-called “peace process” resulting in the failed “Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement,” the rush to negotiate with the Myanmar military prevented the process from being genuinely democratic and inclusive, and eroded trust among those in opposition to the military.<sup>22</sup> That process kicked off with a one-sided agenda framed and dominated by the military, denying other stakeholders any safe and meaningful opportunities to participate equally in the development of the process, much less be involved in decision-making therein.<sup>23</sup>

Furthermore, bringing the “conflicting parties”<sup>24</sup> together—with Myanmar military on one side and revolutionary forces on the other—cements a problematic assumption that the Myanmar military will be a part of the power structure going forward. This assumption also contravenes the reality on the ground and undermines the people’s tireless efforts to build a new, peaceful federal democratic Myanmar, free from military tyranny. Townships covering 86% of the country’s territory and including 67% of the national population are not under stable junta control.<sup>25</sup> Moreover, as the military junta suffers major losses and teeters on the brink of collapse, the Myanmar people’s revolution continues to gain more effective control and establish and strengthen people-led governance through civilian

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<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.* at para. 6.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.* at para. 15.

<sup>18</sup> Khin Ohmar, “Quick fixes will never be the solution for peace in Myanmar,” *DVB*, 21 September 2024, <https://english.dvb.no/quick-fixes-will-never-be-the-solution-for-peace-in-myanmar/>.

<sup>19</sup> ASEAN, *supra* note 1 at para. 4.

<sup>20</sup> Khin Ohmar, *supra* note 18.

<sup>21</sup> ASEAN, *supra* note 1, para. 12.

<sup>22</sup> Khin Ohmar, *supra* note 18.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>24</sup> Panu Wongcha-um, “ASEAN plays ‘stabilising’ role on regional tensions, secretary-general says,” *Reuters*, 10 October 2024, <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/asean-plays-stabilising-role-regional-tensions-secretary-general-says-2024-10-10/>.

<sup>25</sup> “Briefing Paper: Effective Control in Myanmar 2024 Update,” Special Advisory Council for Myanmar, 30 May 2024, <https://specialadvisorycouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/SAC-M-Effective-Control-in-Myanmar-2024-Update-ENGLISH.pdf>.

administrations, law enforcement, and the provision of public services, such as in Karenni State—with the Federal Democracy Charter as the guiding framework for a new Myanmar.

**Despite ASEAN’s decision to “[a]dvance the safe, effective, and transparent delivery of ASEAN humanitarian assistance without discrimination,”<sup>26</sup> any continued efforts to provide aid through the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management (AHA Centre) will only further exacerbate humanitarian needs on the ground.** This is because, firstly, the AHA Centre lacks the mandate and capacities to address the junta-caused crisis in Myanmar, and, secondly, ASEAN continues to engage with the military junta—the very perpetrator of the humanitarian crisis—through the AHA Centre to deliver aid. In particular, the ongoing presence of the junta-controlled Ministry of Social Welfare, Relief and Resettlement on the AHA Centre’s Governing Board allows the military junta to “exercise the overall direction [and] control” of any aid distributed through the AHA Centre.<sup>27</sup> Ultimately, any partnership between the AHA Centre and the military junta will continue not only to enable the junta’s terror campaign, including its weaponization of aid, but also to deepen ASEAN’s complicity in the junta’s ongoing atrocity crimes.

#### Recommendations to ASEAN and its Member States

- (1) Move beyond the dead-on-arrival 5PC to achieve a solution that is truly Myanmar-owned and -led.** Since the birth of the 5PC, the junta has actively disregarded the 5PC through its repeated commission of atrocity crimes. Meanwhile, the people have lost all trust in ASEAN because of its horrific failure to address Myanmar’s crisis and save lives. As a result, it is beyond clear that the 5PC can never “be implemented in its entirety,”<sup>28</sup> making ASEAN’s decision void of meaning. Going forward, any efforts by ASEAN “to help the people of Myanmar to achieve an inclusive and durable peaceful resolution that is Myanmar-owned and -led”<sup>29</sup> must not be empty rhetoric or lip service to the Myanmar people. These efforts must be truly meaningful and driven by genuine political will to support the vision, aspirations, and well-being of the Myanmar people. ASEAN must unequivocally support the Myanmar people’s goals to fully dismantle the military and establish an inclusive federal democracy.
- (2) Cease all pressure on Myanmar’s revolutionary forces and civil society to join any processes to engage or compromise with the illegitimate military junta, and support a locally led political consultation process that entirely excludes the junta.** For a truly “Myanmar-owned and -led” solution, ASEAN must not exert any pressure on Myanmar’s revolutionary forces and civil society to take part in processes to engage or compromise with the military junta. Instead, ASEAN must support the revolutionary forces and civil society, including the people’s legitimate representatives, to lead the way and shape the process towards “an inclusive and durable peaceful resolution”<sup>30</sup> and the rebuilding of Myanmar. ASEAN must follow and support the Myanmar people’s leadership and provide a safe and enabling platform and environment for Myanmar’s legitimate democracy stakeholders to talk—without any involvement of the junta. The complete exclusion of the junta is the only way to ensure robust and meaningful consultation and participation of Myanmar’s civil society and legitimate democracy stakeholders in this process.

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<sup>26</sup> ASEAN, *supra* note 1, para. 18.

<sup>27</sup> “Great Expectations: Analysis of the ASEAN Coordinating Center for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management,” Progressive Voice & FORUM-ASIA, 4 August 2021, <https://progressivevoicemyanmar.org/2021/08/04/great-expectations-analysis-of-the-asean-coordinating-center-for-humanitarian-assistance-on-disaster-management/>.

<sup>28</sup> ASEAN, *supra* note 1, para. 12.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*

**(3) End all engagements with the military junta immediately and engage formally with the legitimate representatives of Myanmar.** If ASEAN genuinely wishes to help the Myanmar people achieve sustainable “peace, stability, [and] democracy,”<sup>31</sup> ASEAN and its member states must cease all engagements with and support of the military junta, as any engagement only enables the junta to continue its violence against the people and deepens ASEAN’s complicity in the junta’s international crimes. ASEAN must also completely ban all junta representatives from and disallow the junta any access to ASEAN’s platforms. ASEAN must instead align with the Myanmar people’s efforts to build a new, inclusive federal democratic Myanmar. In this regard, Malaysia—as the incoming Chair of ASEAN for 2025—must invite the NUG to take Myanmar’s seat.

In tandem, ASEAN must ensure that it is formally engaging—on equal terms—with Myanmar’s democracy stakeholders and legitimate representatives, including the NUG, the NUCC, EROs, and federal units, including but not limited to the Interim Executive Council of Karenni State (IEC), the Chinland Council, and the Mon State Federal Council (MSFC).

**(4) Publicly denounce and end all support for, or plans to support, the junta’s planned sham election.** The junta has no mandate nor legitimacy to conduct any election: Firstly, the people of Myanmar nationwide have categorically rejected, and continued to reject, the junta since its illegal coup attempt. Secondly, the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw—Myanmar’s elected representatives from the 2020 general election—has already declared the 2008 constitution null and void following the junta’s illegal coup attempt.<sup>32</sup> In addition, throughout 2024 the junta has lost substantial territorial and effective control across the country.<sup>33</sup> Furthermore, in October 2024, groups of junta personnel—including soldiers, police, and militia armed with guns—intimidated locals into participating in its sham census in areas under its control.<sup>34</sup>

ASEAN must prove that it is capable of and committed to abiding by its own Charter by adhering to the principles of democracy and rule of law by publicly denouncing the junta’s planned sham election. If ASEAN fails to do so, ASEAN will have to take full responsibility for the military junta’s continued violence and atrocity crimes against the Myanmar people.

**(5) Provide humanitarian aid for IDPs in collaboration with legitimate stakeholders and civil society through cross-border channels.** The cross-border provision of humanitarian aid must not involve the military junta or any of its auxiliaries, including the Myanmar Red Cross Society. ASEAN must finally accept the reality that aid through or in collaboration with the junta cannot and will not reach the communities in direst need, but aid reaching these communities has been, and continues to be, possible through locally led cross-border channels. Therefore, to reach IDPs and save lives, aid must be provided through cross-border channels, in collaboration with Myanmar’s legitimate stakeholders, and directed to local civil society organizations, community-based organizations, and other trusted local frontline responders. This humanitarian assistance must also be gender responsive.

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<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.* at para. 4.

<sup>32</sup> “ဖွဲ့စည်းပုံအခြေခံဥပဒေ (၂၀၀၈ ခုနှစ်) ကို အပြီးသတ် ဖျက်သိမ်းကြောင်း ကြေညာခြင်း,” Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, 31 March 2021, <https://crphmyanmar.org/publications/statements/crph3103212/>.

<sup>33</sup> Special Advisory Council for Myanmar, *supra* note 25.

<sup>34</sup> Aung Zay, “Myanmar junta launches pre-election census one day earlier than announced,” *Myanmar Now*, 1 October 2024, <https://myanmar-now.org/en/news/myanmar-junta-launches-pre-election-census-one-day-earlier-than-announced/>; Grant Peck, “Myanmar’s military government begins a census seen as a way to gather information about opponents,” *Associated Press*, 2 October 2024, <https://apnews.com/article/myanmar-census-civil-war-military-resistance-eafba6e479c59fb926d31a10d4b663ca>.



**(6) Join the ongoing international and Myanmar people’s efforts to hold the Myanmar military accountable under international law for its commission of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide.** In fulfillment of ASEAN’s international obligations, ASEAN and its member states must put an end to the Myanmar military’s mass atrocities and other international crimes. Accordingly, we call on the Philippines and other member states to assume universal jurisdiction, without further delay, over cases submitted by victims and survivors of the Myanmar military’s crimes, as a concrete step towards justice and accountability.

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**Signed by 260 organizations including 59 organizations who have chosen to not disclose their name**

1. 5/ of Zaya State Strike
2. A-Yar-Taw People Strike
3. Action Committee for Democracy Development (ACDD)
4. Action Committee of Basic Education Students (ACBES)
5. Ah Nah Podcast – Conversations with Myanmar
6. All Arakan Youth Organizations Network (AAYON)
7. All Aung Myay Thar San Schools Strike Force
8. All Burma Federation of Student Unions (Monywa District)
9. Alliance of Students’ Union – Yangon (ASU-Yangon)
10. ALTSEAN-Burma
11. Anti-Junta Alliance Yangon-AJAY
12. Anti-junta Forces Coordination Committee (Mandalay)
13. Arakan CSO Network
14. Arakan Rohingya National Union (ARNU)
15. Asia Democracy Network
16. Asia Pacific Solidarity Coalition (APSOC)
17. Asian Cultural Forum on Development Foundation (ACFOD)
18. Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA)
19. Asian Health Institute (AHI)
20. Association of Human Rights Defenders and Promoters (HRDP)
21. Association Suisse-Birmanie (ASB)
22. Athan – Freedom of Expression Activist Organization
23. Aung San Suu Kyi Park, Norway
24. Ayeyarwaddy West Development Organisation (AWDO), Nagphe
25. Ayeyarwaddy West Development Organisation (AWDO), Magway
26. Basic Education General Strike Committee (BEGSC)
27. Basic Education Worker Unions – Steering Committee (BEWU-SC)
28. Blood Money Campaign (BMC)
29. Burma Action Ireland
30. Burmese Relief Center Japan
31. Campaign for a New Myanmar
32. CDM Medical Network (CDMMN)
33. Chanmyatharzi Township People’s Strike

34. Chaung Oo Township Youth Strike Committee
35. Chin Community in Norway
36. Chin Human Rights Organization (CHRO)
37. Chindwin (West) Villages Women Strike
38. Civil Information Network (CIN)
39. Civil Society Organizations Coordination Committee (Monywa)
40. Co-operative University Mandalay Students' Strike
41. Coalition Strike Committee – Dawei
42. Creative Home (CH)
43. CRPH & NUG Supporters Ireland
44. CRPH Funding Ireland
45. CRPH Support Group, Norway and members organizations
46. Daung Sittthe Strike
47. Dawei (Ashaetaw) Women Strike
48. Dawei Youths Revolutionary Movement Strike Committee
49. Defend Myanmar Democracy (DMD)
50. Democratic Party for a New Society, Norway
51. Depayin Township Revolution Steering Committee
52. Depayin Women Strike
53. Educational Initiatives Prague
54. Equality Myanmar (EQMM)
55. Ethnic Youth General Strike Committee (Mandalay)
56. Federal Corner
57. Former Political Prisoners and New Generation Group – Monywa
58. Free Burma Campaign (South Africa) (FBC(SA))
59. Freedom and Labor Action Group (FLAG)
60. Future Thanlwin
61. Gangaw Women Strike
62. General Strike Collaboration Committee (GSCC)
63. General Strike Committee of Basic and Higher Education (GSCBHE)
64. Generation Wave (GW)
65. Generations' Solidarity Coalition of Nationalities (GSCN)
66. German Solidarity with Myanmar Democracy e.V. (GSM)
67. Human Rights Educators Network (HREN)
68. Human Rights Foundation of Monland (HURFOM)
69. Industries Strike
70. Info Birmanie
71. Initiatives for International Dialogue (IID)
72. Institute for Asian Democracy
73. Integria, z.ú. Czech Republic
74. International Association, Myanmar – Switzerland (IAMS)
75. International Campaign for the Rohingya
76. Italia-Birmania.Insieme
77. Japan Campaign to Ban Landmines (JCBL)
78. Japan Catholic Council for Justice and Peace
79. Japan Tropical Forest Action Network (JATAN)
80. Justice & Equality Focus
81. Justice For Myanmar
82. K'cho Ethnic Association( Europe)
83. Kachin Association Norway
84. Kachin Legal Aid Group (KLAG)



85. Kachin Student Union
86. Kachin Women's Association Thailand (KWAT)
87. Kalay Township Strike Force
88. Kalay Women Strike
89. Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG)
90. Karen Peace Support Network (KPSN)
91. Karen Women's Organization (KWO)
92. Karenni Human Rights Group (KnHRG)
93. Keng Tung Youth
94. KontraS
95. Kyae Lak Myay
96. Kyain Seikgyi Spring Revolution Leading Committee
97. Kyauktada Strike Committee (KSC)
98. Latpadaung Region Strike Committee
99. Legal Aid for Human Rights
100. Let's Help Each Other (LHEO)
101. LGBT Alliance
102. LGBT Alliance Myanmar (Kalay Region)
103. LGBT Alliance Myanmar (Kyaukse Region)
104. LGBT Community Yangon
105. LGBT Union – Mandalay
106. Magway People's Revolution Committee
107. Maharaungmyay Township People's Strike
108. Mandalay University Students' Strike
109. Mandalay Alliance Coalition Strike
110. Mandalay Medical Family (MFM)
111. Mandalay Strike Force (MSF)
112. Mandalay Women Strike
113. Mandalay Youth Strike
114. Mandalay-based People's Strike
115. Mandalay-Based University Students' Unions (MDY\_SUs)
116. MATA Sagaing
117. MayMyo Strike Force
118. Mekong Watch
119. Min Hla Farmers Group
120. Minbu Farmers Group
121. Monywa LGBT Strike
122. Monywa People's Strike Steering Committee
123. Monywa Women Strike
124. Monywa-Amyint Road Strike Leading Committee
125. Monywa-Amyint Road Women Strike
126. Multi-Religions Strike
127. Mya Taung Strike
128. Myanmar Campaign Network (MCN)
129. Myanmar Catholic Community In Norway
130. Myanmar Community in Norway
131. Myanmar Hindu Union
132. Myanmar Institute of Information Technology Students' Strike
133. Myanmar Labor Alliance (MLA)
134. Myanmar People Alliance (Shan State)
135. Myanmar Tourism Committee (MTC)

136. Myaung Youth Network
137. MyaYar Knowledge Tree
138. Myingyan Civilian Movement Committee
139. Network for Human Rights Documentation – Burma (ND-Burma)
140. Network of University Student Unions – Monywa
141. New Myanmar Foundation
142. New Rehmonnya Federated Force (NRFF)
143. NLD Organization Committee (International) Norway
144. No Business With Genocide
145. No.12 Basic Education Branch High School ( Maharaungmyay) Students' Union
146. Norway Matu Community
147. Norway Rawang Community
148. Nyan Lynn Thit Analytica
149. Pa-O Youth Organization
150. Pale Township People's Strike Steering Committee
151. Political Prisoners Network – Myanmar (PPN-M)
152. Progressive Voice (PV)
153. Pwintphyu Development Organisation
154. Pyi Gyi Tagon Strike Force
155. Queers of Burma Alternative (QBA)
156. Representative Committee of University Teacher Associations (RC of UTAs)
157. Rohingya Community in Norway
158. Rohingya Maiyafuñor Collaborative Network (RMCN)
159. Rohingya Southeast Asia Network (RAISA)
160. Samgha Sammaga-Mandalay
161. Save and Care Organization for Ethnic Women at Border Areas (SCOEWBA)
162. SEA Junction
163. Seinpann Strike
164. Shan MATA
165. Shwe Pan Kone People's Strike Steering Committee
166. Sitt Nyein Pann Foundation
167. Southern Dragon Myanmar
168. Southern Youth Development Organization (SYDO)
169. Spring Traveller
170. Ta'ang Women's Organization
171. Tamar Institute of Development
172. Taze Strike Committee
173. Taze Women Strike
174. Thai Action Committee for Democracy in Burma (TACDB)
175. Thakhin Kodaw Mhine Peace Network (Monywa)
176. Thayat Chaung Women Strike
177. The 88 Generation Peace and Open Society (Monywa)
178. Twitter Team for Revolution (TTFR)
179. U.S. Campaign for Burma
180. Union of Karenni State Youth (UKSY)
181. University Students' Unions Alumni Force
182. Volunteers in Myanmar
183. Wetlet Revolution Leading Committee
184. Wetlet Township Women Strike
185. White Coat Society Yangon (WCSY)
186. Women Advocacy Coalition – Myanmar (WAC-M)

187. Women Alliance Burma (WAB)
188. Women's League of Burma (WLB)
189. Women's Peace Network (WPN)
190. Yadanabon University Students' Union (YDNBUSU)
191. Yangon Medical Network (YMN)
192. Yangon Women Strike
193. Yasakyo Township People's Strike Steering Committee
194. Yinmarpin and Salingyi All Villages Strike Committee
195. Youth for Democratization of Myanmar (UDM)
196. Zomi Christian Fellowship of Norway
197. Zomi Community Norway
198. ပဲခူးအရှေ့နိုင်ငံရေးအကျဉ်းသားဟောင်းများအဖွဲ့ (FPPN-EB)
199. မျိုးဆက်-Generations
200. မုန်တိုင်းကြားက သက်တံများ
201. အညာလွင်ပြင်ရပ်ဝန်း