

Political Briefing 2024

Myanmar at a turning point?



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Publication date: 03/05/2024

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About German Solidarity Myanmar

German Solidarity Myanmar (GSM) is a young activist organisation that supports the Myanmar democracy movement through political education, public relations and advocacy. The organisation is committed to a more decisive stance and proactive Myanmar policy on the part of the Federal Republic of Germany and the European Union.

You can find more information at www.solidarity-myanmar.de

1. Executive Summary

At a time when the headlines are dominated by the war in Ukraine and the conflict in the Middle East, Myanmar remains one of the world's forgotten conflicts. The country is the scene of the worst humanitarian crisis in the strategically important Indo-Pacific region. It is no coincidence that it is ranked 5th on the International Rescue Committee's 2024 Emergency Watchlist¹. On the Economist Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index, the country ranks second to last below North Korea². Myanmar - long a blind spot in European engagement in the region - is also at the centre of geopolitical trends and global challenges. After nine years of democratic opening between 2012 and 2021, Myanmar now exemplifies the rise of authoritarianism and the global crisis of democracy. The country is a hotspot for trends ranging from climate change and biodiversity loss to religious extremism, from refugee movements to international drug trafficking. Therefore, the international community ignores Myanmar at its own peril.

At the same time, there has been reason for optimism in Myanmar since 2023. The Myanmar democracy movement has come a long way since the coup in February 2021, evolving from a spontaneous movement of mass civilian protests into a revolutionary resistance movement. For the first time in Myanmar's history, there is a broad alliance of ethnic groups against the regime. The People's Defence Forces (PDF) are advancing in many areas of Myanmar. Recently resistance groups were able to achieve significant victories against the military with Operation 1027³. The last six months in particular have been a turning point in the Myanmar people's "Spring Revolution" against military rule.

In contrast to the conflicts in Syria, Yemen and Sudan, Myanmar's resistance movement is not fighting a proxy war, but is largely on its own. And contrary to the predictions of foreign Myanmar experts that the uprising against the coup would be quickly crushed without direct support from the international community, the Spring Revolution is showing great resilience⁴. One international observer admitted as early as 2022: "[...] I completely underestimated the anger, determination and sheer courage of Burma's youth as a nationwide phenomenon ... [who] are committed to a desired revolution" as well as the "overthrow of the entire military-controlled order"⁵.

The loose and often fractious alliance between the various factions in the resistance has left the supposedly largest military in Southeast Asia so weakened that it is now trying to forcibly recruit 60,000 people a year. Although neither the resistance movement nor the junta currently controls the entire country, the people of Myanmar have shown impressive resilience time and again and have managed to inflict severe defeats on the junta. The Myanmar military has lost more ground in the last year than ever before in its 79-year history. The year 2024 could prove to be decisive.

This is precisely why it is important to recognise that this is a globally unique democratic revolution that deserves more recognition and support. Germany and the EU have it within their power to make a more effective contribution to a federal, democratic and inclusive Myanmar.

¹ IRC 2024, [Inside the 2024 Emergency Watchlist](#)

² Economist Intelligence Unit, [Democracy Index 2023](#)

³ Nicholas Kong, [Three-Year Old Spring Revolution: Resist, Revolt, Reconcile, Reunite, Reform, Rebuild And Restore](#), Eurasia Review, 31.01.2024

⁴ David Hutt, [Why the West won't recognise Myanmar's NUG](#), Asia Times, 16.07.2021

⁵ Anthony Davis and Aung Zaw, [Myanmar Junta in 'Political and Military Cul-de-Sac': Security Expert](#), The Irrawaddy, 22 June 2022

အစီရင်ခံစာ အနှစ်ချုပ်

ကမ္ဘာ့သတင်းစာမျက်နှာများထက်ဝယ် ယူကရိန်းစစ်ပွဲနှင့် အရှေ့အလယ်ပိုင်းဒေသဆိုင်ရာ သတင်းများ စဉ်ဆက်မပြတ် နေရာယူနေသည့်အချိန်တွင် မြန်မာ့နိုင်ငံရေးပဋိပက္ခသည် ကမ္ဘာကြီး၏ အမေ့လျော့ခံပဋိပက္ခများထဲမှ တစ်ခု ဖြစ်နေခဲ့သည်။ မဟာဗျူဟာကျ၊ အရေးပါသည့် အင်ဒို-ပစိဖိတ်ဒေသ၏ ဒေသတွင်းနိုင်ငံများထဲ၌ အဆိုးရွားဆုံးသော လူသားချင်းစာနာထောက်ထားမှုကင်းမဲ့ခြင်းကို မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင် တွေ့မြင်ရမည်ဖြစ်သည်။ နိုင်ငံတကာ ကယ်ဆယ်ရေး ကော်မတီ၏ ၂၀၂၄ ခုနှစ်၊ အရေးပေါ်စောင့်ကြည့်စာရင်းတွင် အဆင့် ၅ နေရာ၌ ရပ်တည်နေခြင်းသည် အကြောင်းမဲ့မဟုတ်ပေ။ Economist Intelligence Unit ၏ ဒီမိုကရေစီအညွှန်းကိန်းအရ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသည် အနိမ့်ဆုံးနေရာတွင်ရပ်တည်နေသည့် မြောက်ကိုရီးယား၏အထက်၊ ဒုတိယအနိမ့်ဆုံးအဆင့်တွင် ရပ်တည်နေသည်။ ဥရောပနိုင်ငံများ၏ ကာလရှည်ကြာစွာ မျက်ကွယ်ပြုခြင်းခံခဲ့ရသည့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသည် ပထဝီနိုင်ငံရေး လမ်းကြောင်းများနှင့် ကမ္ဘာလုံးဆိုင်ရာ စိန်ခေါ်မှုများ၏ အချက်အချာဖြစ်သောနေရာတွင် တည်ရှိလျက်ရှိသည်။ ၂၀၁၂ ခုနှစ်မှ ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်၊ ကိုးနှစ်တာကာလအတွင်း ဒီမိုကရေစီလမ်းဖွင့်ပြီးနောက်၊ ယခုကာလ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံရေး အခြေအနေသည် အာဏာရှင်အစိုးရများထွန်းကားလာမှုနှင့် ကမ္ဘာ့ဒီမိုကရေစီရေးအကျပ်အတည်းတို့ကို သက်သေ ပြနေပါသည်။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသည် ရာသီဥတုပြောင်းလဲမှုနှင့် ဇီဝမျိုးစုံမျိုးကွဲများဆုံးရှုံးခြင်းမှသည် ဘာသာရေး အစွန်းရောက်မှုများအထိလည်းကောင်း၊ ဌာနေစွန့်ခွာဒုက္ခသည်များအရေးမှသည် နိုင်ငံတကာမူးယစ်ဆေးဝါး ရောင်းဝယ်ဖောက်ကားခြင်းစသည့် မျက်မှောက်ခေတ် ပြဿနာများ၏ အဓိကနေရာတစ်ခု ဖြစ်နေခဲ့သည်။ ထို့ကြောင့် နိုင်ငံတကာအသိုင်းအဝိုင်းက မြန်မာနိုင်ငံကို ဆက်လက် လျစ်လျူရှုထားရန်မှာ အန္တရာယ်ကြီးလှပေသည်။

တစ်ချိန်တည်းမှာပင် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင် ၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ်မှစတင်ကာ မျော်လင့်ချက်ရောင်နီများ သန်းစပြုလာခဲ့သည်။ မြန်မာ့ဒီမိုကရေစီရေးလှုပ်ရှားမှုခရီးရှည်ကြီးသည် ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်၊ ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ အာဏာသိမ်းပြီးစအချိန်က လူထုဆန္ဒပြပွဲများမှသည် ယနေ့အချိန်၌ လက်နက်ကိုင်တော်လှန်ရေး အသွင်အထိ အဆင့်ဆင့်အသွင်ပြောင်းလဲ လာခဲ့သည်။ မြန်မာ့သမိုင်းတွင် ပထမဆုံးအကြိမ်အဖြစ် စစ်အစိုးရကိုဆန့်ကျင်သည့် ကျယ်ပြန့်သော မဟာမိတ်အဖွဲ့အစည်းများ ပေါ်ထွက်လာခဲ့သည်။ ပြည်သူ့ကာကွယ်ရေးတပ်ဖွဲ့ (PDF) သည် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံရှိ နယ်မြေဒေသများစွာတွင် အသာစီးရအောင်မြင်လာလျက်ရှိသည်။ မကြာသေးမီက တော်လှန်ရေးအဖွဲ့များသည် စစ်ဆင်ရေး 1027 ဖြင့် အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်တပ်ကို သိသိသာသာအောင်ပွဲများ ရယူနိုင်ခဲ့ကြသည်။ အထူးသဖြင့် လွန်ခဲ့သည့်ခြောက်လတာကာလသည် စစ်အုပ်ချုပ်ရေးကိုဆန့်ကျင်သည့် “မြန်မာ့နေ့ဦးတော်လှန်ရေး” ၏ အချိုးအကွေ့တစ်ခုဟု ဆိုရပေမည်။

ဆီးရီးယား၊ ယီမင်နှင့် ဆွဒန်နိုင်ငံများတွင် ဖြစ်ပွားနေသောပဋိပက္ခများနှင့် ကွဲပြားခြားနားချက်မှာ မြန်မာတို့၏ စစ်အာဏာရှင်ကိုတွန်းလှန်သောစစ်သည် ပရောက်စီစစ်ပွဲကဲ့သို့ တိုက်ခိုက်နေခြင်းမဟုတ်ဘဲ မိမိဘာသာရှိသမျှအားဖြင့်သာ ရုန်း၍ တိုက်ခိုက်နေကြခြင်းဖြစ်သည်။ “နိုင်ငံတကာအသိုင်းအဝိုင်း၏ တိုက်ရိုက်ထောက်ခံမှုမရှိသည့် အာဏာရှင်ကို တွန်းလှန်သည့်လှုပ်ရှားမှုသည် မကြာမီအားပျော့ပျက်ပြယ်သွားလိမ့်မည်” ဆိုသည့် နိုင်ငံခြားရောက် မြန်မာပညာရှင်များ၏ခန့်မှန်းချက်များကို ဆန့်ကျင်ကာ နေ့ဦးတော်လှန်ရေးသည် ယနေ့အထိ ခိုင်ကြည်သောစိတ်ဖြင့် ဆက်လက်ခရီးဆက်နေလျက်ရှိသည်။ နိုင်ငံတကာအရေး လေ့လာသူတစ်ဦးက ၂၀၂၂ ခုနှစ် အစောပိုင်းတွင် ထုတ်ဖော်ပြောကြားခဲ့သည်မှာ“တော်လှန်ရေးတွင် စိတ်အားတက်ကြွစွာပါဝင်နေကြသည့် မြန်မာလူငယ်များ၏ နာကျည်းမှု၊ ဆိုးဖြတ်ချက်နှင့် ရဲစွမ်းသတ္တိတို့ကို နိုင်ငံတဝှမ်းဖြစ်ပျက်နေသည့်ဖြစ်စဉ်တစ်ခုအဖြစ်သာ လျော့တွက် ခဲ့မိသည်...”နှင့် “စစ်တပ်၏ ထိန်းချုပ်မှု၊ အမိန့်အာဏာတစ်ခုလုံးကို ဖြုတ်ချဆန့်ကျင်လိုက်ခြင်း” ဟူ၍ဖြစ်သည်။

မိတ်ဖက်တော်လှန်ရေးအဖွဲ့များအကြား မကြာခဏဆိုသလို သဘောထားတင်းမာခြင်း၊ ပျော့ပြောင်းအဆင်ပြေခြင်း စသည်ဖြင့်ရှိနေသော်လည်း ဘုံရန်သူဖြစ်သည့် အရှေ့တောင်အာရှ၏ အင်အားအကြီးဆုံးစစ်တပ်ကို အားပျော့သွားစေခဲ့သည်မှာတော့ အမှန်ပင်ဖြစ်သည်။ ထို့ကြောင့် အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်တပ်သည် ယခုအခါ တစ်နှစ်လျှင် စစ်သားသစ် ၆၀,၀၀၀ ကို အတင်းအကြပ်စုဆောင်းရန် ကြိုးပမ်းလျက်ရှိသည်။ တော်လှန်ရေးတပ်ပေါင်းစုနှင့် အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်တပ်သည် လက်ရှိတွင် တစ်ပြည်လုံးကို မည်သည့်ဘက်ကမျှ တစ်ဦးတည်း အသာစီးရ ထိန်းချုပ်ထားနိုင်ခြင်း မရှိသေးသော်လည်း၊ မြန်မာပြည်သူတို့၏ တွန်းလှန်စစ်သည် အံ့ဩဖွယ်ရာ ကြံ့ကြံ့ခံနိုင်စွမ်းကို အကြိမ်ကြိမ်ပြသခဲ့ပြီး၊ မြန်မာစစ်တပ်ကို ဆိုးရွားသောရှုံးနိမ့်မှုများ ကြုံစေခဲ့သည်။ (၇၉) နှစ်သက်တမ်းရှိ မြန်မာ့တပ်မတော်သည် လွန်ခဲ့သောနှစ်မှစတင်ကာ ၎င်း၏ပိုင်နက်နယ်မြေများကို ပိုမိုလက်လွှတ်ဆုံးရှုံး လာလျက်ရှိသည်။ ထို့ကြောင့် ၂၀၂၄ ခုနှစ်သည် အနိုင်အရှုံးကို အဆုံးအဖြတ်ပေးမည့်နှစ်ဟုပင် ဆိုနိုင်ပေသည်။

ဤအကြောင်းအချက်များကြောင့် မြန်မာ့တော်လှန်ရေးသည် ကမ္ဘာကြီး၏ ယခုထက်ပိုသော အသိအမှတ်ပြုမှုနှင့် ထောက်ခံမှုရရှိရန်ထိုက်တန်သော၊ ထူးခြားသည့် ဒီမိုကရေစီတော်လှန်ရေးတစ်ရပ် ဖြစ်သည်။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီနှင့် ပွင့်လင်းသောအနာဂါတ်လူ့ဘောင်ထွန်းကားရန်အတွက် ၇၂မနီနှင့် ဥရောပသမဂ္ဂတို့သည် ပိုမို ထိရောက်သည့် ပံ့ပိုးကူညီမှုများကိုပေးနိုင်သည့် အခွင့်အာဏာကို လက်ဝယ်ပိုင်ဆိုင်ထားကြသူများပင်ဖြစ်ကြသည်။

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List of Abbreviations

AAPP	Assistance Association for Political Prisoners	KIA	Kachin Independence Army
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations	KNU	Karen National Union
CDM	Civil Disobedience Movement	NLD	National League For Democracy
CRPH	Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw	NUCC	National Unity Consultative Council
CSOs	Civil Society Organisations	NUG	National Unity Government
EROs	Ethnic Resistance Organisations	OCHA	United National Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
HRP	Humanitarian Response Plan	PDF	People's Defense Forces
IDEA	International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance	SAC	State Administration Council
ILO	International Labour Organisation	3-BHA	Three Brotherhood Alliance

2. Overview of the current situation

a. Political and geopolitical situation

Military regime

The State Administration Council (SAC) - the military junta under Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, established after the military coup of 1 February 2021 - continues to hold control over most institutions of Myanmar's central government, but does not exercise effective control over large parts of Myanmar's territory due to enormous territorial losses in the last six months. Min Aung Hlaing's regime is characterised above all by its instability: there have been three government reshuffles within the SAC in 2023 alone and the cabinet has been reshuffled six times since 2021⁶.

Although the junta claims to be following the 2008 constitution, saying it has only taken power for “the duration of a state of emergency”, this state of emergency has already been unconstitutionally extended five times. There is no date scheduled for elections, which have been repeatedly announced. The ban on more than 40 political parties in March 2023 has made any possibility of free and democratic elections even more remote⁷.

Democracy movement

The Myanmar democracy movement has changed considerably since the military coup. Traditionally, it was dominated by the National League of Democracy (NLD). Most of its leadership is now in prison: since the coup in 2021, the junta has arrested 649 NLD members, including General Secretary Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and President U Win Myint. The democracy movement is therefore more than ever a loose and pluralistic network of organisations, including political parties, Ethnic Resistance Organisations (EROs) and civil society structures such as trade unions and civil resistance strike committees.

At the institutional level, these actors are organised in the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC), which published the *Federal Democracy Charter* in 2021 as a roadmap for a federal, democratic and inclusive Myanmar⁸.

At the centre of the democracy movement is the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), a group of elected representatives, and the National Unity Government (NUG). According to the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), this is “the most diverse and inclusive government ever established in Myanmar”⁹. The Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Thomas Andrews, has therefore repeatedly called on the international community to recognise NUG as the legitimate representative of the Myanmar people and to support it with financial and diplomatic means¹⁰. Within the European Union, the European

⁶ ISP Insight 2024, [NAYPYITAWLOGY-4 - SAC's Rickety Administration](#)

⁷ Human Rights Watch 2023, [Myanmar Junta Dissolves Political Parties](#)

⁸ NUG 2021, [Federal Democracy Charter](#)

⁹ IDEA 2022, [Towards the restoration of democracy in Myanmar: Reflections on Democracy Day](#)

¹⁰ UN Human Rights Council 2024, [Situation of human rights in Myanmar - Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Thomas H. Andrews](#)

Parliament has also called for greater support for the NUG, most recently in a declaration dated 11 May 2023¹¹. At the United Nations, Myanmar is represented by NUG diplomat U Kyaw Moe Tun¹².

The NUG works closely with several Ethnic Resistance Organisations (EROs), in particular the Karen National Union, the Chin National Front and Karenni National Progressive Party, as well as the People's Defence Forces¹³. While coordination at the national level is sporadic and a central chain of command functions only to a limited extent, new interim structures for the coordination of military actions and local administration have been formed at the regional level. These include the Sagaing Forum, the Karenni State Consultative Council, the Interim Chin National Consultative Council and the Kachin Political Interim Coordination Team¹⁴. These enjoy broad support from military resistance and civil society actors in the respective regions.

International community & geopolitical context

In 2021, the United Nations General Assembly condemned the military coup in Myanmar and called on member states to prevent arms supplies to the junta. A year later, the UN Security Council passed its first ever resolution on Myanmar, condemning the violence against civilians, calling for the release of political prisoners, and officially giving ASEAN the lead role in resolving the crisis¹⁵.

The starting point for ASEAN was the so-called "Five Point Consensus" published in 2021, which continues to be disregarded by the junta. Successive member states that have held the chairmanship of ASEAN have nevertheless favoured "quiet diplomacy"¹⁶. ASEAN has excluded junta political representatives from ASEAN summits and foreign ministers' meetings, and ASEAN heads of government have agreed that Myanmar will not assume the ASEAN chairmanship for 2026¹⁷.

Western nations have mainly responded to the crisis in Myanmar with targeted sanctions: a total of eight sanctions packages by the European Council and more than 20 sanctions packages by the United States¹⁸. The most significant legislation enacted regarding Myanmar is the so-called Burma Act of the United States, which provides for sanctions, humanitarian assistance, but also "non-lethal" support for the Myanmar democracy movement¹⁹. Funding for these projects is currently stuck in the US Congress²⁰.

China, for its part, plays a complex role in Myanmar. The People's Republic has repeatedly criticised Western sanctions. But in the last six months in particular, China has taken on an increasingly active

¹¹ European Parliament 2023, *European Parliament resolution of 11 May 2023 on Myanmar, notably the dissolution of democratic political parties*

¹² Alex Willemyns, "[Kyaw Moe Tun to remain Myanmar's UN rep](#)", Radio Free Asia, 21/09/2023

¹³ NUG 2024, [Joint Position Statement by Allied Organisations Engaged in Revolutionary Struggle towards Annihilation of Military Dictatorship and Establishment of a Federal Democratic Union](#)

¹⁴ Progressive Voice 2023, [Future Federalism](#)

¹⁵ UNSC 2022, [Resolution 2669](#)

¹⁶ Stimson Centre 2023, [Myanmar Reveals ASEAN's Weak Spot Again](#)

¹⁷ OHCHR 2024, [Human Rights Council Adopts Seven Resolutions, Extends Mandates on the Human Rights of Persons with Albinism, Iran and Myanmar](#)

¹⁸ EU Council 2023, [Myanmar/Burma: Council adds 4 persons and 2 entities to EU sanctions list in eighth round of sanctions](#)

¹⁹ US Congress 2021, [H.R. 5497 - BURMA Act of 2021](#)

²⁰ Mike Haack, [What happened to the Burma Act?](#), Frontier Myanmar, October 26, 2023

role in Myanmar, also opposing the junta. Analysts at the United State Institute for Peace, for example, believe that China has supported the Three Brotherhood Alliance's offensive in northern Shan State - Operation 1027 - to end organised cybercrime (see "Organised crime") in the border region. Through several rounds of negotiations in Kunming, Yunnan, China has since attempted to restore stability to the China-Myanmar border²¹.

Russia is the biggest supporter of the military junta and protects the junta in international bodies such as the UN Security Council. Myanmar and Russia are also cooperating in the field of nuclear energy and are planning to build a reactor in Myanmar. Myanmar's military junta in return supports Russia's war in Ukraine, which violates international law - not only diplomatically, but also with arms deliveries (see p. 12)²².

b. Military conflict

The tide is turning

The conflict in Myanmar is now entering its fourth year. The war, which has received little attention worldwide, is a complex web of entrenched conflicts, shifting alliances and a brutal struggle for control of the country. The main players are the military junta (Tatmadaw), ethnic revolutionary organisations (EROs) such as the Karen National Union (KNU) and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the National Unity Government (NUG) and the People's Defence Forces (PDFs)²³. Myanmar's EROs and PDFs are fighting against the junta, which is still well-equipped but faces enormous resistance from all sides^{24 25}. Since the coup began, the junta has recorded unprecedented levels of deserters, including high-ranking personnel and generals²⁶. The NUG's co-operation with the EROs is a significant development²⁷²⁸, which has greatly altered the balance of power in Myanmar²⁹. Currently, neither the junta nor the anti-junta forces control the entire country³⁰ and there has been a huge increase in fighting since the end of 2023^{31 32}.

The rapidly changing situation in Myanmar is perhaps best illustrated by Thomas Van Linge's map of military control, which was verified by GSM local partners in Myanmar and Thailand. Although the extent of control by the resistance movement cannot yet be 100% confirmed, it is clear that the situation is looking increasingly grim for the junta.

²¹ USIP 2024, [Three Years After Coup, Myanmar's Generals Face an Existential Crisis](#)

²² Fulcrum 2023, [Myanmar-Russia Relations Since the Coup: An Ever Tighter Embrace](#)

²³ Service Centre for Peacebuilding BW, [Myanmar - a conflict analysis from a peace policy perspective](#)

²⁴ Peace Research Institute Oslo, [Counting Myanmar's Dead: Reporte Civilian Casualties Since the 2021 Military Coup](#)

²⁵ Action on Armed Violence, 03.02.24, [Myanmar: three years of a devastating, under-reported war](#)

²⁶ Centre for Strategic & International Studies, Martin. M. 14.12.23, [New Stage for the Military Conflict in Myanmar?](#)

²⁷ Lowly Institute, 04.12.23, [Myanmar: the last days of the junta?](#)


²⁸ International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), [Conflict in Myanmar and the International Response](#)

²⁹ Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED), 17.01.24, [Myanmar: Resistance to the military gains momentum](#)

³⁰ Die Zeit, Radunski M. 20.12.23, [China und Myanmar: Die Junta war China's Partner - sind es jetzt die Rebellen?](#)

³¹ UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, 06.12.2023 [Urgent action needed to save lives amid intensifying conflict in Myanmar](#)

³² International Crisis Group, 2023, [Myanmar](#)



Myanmar 1 February 2021, GSM adapted from Thomas van Linge³³

³³ Thomas van Linge, 01.02.2024, [The situation in Myanmar](#)

"Operation 1027" of the Three Brotherhood Alliance (3-TBA), which began on 27 October 2023, is seen as the turning point of the revolution in Myanmar³⁴. The 15,000 fighters of the 3-TBA include the Arakan Army (AA), the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), as well as allied rebel groups. The 3-TBA scored significant victories by taking control of the Kokang Self-Administered Zone and other areas bordering China.

In March 2024, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) also captured strategic military bases in Kachin State. In April 2024, the military's stronghold, the capital Naypyidaw, was attacked with drones for the first time in its history³⁵. The Myanmar Peace Monitor lists a total of 50 cities that the resistance forces took control of between October 2023 and March 2024, particularly along the critical trade routes on the Chinese and Thai borders³⁶.

Junta leader Min Aung Hlaing has lost huge territories and is facing unprecedented calls for his resignation. An air force major general labelled him "the worst leader in the history of the military", while even ultra-nationalists called for his resignation at different rallies³⁷. The year 2024 could prove decisive.

Air strikes

As the junta has suffered significant losses on the ground, it is increasingly using airstrikes against its own people³⁸. According to estimates by research group Nyan Lynn Thit Analytica, there were over 1,400 airstrikes in Myanmar by May 2023³⁹. Since then, the frequency of airstrikes has increased and by the end of 2023, more than 800 additional airstrikes had taken place⁴⁰, plus an unknown total number of airstrikes in the first four months of 2024. According to conservative estimates, the junta has thus flown more than 2,000 airstrikes against its own population since the coup, air strikes that have significantly increased in the first quarter of 2024.

Conscription Law

Myanmar's conscription law, the People's Military Service Law of 2010, was activated on 10 February 2024 against the backdrop of enormous territorial losses. The junta plans to recruit 60,000 people a year from a population it largely despises. This desperate move by a weakened junta⁴¹ has quickly led to chaos: reports of suicide among conscripts, an increased exodus abroad, killed military administrators tasked with enforcing conscription and mass resignations of responsible officials are now commonplace. The impact is expected to be far-reaching: unprecedented fear among Myanmar's more than 14 million youth, a mass exodus to escape the draft and a refugee crisis that is putting pressure on neighbouring countries⁴². The forced conscription could also lead to

³⁴ Brookings Institute, 16.01.24, [Changing the Tides of Myanmar's Civil War?](#)

³⁵ The Diplomat - Strangio, S. 05.04.24 - [Myanmar Resistance Forces Launch Drone Attack on Capital](#)

³⁶ Myanmar Peace Monitor, [50 Towns Captured and Controlled By Revolutionary Forces](#), 19.03.24

³⁷ Al Jazeera - Nachemson, A. 26.03.2024 [Backs to the wall: Myanmar military prepares to mark Armed Forces Day](#)

³⁸ Htein Htoo Zan, The Irrawaddy, 27.09.2023, [Central Myanmar sees 324 per cent increase in air strikes: UN](#)

³⁹ RFA Burmese, 24.05.2023, [Myanmar junta increasingly relying on airstrikes, research group says](#)

⁴⁰ UNHROHC, September 2023, [Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar](#)

⁴¹ Institute for Strategy and Policy Myanmar (ISP), 16.02.24, [Pandemonium: The conscription law and five negative potential consequences](#)

⁴² UNHROHC, 24.02.2024, [Myanmar: military junta even greater threat to civilians as it imposes military draft](#)

radicalisation and boost the various groups fighting the junta⁴³. The junta itself is also likely to suffer, not only because it is struggling to enforce conscription effectively, but also because conscripted soldiers are expected to reduce the junta's effectiveness.

Supply of weapons

Since the coup d'état in February 2021, several countries have been identified by the UN as arms suppliers to the junta in Myanmar⁴⁴:

Russia: A major supplier estimated to have delivered over USD 406 million worth of advanced weapons systems, including fighter jets and helicopters, since the coup.



China: Another important supplier, estimated to have sold USD 267 million worth of military equipment and material to the junta.

Singapore: Companies in Singapore have also been implicated in the supply of arms and related material to the Myanmar military worth approximately USD 254 million.

India: The UN reports that India supplied weapons worth USD 51 million to the junta after the coup.

Thailand: Thailand has also supplied the junta with military equipment totalling USD 28 million.

Sources of arms




In transactions accounting for 94% of the \$1 billion, the military itself—e.g., the Directorate of Procurement, Directorate of Defense Industries, or specific branches of the military like the Myanmar Air Force—was listed as recipient on trade-related documents, eliminating any doubt of who the end recipient would be.

Types of arms

The types of goods provided to the Myanmar military encompassed in the \$1 billion USD in military-related trade since the coup is staggering. The Special Rapporteur has identified:

fighter jets	reconnaissance & attack drones	tank upgrades
advanced missile systems	attack helicopters	radar complexes
radio & comms equipment	electronic warfare equipment	raw materials
components for naval ships	parts for small arms	parts for military vehicles
parts for weapons manufacture	manufacturing equipment for weapons	



Supplies to the domestic arms industry: Over \$160 million of the trade documented in this report relates to the purchase of raw materials, manufacturing machinery, tools, and equipment used in the production of weapons and ammunition within the Myanmar military's Directorate of Defense Industries arms factories (known in Burmese as Karkweye Pyitsee Setyone, or "KaPaSa").

UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, May 2023

c. Human rights situation

In March 2024, UN Human Rights Commissioner Volker Türk described the situation in Myanmar as a "never-ending nightmare"⁴⁵. The military's increased surveillance and repression have largely abolished basic human rights such as freedom of expression, assembly, association, privacy and movement⁴⁶. Furthermore, the brutality of the military regime in Myanmar is notorious, but the true extent of their atrocities is difficult to document due to the lack of free journalism.

⁴³ United States Institute of Peace (USIP) Ye Myo Hein, 26.02.24, [Myanmar's Fateful Conscription Law](#)


⁴⁴ United Nations Special Rapporteur on the situation of Human Rights in Myanmar, May 2023, [The Billion Dollar Death Trade: the international arms network that enable human rights violations in Myanmar](#)

⁴⁵ UN 2024, [Myanmar: Unbearable levels of suffering and cruelty](#)

⁴⁶ Amnesty International 2023, [Amnesty International Report 2022/23 - Myanmar](#)

Although there are no exact figures on the number of victims since the coup, the following list from various sources^{47 48 49 50} paints a bleak picture of a country in deep crisis:

- High estimates: The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) estimates a very high **death toll of at least 50,000** since the coup, including **at least 8,000 civilians**.
- Reported civilian deaths: A study by the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) found that **at least 6,337 civilians** were killed in the first 20 months after the coup (until September 2022).
- Verified deaths: The Assistance Association of Political Prisoners (AAPP) reported **4,961 verified deaths** and **20,387 verified detainees**.



Most of the deaths are not collateral damage, but politically motivated murder. Credible sources clearly document that women and young people are targeted and often tortured and raped to death⁵¹. The death penalty for the execution of political prisoners has been reintroduced after more than 30 years and has also been implemented several times despite international protest in order to silence political prisoners⁵². Furthermore, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of

⁴⁷ Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, 02.03.2024 [Myanmar](#)

⁴⁸ Peace Research Institute Oslo, 2023, [Counting Myanmar's dead: reported civilian casualties since the 2021 military coup](#)

⁴⁹ Action on Armed Violence, 03.03.2024 [Myanmar - three years of devastating. under reported war](#)

⁵⁰ Assistance Association of Political Prisoners, 29.03.2024 [Daily Briefing in relation to the military coup](#)

⁵¹ AAPP 2024, [Women Subjected to Sexual Violence during the Spring Revolution under the Military Coup](#)

⁵² Amnesty International 2022, [Myanmar: First executions in decades mark atrocious escalation in state repression](#)

Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimates that 78,000 civilian homes - i.e. buildings of no military significance whatsoever - have been completely destroyed⁵³.

It is therefore clear that the Myanmar junta systematically violates human rights with the aim of suppressing any resistance with psychological terror and a "strategy of violence"⁵⁴.

d. Humanitarian situation

The current United Nations Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP 3/2024) assumes that 18.6 million people throughout Myanmar will require humanitarian aid in 2024 (2022: 14.4 million, 2023: 17.6 million), including over six million children⁵⁵. People are struggling to survive in the midst of conflict and insecurity as well as rising inflation, which makes it extremely difficult for people to meet their basic needs. The armed conflict has displaced more than 2.4 million people since the coup⁵⁶ and tens of thousands have fled to neighbouring countries⁵⁷.

In 2023, only 3.2 million people were reached with aid, but this support was not as extensive and sustainable as planned due to underfunding and access restrictions. The total requirement for humanitarian aid in 2023 was stated as USD 994 million, but only 37% was ultimately funded⁵⁸. The HRP 2024 aims to reach 5.3 million people with urgent aid and states: "a repeat of the low funding levels of 2023 in 2024 would be catastrophic for the people affected."⁵⁹

Educational opportunities have also deteriorated for children and young people. The school infrastructure has collapsed in large parts of the country as a result of the fighting and the pandemic. In 2024 the proportion of people without access to educational facilities is now estimated at 4.5 million (compared to 3.7 million in 2023). By the end of 2024, a large proportion of these children and young people will have been cut off from educational institutions for half a decade. UNICEF therefore launched a Humanitarian Action Plan for Children in December 2023⁶⁰.

The humanitarian situation in Myanmar was also severely affected by Cyclone Mocha in May 2023, particularly in Rakhine State, when 1246 schools were severely damaged in Rakhine State and north-west Myanmar. The military administration in Nay Pyi Taw did not only delay disaster relief, but also made access impossible by launching air strikes. Access for humanitarian aid has been largely impossible since mid-November 2023⁶¹. The approximately 72,000 displaced Rohingya and Kaman people in refugee camps in Rakhine State, who can barely access humanitarian aid but almost

⁵³ UN OCHA 2024, [Myanmar Humanitarian Update No. 36](#)

⁵⁴ QUNO 2024, [Marking Three Years of Military Rule in Myanmar](#)

⁵⁵ UN OCHA 2024, [Myanmar Humanitarian Update No. 36](#)

⁵⁶ Aung Soe Thet, Zaw Wai Soe, Win Thuzar Aye, Cynthia Maung, Lars Lien, Ole Petter Otternson, et al. 28.03.2024, [Three years after the Myanmar military coup - the people are suffering](#)

⁵⁷ European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations, January 2024, [5 things you need to know about Myanmar's humanitarian crisis](#)

⁵⁸ UN OCHA 2024

⁵⁹ *ibid.*

⁶⁰ UNICEF 2023, [Humanitarian Action for Children - Myanmar](#)

⁶¹ *ibid.*

completely dependent on such support, continue to be among the worst affected⁶². It is therefore no coincidence that most of the 400+ people who died as a result of the cyclone were Rohingya⁶³.

Localisation of humanitarian aid

There is growing criticism of international humanitarian aid in Myanmar. Observers emphasise that local, informal civil society groups are making a far greater contribution than UN agencies. In response to the revolution, such groups - often courageous women, former refugees and activists - are working tirelessly to reach millions of displaced people and those in need of assistance. These groups have a far greater reach than the INGOs funded under the HRP. In a survey conducted in late 2022, only 6% of Myanmar respondents said they had received assistance from the formal humanitarian sector, while 35% pointed to support from local groups. A USAID-funded report therefore comes to a sobering conclusion in its assessment of international humanitarian aid: "When 80% of aid is limited to the areas controlled by one belligerent, it cannot be considered impartial de facto. When it is primarily food aid, and very few other needs are being met, it cannot be considered effective."⁶⁴

e. Economic situation

The military coup of 2021 has significantly impacted the country's economic development: Last year, the World Bank forecast GDP growth of 1% for the current financial year in Myanmar, which ends in March 2024. The forecast implies that economic output in 2024 will still be around 10% lower than in 2019, as the effects of the conflict and misguided market interventions affecting both the supply and demand side of the economy persist. The consumer price index points to inflation of almost 29% in the first half of 2023⁶⁵.

Household incomes continue to be impacted by the cumulative effects of the conflict, such as inflation and the lack of medical care. In the first half of 2023, 40% of households reported a lower income than in the previous year⁶⁶. It is estimated that almost half of the population lives below the poverty line.

Fuel prices have risen by almost 370% since 2020⁶⁷. Households and businesses are struggling with frequent power cuts. Diesel is needed to run generators during powerless hours, which drives up operating costs. A study by the World Bank in the textile sector shows that 62% of factories have to generate their entire electricity consumption using their own generators. The total losses due to power outages were estimated at around 31 per cent of the total annual turnover of textile

⁶² UN OCHA 2024, [Myanmar Humanitarian Update No. 32](#)

⁶³ Peter Hornung, [At least 400 dead after cyclone "Mocha"](#), Tagesschau, 16 May 2023

⁶⁴ Harvey, P., Stoddard, A., Czarano, M., et al. (2023) [Humanitarian Access SCORE report: Myanmar: survey on the coverage, operational reach, and effectiveness of humanitarian aid](#)

⁶⁵ World Bank 2023, [Myanmar Economic Monitor - December 2023](#)

⁶⁶ Myanmar Agriculture Policy Support Activity (MAPSA). 2023. [Vulnerability and welfare: Findings from the fifth round of the Myanmar Household Welfare Survey \(March - June 2023\)](#). Myanmar SSP Working Paper 44. Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).

⁶⁷ Frontier Myanmar, [Soaring fuel prices hit transport sector as living costs jump](#); 10.05.2022

companies in 2022.⁶⁸ Foreign direct investment has decreased by 60% between 2021 and 2022⁶⁹, implying that infrastructure problems will continue.

The armed conflict that has escalated in the country since October 2023 has disrupted key border trade routes with India, China and Thailand, impacting international trade⁷⁰. In the first six months of the financial year 2024, 40% of exports and 21% of imports took place overland. Major transport routes within Myanmar are blocked, restricting the movement of people and goods and leading to shortages of food and other staples in local markets⁷¹.

Out-migration has increased due to the conflict, falling real incomes and reduced economic opportunities, exacerbating labour shortages⁷². The armed conflict has also triggered migration within Myanmar to safer areas - particularly Yangon - driving up prices in the rental market⁷³. Forced conscription has increased the exodus of young people out of the country, accelerating the brain drain and labour shortage.

f. The situation for employees and trade unions

The conditions for independent trade unions changed abruptly with the military coup. Trade unions were banned and workers' rights and fundamental principles of the ILO, such as freedom of association, were suspended. Just a few days after the coup in February 2021, the ILO reported that police and military raided trade unionists' homes⁷⁴. Many trade union officials therefore fled into exile or went underground. On 2 March 2021, 16 trade unions were declared "illegal organisations" by the SAC⁷⁵. In April 2021, the leading representative of the Myanmar Women's Trade Union STUM, Daw Myo Aye, was arrested⁷⁶. More than 20 union leaders have been issued arrest warrants by the military junta, reports Khaing Zar Aung⁷⁷, acting president of the Confederation of Myanmar Industrial Trade Unions (currently in exile in Germany).

The combined attacks on labour rights and civil liberties have a significant impact on employees in Myanmar companies. Many goods produced in Myanmar are exported to Europe and Germany, especially textiles. Myanmar is one of the poorest countries in the world and therefore enjoys the benefits of the EU's 'Everything-But-Arms' (EBA) trade agreement, which allows for duty-free and quota-free access to the European market. The clothing industry in particular makes use of this. Companies producing in Myanmar included Primark and H&M, which withdrew from production in Myanmar in 2023⁷⁸. The withdrawal of EBA privileges is being called for by the major international trade union confederations. For quite a few employees in Myanmar, this would mean the loss of their only remaining source of income. At the same time, however, it is clear that brands producing in

⁶⁸ World Bank 2023, [Resilience Amid Constraints : Myanmar's Garment Industry in 2023](#)

⁶⁹ World Bank Open Data, [Foreign direct investment, net inflows \(BoP, current US\\$\) - Myanmar](#)

⁷⁰ The Irrawaddy, [Myanmar-Thai Border Trade Plummetts Again as Fighting, Restrictions Take Toll](#), 29.2.2024

⁷¹ World Bank 2023, [Myanmar Economic Monitor - December 2023](#)

⁷² *ibid.*

⁷³ Ant Pwe Aung, [Living just enough for the city: Yangon rent prices on the rise](#), Frontier Myanmar, 07.03.2024

⁷⁴ ILO 2021, [ILO statement on Myanmar](#)

⁷⁵ Khaing Zar Aung, [Myanmar: trade unionists in the firing line](#), Social Europe, 19.04.2023

⁷⁶ BHRRC, [HRD Attack - Daw Myo Myo Aye - Solidarity Trade Union of Myanmar \(STUM\)](#)

⁷⁷ Petra Brännmark, [Interview: Khaing Zar](#), Global Worker (May 2021)

⁷⁸ Don-Alvin Adegeest, [H&M wants to phase out sourcing in Myanmar](#), Fashion United, 21.08.2023

Myanmar are barely able to fulfil their duty of care along the supply chains. Cambodia's EBA status was withdrawn in 2020 with reference to the human rights situation⁷⁹. The Business and Human Rights Resource Centre (BHRRC)⁸⁰ and a report by the ILO Commission of Inquiry⁸¹ show that living and working conditions for workers in Myanmar have deteriorated dramatically since the military coup:

The significant increase in labour and human rights violations against employees since the military took power includes wage theft, arbitrary dismissals, inhumane working conditions and compulsory overtime. Documented cases also include killings and arbitrary detention of workers, gender-based violence, attacks on freedom of association and child labour. These cases are probably just the tip of the iceberg, as civil liberties and reporting are severely restricted under military rule and workers who denounce abuses face reprisals.

g. Civil society

Civil society in Myanmar must now be considered as one of the most terrorised and oppressed in the world, but at the same time one of the most resilient. In its report published after the 2021 coup, IDEA explicitly highlighted Myanmar as the country with the "most dramatic democratic backsliding" in the region⁸² and accordingly rates democratic representation as a "0" in 2024⁸³. Freedom House comes to similar conclusions and classifies the country as "not free", with 0/40 points for political rights and 8/60 points for civil rights⁸⁴. Transparency International now classifies Myanmar as very corrupt and ranks it 162/180 on the global Corruption Perceptions Index⁸⁵.

The media is completely suppressed and civil society organisations (CSOs) are forced to stay out of politics or flee the country. What remains astonishing, but largely unknown in the international community, is how civil society groups are nevertheless resisting the regime in diverse and very creative ways. Former government employees, part of the "civil disobedience movement", continue to refuse to work for the regime⁸⁶. Many young activists in particular, mainly young women, oppose the regime both openly and secretly, risking their lives on a daily basis⁸⁷.

h. Situation of women and marginalised groups

In the past, women in Myanmar have been involved at all levels of resistance movements and have contributed to democratic developments just like their male counterparts⁸⁸. The same is true since the coup in 2021: a significant increase in women's activism across the country has been very

⁷⁹ EC 2020, [Cambodia loses duty-free access to the EU market over human rights concerns](#)

⁸⁰ BHRRC, [Myanmar garment worker allegations tracker](#), accessed 21.04.2024

⁸¹ ILO 2023, [ILO Myanmar Commission of Inquiry finds far-reaching violations of freedom of association and forced labour Conventions](#)

⁸² IDEA 2021, [The State of Democracy in Asia and the Pacific 2021](#).

⁸³ IDEA, [Myanmar Country Page](#), 07.04.2024

⁸⁴ Freedom House 2024, [Freedom in the World 2024 - Myanmar](#)

⁸⁵ Transparency International, [Myanmar Country Page](#), 07.04.2024

⁸⁶ Emily Fishbein, [Myanmar's striking civil servants: Displaced, forgotten, but holding on](#), Al Jazeera, 29.08.2023

⁸⁷ Naw Hser Hser and Maggi Quadrini, [Three Years After the Myanmar Coup, Women Human Rights Defenders Remain at the Forefront](#), The Diplomat, 31.01.2024

⁸⁸ Asienhaus: Blickwechsel Myanmar: Feminismus in einem intersektionalem Widerstand?
<https://www.asienhaus.de/aktuelles/blickwechsel-myanmar-feminismus-in-einem-intersektionalem-widerstand#fancybox-4711>

visible⁸⁹. Women and the LGBTIQ+ community continue to be involved in various areas of the resistance movement. From organising underground civilian demonstrations to participating as fighters or providing medical support, women often take the lead. The participation of women and marginalised groups in the resistance is actually about as high as that of men⁹⁰. Nevertheless, the situation has worsened particularly for women and marginalised groups.

The impact of armed conflict on women and girls has been severe, especially in ethnic areas of Myanmar, and not just since the coup. Junta soldiers have been using rape as a weapon of war for decades⁹¹. The number of female victims is increasing due to the frequent airstrikes on civilians throughout the country. According to data from the Women's League of Burma (WLB), at least 708 women have died since the coup - these are verified cases and the actual death toll is likely much higher. From February 2021 to December 2023, the number of deaths increased dramatically by about 46%⁹². UN Women estimates that the number of women who had to leave their homes between 2021 and 2023 rose from 336,000 to 1.9 million. In addition, the psychological burden that women have to cope with should not be underestimated. A sense of insecurity permeates daily life, and it is estimated that at least one in three women do not feel safe at night⁹³. AAPP found that the junta oppresses women in many ways⁹⁴, including through inhumane violence, arrests, beatings, torture and interrogations that violate their dignity, sexual violence in prison and rape, before brutally murdering them.

When the military announced the conscription law on 10th February 2024, it claimed that women would not be called up for the time being. However, there have been several reports that women have also been called up by name. LGBTIQ+ people are concerned about the tightening of the conscription law as it may lead to discriminatory acts on the part of the military junta - such as humiliation, dehumanisation, sexual assault and being sent to the front lines as cannon fodder. In an interview with HI (Honest Information), some LGBTIQ+ reported that they saw no way out as their names were on the list and decided to take their own lives⁹⁵.

i. Situation of ethnic minorities

Ethnic minorities in Myanmar

Since the country's independence in 1948, ethnicity and conflict have been inextricably linked in Myanmar, leading to a vicious cycle of violence that continues to escalate⁹⁶.

Myanmar is a country with more than 135 ethnic minorities. Each ethnic group has its own identity and language as well as cultural and political values. For decades, the main demands of Myanmar's

⁸⁹ Than, T., [Myanmar Women's activism after the February 2021 coup - On the front lines: Women's Mobilization for Democracy in an era of backsliding](#), Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 21.03.2024

⁹⁰ Stiftung Asienhaus: [Blickwechsel Myanmar: Feminismus in einem intersektionalem Widerstand?](#)

⁹¹ Begum, T. 5.11.2023, [Myanmar's military commanders responsible for rape and torture - war crimes report](#) The Guardian

⁹² Women's League of Burma 2023, [July - December 2023 Situation Update of Burma/Myanmar](#)

⁹³ UN Women 2023, [Our Work in Myanmar](#)

⁹⁴ AAPP, 1st March 2024, [Women subjected to sexual violence during the Spring Revolution under the Military coup](#)

⁹⁵ [Effects of the Conscription Law on LGBTIQ+ in Myanmar](#) (in Burmese)

⁹⁶ International Crisis Group, 2020, [Identity Crisis: Ethnicity and Conflict in Myanmar](#)

ethnic minorities have been to gain genuine autonomy for their areas and to have a meaningful say in the affairs of the country as a whole. Myanmar's ethnic minorities have been fighting for their ethnic and political rights for decades, as successive dictators in Myanmar have pursued a policy of "Burmanisation"⁹⁷, ranging from the suppression of the teaching of ethnic history, language and culture to military attacks, human rights violations and atrocities on civilians⁹⁸.

The Karen National Union (KNU) was the first Ethnic Revolutionary Organisation (ERO) to resist militarily. Since then numerous armed groups have emerged, often accompanied by corresponding political wings. Some groups disbanded, renamed themselves and rejoined the struggle.⁹⁹

Over the past three decades, the term "peace process" has often been used in Myanmar to describe efforts to end the country's long-running political and ethnic conflicts. In the final years before the coup, efforts were centred on a Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) and the 21st Century Panglong Conference (the follow-up to Panglong in 1947). These initiatives were abruptly ended by the military coup on 1 February 2021¹⁰⁰.

Ethnic minorities since the coup

After the military coup, young people, who did not want to accept the injustices of the military, fled into the jungle, where Ethnic Revolutionary Organisations (EROs) have their bases. The young people were taken in, harboured and trained by the EROs to fight back against the military. Significant victories and territorial gains by the EROs since 2023 show that mutual respect and trust exist on the ground. Many of the groups now fighting against the military junta aim to engage in political dialogue on building a federal democratic nation.

Despite increasing military successes, the human rights situation of ethnic minorities continues to deteriorate - particularly due to the forced recruitment of Rohingya and Kaman Muslims in Rakhine State¹⁰¹. In the areas where most ethnic minorities live - such as the Chin, Kachin, Karen and Karenni (formerly Kayah) - airstrikes by the military increased significantly in 2023. In some regions, airstrikes have increased by more than 300 per cent in the last year¹⁰².

Rohingya minority

The Rohingya are a predominantly Muslim ethnic group that lives mainly in south-western Rakhine State. According to the Citizenship Law (1982), they do not officially belong to the 135 indigenous population groups of Myanmar. They are not recognised as citizens and are officially stateless. The UN categorises them as the most persecuted minority in the world.

In the summer of 2017 more than one million Muslim Rohingya were displaced from Myanmar, which is predominantly Buddhist. They fled mass rape, torture and murder, carried out in particular by the junta. Most of the Rohingya fled to Cox Bazar in Bangladesh, which is considered the largest refugee camp in the world. An estimated 1.35 million Rohingya refugees are currently in

⁹⁷ Burmese Domestic Policy: [The Politics of Burmanisation](#)

⁹⁸ Burma Campaign UK: [Burma's Constitution - Denying ethnic rights](#)

⁹⁹ Graceffo, A. 27.02.2024. [Backgrounder: Ethnic Armies in the Myanmar Civil War](#), Geopolitical Monitor

¹⁰⁰ Transnational Institute, October 2023. [The Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement in Myanmar](#)

¹⁰¹ Voice Of America (VOA). [Video Rohingya forcibly recruited into Myanmar Military](#)

¹⁰² Human Rights Watch, [World Report Myanmar 2023](#)

Bangladesh¹⁰³. Human Rights Watch estimates that 600,000 more Rohingya remain in Myanmar and are being held by the junta in an "apartheid system"¹⁰⁴. In the current fighting between the Arakan Army and the junta they are at risk of being abused as human shields. This year there have been increasing reports of forced recruitment by the junta¹⁰⁵.

The future of the Rohingya is still unclear. A clarification or explanation of the situation for this ethnic group must be demanded both by the dominant ERO in Rakhine State, the Arakan Army, and by the democracy movement. The Acting President of the NUG, Duwa Lashi La, recently announced the recognition of citizenship rights for the Rohingya and the abolition of the 1982 Citizenship Law¹⁰⁶.

j. Climate change, biodiversity & natural resources

Myanmar is one of the countries in the world hardest hit by the climate crisis - in the first 20 years of the 21st century, no country apart from Puerto Rico had suffered comparable damage and losses due to climate change¹⁰⁷. The United Nations categorises 40% of Myanmar's population as extremely vulnerable to climate change, environmental degradation and disasters¹⁰⁸.

The country is also one of the 10 irreplaceable hotspots for biodiversity. Myanmar's natural ecosystems are among the most intact in the world. Between 2010 and 2020 alone, 100 new species were discovered. This makes the threat posed by the military junta to the preservation of Myanmar's biodiversity and ecosystems all the more dramatic. At the COP28 conference, United Nations experts stated: "The military junta, increasingly isolated from the global economy and cash-strapped, has accelerated the exploitation of Myanmar's natural resources, including timber, jade and rare earths, to fund its human rights abuses. Increased resource extraction, often unregulated and supported by the military or other armed groups, is harming the environment, polluting water sources, devastating forests and exacerbating climate change risks."¹⁰⁹

k. Organised crime

Organised crime has increased dramatically since the military coup in 2021: Myanmar currently ranks first in the world on the Global Organised Crime Index¹¹⁰. An important driver of crime is the international drug trade. In 2023, UNODC reported that Myanmar has now replaced Afghanistan as the largest producer of opium¹¹¹. There is also an extensive industry for human trafficking and online fraud. Syndicates and triads that engage in this forced scamming have set up their own 15 criminal zones on the Thai and Chinese borders, holding more than 100,000 people in slave-like conditions and forcing them to work up to 20 hours a day to earn billions through cyberscams¹¹². "Forced

¹⁰³ FAO, IOM, Plan International, 13.3.2024, [Joint Response Plan Rohingya Humanitarian Crisis 2024](#)

¹⁰⁴ Human Rights Watch, September 2023, [Düstere Zukunft für Rohingya in Bangladesh und Myanmar](#)

¹⁰⁵ Myanmar Now, 15.2.24, [Five Forcibly recruited Rohingya men killed in battle in Rakhine State](#)

¹⁰⁶ Deccan Herald, 2.4.24, [The Tuesday Interview with NUG Acting President Duwa Lashi La](#)

¹⁰⁷ Germanwatch 2021, [Global Climate Risk Index](#)

¹⁰⁸ MIMU 2022, [Climate, Environmental Degradation and Disaster Risk in Myanmar](#)

¹⁰⁹ OHCHR 2023, [Press Release - Military coup has exacerbated already severe climate risks in Myanmar: UN experts](#)

¹¹⁰ Global Initiative against Transnational Organised Crime 2023, [Global Organised Crime Index](#)

¹¹¹ UNDOC 2023, [Southeast Asia Opium Survey 2023: Cultivation, Production and Implications](#)


¹¹² JFM, ["Forced Scamming"](#), accessed 2024-03-09

scamming is now seen as a global threat to public safety. "What began as a regional criminal threat has developed into a global human trafficking crisis," says Jürgen Stock, Secretary General of INTERPOL¹¹³.

3. Assessment of German Myanmar Policy

a. Scorecard Federal Government

Germany's engagement in Myanmar since the military coup can be divided into six dimensions: (1) international diplomacy, (2) measures against the junta, (3) measures for the democratic opposition, (4) humanitarian aid and development cooperation, (5) asylum, refugees & diaspora, and (6) international accountability. Germany Solidarity Myanmar's assessment provides a nuanced but also very mixed picture of German Myanmar policy with concrete measures that should be prioritised in 2024-2025 (see p. 25).



b. International diplomacy

United Nations: Germany voted in favour of the UN resolution of 18 June 2021, which called for an end to the military coup and the brutal crackdown on protests¹¹⁴. It uses its membership of UN bodies such as the Human Rights Council to call for an end to the violence, the release of political

¹¹³ Interpol 2023, [INTERPOL issues global warning on human trafficking-fuelled fraud](#)

¹¹⁴ UNGA 2021, [The situation in Myanmar : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly](#)

prisoners and the implementation of ASEAN's Five Point Consensus - most recently at the 54th session of the HRC in October 2023¹¹⁵.

ASEAN: The ASEAN Five Point Consensus supported by the German government - which provides for a ceasefire, negotiations and humanitarian aid - has only existed on paper for almost three years now¹¹⁶. Simply referring to ASEAN's central role in resolving the Myanmar crisis is therefore far from sufficient. There was no progress to report in 2023 for new formats or approaches, such as a "Friends of Myanmar" group of countries.

Rating federal government: 2/5

c. Political measures against the military junta

Sanctions: Germany supports the eight sanctions packages adopted by the European Council against individuals, companies and institutions and played a key role in shaping them together with the EU member states France and Denmark¹¹⁷. As members of the military junta and their supporters in most cases have no assets within the European Union, the effect of these sanctions is mainly symbolic. Bilateral and multilateral initiatives to extend the sanctions regime to countries such as Japan, South Korea and Singapore could have a greater real impact on the junta. Overall, the use of targeted sanctions (rather than blanket sanctions that would affect the population as a whole) is positively emphasised by most observers¹¹⁸.

Legitimacy: The most decisive measure taken by the German government since the military coup remains the de facto expulsion of Myanmar's military attaché in Berlin in February 2022, a blow to the legitimacy of the military junta¹¹⁹.

Since then, however, Germany has also been involved in incidents that have benefited the legitimacy of the military junta. Most recently, the BMBF published a funding guideline for cooperation projects between the EU and ASEAN on the topic of the circular economy, in which Myanmar with its junta-led Ministry of Science and Technology (MoST) was included in the list of possible partner countries¹²⁰. In general, it should be noted that the German government does not appear to explicitly rule out the participation of the military junta in cooperation projects it funds with ASEAN. This plays directly into the hands of the junta. Participation in civil society formats such as the Berlin Foreign Policy Forum 2023 is also used by the junta for propaganda purposes¹²¹.

Rating Federal Government: 3/5

¹¹⁵ UN 2023, [High Commissioner report on Myanmar - 23rd Meeting, 54th Regular Session of Human Rights Council](#)

¹¹⁶ ASEAN 2023, [Asean Leaders' Review and Decision on the Implementation of the Five-Point Consensus](#)

¹¹⁷ EU Council 2023, [Myanmar/Burma: Council adds 4 persons and 2 entities to EU sanctions list in eighth round of sanctions](#)

¹¹⁸ Willis and Preble 2024, [3 years on from coup, economic sanctions look unlikely to push Myanmar back to democracy](#)

¹¹⁹ GSM 2022, [A strong signal for democracy - in Germany and Myanmar!](#)

¹²⁰ Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung 2023, [Bekanntmachung](#)

¹²¹ Myanmar Ministry Of Foreign Affairs 2023, [Facebook official site](#)

d. Political measures to support the pro-democracy opposition

Legitimacy: The German government is maintaining dialogue with the National Unity Government (NUG) (e.g. meetings between Minister of State Tobias Lindner and NUG Foreign Minister Zin Mar Aung). The invitation of NUG and representatives of Ethnic Resistance Organisations to the Munich Security Conference 2024 has given the Myanmar democracy movement greater visibility, even though Myanmar hardly played a role in the conference agenda.

To date, Germany does not yet officially recognise the NUG as the legitimate government of Myanmar and does not conduct exchanges at cabinet level. Parliamentary contacts with the CRPH have also been limited. Within the EU, however, France¹²² and the Czech Republic¹²³ have already authorised and supported the opening of representative offices.

Material support: To date, there has been no concrete support for local governance structures and government services, such as the nearly 6,000 schools and 254 hospitals and clinics administered by the National Unity Government¹²⁴. In contrast to the Burma Act in the United States, the federal government has not yet provided "technical and non-lethal support" - such as radar and communications equipment, protective gear and medical supplies - to NUG, EROs and other pro-democracy institutions¹²⁵.

Capacity building: Some political foundations in Germany support the democracy movement with political education and capacity building. Additional funding and the involvement of broad expertise from German civil society could allow for an even more effective contribution. All institutions within the democracy movement need broader access to appropriate educational programmes.

Rating Federal Government: 2/5

e. Humanitarian aid and development cooperation

Humanitarian aid: The United Nations estimates that 18.6 million people, more than a third of the country, will need humanitarian aid in 2024 (compared to 1 million before the military coup). The country is therefore also ranked 5th on the International Rescue Committee's 2024 Emergency Watchlist¹²⁶. Nevertheless, only 38% of the 2023 Humanitarian Response Plan for Myanmar was funded by international donors. With USD 20.5 million, Germany contributed just 6% to these efforts - far behind the USA, Australia and Japan¹²⁷. In addition to an increase in funding, direct cooperation with CSOs, EROs and NUG is essential.

Development cooperation: In light of the expulsion of the Rohingya, the BMZ decided in spring 2020 to phase out bilateral development cooperation with Myanmar when the current projects came to

¹²² NUG, [NUG REPRESENTATIVE OFFICE - The French Republic](#)

¹²³ NUG, [NUG REPRESENTATIVE OFFICE - The Czech Republic](#)

¹²⁴ NUG 2024, Announcement: Interim Implementation of Local Administration and Social Services

¹²⁵ Center for Strategic and International Studies 2023, [What the Burma Act Does and Doesn't Mean for U.S. Policy in Myanmar](#).

¹²⁶ International Rescue Committee 2024, [Inside the 2024 Emergency Watchlist](#)

¹²⁷ UNOCHA, [Myanmar Humanitarian Response Plan 2023](#)

an end. The few remaining projects are being supported via special budget items, such as transitional aid and the Special Initiative on Displacement¹²⁸.

Rating federal government: 2/5

f. Refugees, asylum & diaspora

Asylum: Since the military coup, 436 Myanmar nationals have applied for asylum in Germany. During this period, only 118 applications were recognised and 144 were rejected¹²⁹.

	Year 2021	Year 2022	Year 2023	Total
Asylum claims	88	142	206	436
Asylum decisions	118	70	147	335
<i>Granted political asylum</i>	4	10	25	39
<i>Granted full refugee status</i>	10	16	28	54
<i>Granted subsidiary refugee status</i>	13	7	5	25
<i>Deportation stop</i>	1	2	1	4
<i>Rejections</i>	80	20	44	144
<i>Other procedures</i>	10	15	44	69

Resettlement: More than 45,000 Myanmar refugees have arrived in Thailand since the coup. They have limited access to the education and healthcare system and their resettlement to third countries is proceeding slowly¹³⁰. Under the UNHCR resettlement programme, only 129 Myanmar nationals have been admitted to the EU since 2021, the majority in France and none of them in Germany - compared to 24,182 people who found refuge in the USA in 2023 alone¹³¹. The German government should advocate for better conditions for Myanmar refugees in Thailand and work to ensure that the first contingents can also leave for Germany via the resettlement programme.

Passport renewal: The renewal of passports causes enormous problems for Myanmar nationals living in Myanmar and worldwide^{132,133}, including in Germany¹³⁴. Renewals are often refused, passports are withheld and huge fines are charged. This leaves politically active people and refugees in particular stateless on German soil, as it is not possible to renew their passports that are only valid for five years. The junta-run Myanmar embassy in Berlin is not fulfilling its obligations towards the diaspora.

Rating federal government: 1/5

g. International accountability

International Court of Justice: On 15 November 2023, Germany joined the proceedings initiated by The Gambia before the International Court of Justice on the genocide against the Rohingya. "Germany feels a special obligation to contribute to the prevention, investigation and combating of

¹²⁸ GIZ, [Myanmar Country Page](#), 07.04.2024

¹²⁹ BAMF 2021, [application, decision and portfolio statistics](#); BAMF 2022, [application, decision and portfolio statistics](#); BAMF 2023, [application, decision and portfolio statistics](#)

¹³⁰ Human Rights Watch 2023, [Thailand: Recent Refugees Pushed Back to Myanmar](#)

¹³¹ UNHCR, as of 29/03/2024, [Resettlement Finder](#)

¹³² Sa Tun Aung, 30.10.2023, [Myanmar regime cancels passports of expatriates in Singapore](#)

¹³³ Handley, E. 24.07.2022, [Myanmar Nationals in Australia face passport limbo](#)

¹³⁴ Myanmar Embassy Berlin, February 2024, [Announcement of the plan to levy income tax on the salary of foreign nationals](#)

possible genocide and to send a signal that states will be held accountable for acts of genocide," said the statement from the Federal Foreign Office¹³⁵.

Fortify Rights: In January 2023, the American human rights organisation Fortify Rights filed a complaint against the junta with the German public prosecutor's office in accordance with the principle of universal jurisdiction. Two Myanmar refugees living in Germany were involved in the complaint. In November 2023, it became known that the Federal Public Prosecutor's Office in Karlsruhe had decided not to initiate an investigation into the complaint¹³⁶.

Rating Federal Government: 3/5

4. Political demands

Germany cannot free Myanmar from its dictatorship, but it can oppose the junta more resolutely and support the democracy movement more effectively:

Political measures

Condemnation, pressure and no legitimisation of the junta: Germany and the EU should continue to strongly condemn the military coup and the daily human rights violations. This can be done through public statements, resolutions at the United Nations, resolutions of the European Council or Parliament and direct diplomatic channels. In order not to legitimise the junta, we also demand that the military junta be denied participation in meetings and events (especially within the framework of ASEAN) in which Germany and the EU participate or which are financially supported by Germany and the EU.

Stronger sanctions and bilateral pressure: We call on the German government and the EU, in cooperation with partners such as the US and the UK, to impose further sanctions against the military junta and its business partners and to accelerate their implementation. Bilateral pressure must be used to convince Australia, South Korea, Singapore and Japan to join new rounds of sanctions.

Targeted sanctions against aviation fuel: The EU has so far only sanctioned three aviation fuel suppliers: Asia Sun Group, Asia Sun Trading and Asia Sun Energy¹³⁷, although organisations such as Amnesty International and Justice For Myanmar have been listing at least 53 companies since November 2022¹³⁸, which are connected to Asia Sun Group as the main supplier, but are still not on the EU sanctions list. Germany and the EU should also sanction intermediaries in countries such as

¹³⁵ Federal Foreign Office 2023, [Statement on the occasion of Germany's accession to the genocide proceedings before the ICJ against Myanmar](#).

¹³⁶ Fortify Rights 2023, [German Federal Prosecutor Declines to Investigate Myanmar Atrocities, Fortify Rights Committed to Ending Impunity](#)

¹³⁷ [EU sanctions list](#) April 2024

¹³⁸ Amnesty International, November 2022, [Deadly Cargo: exposing the supply chain that fuels war crimes in Myanmar](#)

¹³⁹ Justice For Myanmar, 22 November 2024: [Myanmar Jet Fuel Companies for Targeted Sanctions](#)

Vietnam¹⁴⁰ and advocate for a complete ban on the export of aviation fuel to Myanmar, as recently called for by the UN Human Rights Council¹⁴¹.

Involvement, cooperation and continuous dialogue with the National Unity Government (NUG), Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH) and the Ethnic Revolutionary Organisations: The Federal Government should ensure continuous dialogue with NUG (including at cabinet level), while the Bundestag should maintain a regular exchange with the elected members of the CRPH. Germany and the EU should create a framework for financial and so-called "non-lethal support" for NUGs and EROs, based on the Burma Act in the USA.

Pressure on ASEAN: The German government and the EU should exert greater pressure on the organisation to bring about a solution to the crisis. We call for Myanmar to play a central role in the new EU-ASEAN Strategic Partnership within the area of "Security Cooperation" and for new initiatives that go beyond the Five Point Consensus to be launched at the 25th EU/ASEAN Ministerial Meeting.

Establishment of a "Friends of Myanmar" group: We call on the German government to actively participate in the establishment of an informal association of nations that support the Myanmar democracy movement. Such a group of "Friends of Myanmar" has been proposed several times by the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar. This group would support the democratic aspirations of the people of Myanmar and launch targeted initiatives to deprive the military junta of arms, funding and legitimacy.

Stronger parliamentary engagement: We call on the Bundestag to establish a formal or informal parliamentary group of supporters, similar to the one that exists for Taiwan, for the Myanmar democracy movement. MPs should regularly scrutinise the German government's Myanmar policy in the Committees on Foreign Affairs, Humanitarian Aid and Human Rights, and Economic Cooperation and Development.

Humanitarian aid

Organisation of an international donor conference for Myanmar: Germany, together with France and the European Commission, should organise a donor conference based on the model of the "International Humanitarian Conference for Sudan and the Neighbouring Countries"¹⁴². The idea of the former UN Special Envoy of an Inclusive Humanitarian Forum involving NUGs, EROs and CSOs could serve as a blueprint¹⁴³.

Increasing humanitarian aid via cross-border mechanisms and local civil society organisations: A massive increase in aid for and through civil society organisations and cross-border mechanisms would enable donors to reach millions of the country's most needy. These groups have decades of experience and are therefore the most efficient providers of aid, but are often unable to access international funds due to bureaucratic requirements (such as official registration with the junta-run ministry).

¹⁴⁰ Amnesty International 2024, [Myanmar: New data suggests military still importing fuel for deadly air strikes despite sanctions](#)

¹⁴¹ OHCHR 2024, [Human Rights Council Adopts Seven Resolutions, Extends Mandates on the Human Rights of Persons with Albinism, Iran and Myanmar](#)

¹⁴² EC 2024, [EU, France and Germany announce International Humanitarian Conference to support Sudan](#)

¹⁴³ UN 2023, [Remarks by Noeleen Heyzer, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Myanmar at the General Assembly](#)

Funding for the National Unity Government (NUG) and Ethnic Revolutionary Organisations: Substantial funding for the NUG and allied ethnic and civil society actors should help consolidate services and infrastructure in areas such as healthcare, education, justice and administration. For these reasons, we call for 30% of humanitarian aid to be channelled through the NUG and its partners rather than through international humanitarian actors who collaborate with the military junta. Alternatively, additional funds should be made available for this purpose.

Support for civil society

Funding for civil society groups: Germany and the EU could provide more financial support to independent media, human rights groups and pro-democracy organisations on the Myanmar-Thailand border and beyond, e.g. via the European Endowment for Democracy.

Promoting democratic principles: Supporting initiatives that promote democratic values, civic education and the rule of law can strengthen Myanmar's civil society in the long term. This could include, for example, support for the development of federal institutions and administration. The German government should provide additional financial resources for political foundations in this area.

Measures for refugees

Take in Myanmar refugees: The German government should follow the French example and take in Myanmar refugees from neighbouring countries such as Thailand via the UNHCR's resettlement programme. At the same time, the Interior Ministry should make it easier for Myanmar refugees to obtain asylum in Germany. In addition, the Interior Ministry, in cooperation with the Federal Foreign Office, should provide targeted support for democracy activists, journalists and other civil society actors so they are able to depart for Germany. Training programmes, for example in the care sector (to counteract the shortage of skilled workers in Germany), should also be made more accessible by reducing bureaucratic hurdles.

5. Short press review

The press review includes selected articles in German language from March 2023 onwards. For older reports, please refer to the first Political Briefing of German Solidarity Myanmar from March 2023¹⁴⁴

2023

The Kanbalu massacre (April 23) and other human rights violations:

- [Spiegel, April 23, Militär verübt Massaker an Zivilisten in Sagaing-Region](#)
- [Die Zeit, April 23, V. Hölzl, Der Krieg, den keiner kennt](#)
- [taz v. Aug. 23, M. Lenz, Terror gegen das eigene Land](#)

Humanitarian situation and cyclone "Mocha" (Aug 23):

- [Spiegel, Aug 23, Grosse Verzweiflung nach Zyklon Mocha](#)
- [taz August 23, M. Lenz: Mord zwischen Buddhastatuen](#)

¹⁴⁴ German Solidarity Myanmar, March 2023, [Political Briefing Myanmar](#)

Economic news:

- [Spiegel \(April 23\) Illegaler Teakholz-Handel in die EU + Deutschland](#)
- [Spiegel, Aug 23, H&M kappt Lieferbeziehungen zu Myanmar](#)
- [Spiegel, Okt 23, Wie deutsche Satellitentechnik in eine Militärdiktatur gelangte](#)
- [ZDF frontal \(Okt 23\) - Myanmar Files: Deutsche Technik für Diktatoren](#)
- [Tagesspiegel v. 12.12.23, Myanmar jetzt grösster Opiumproduzent weltweit](#)
- [SZ, 1.3.24, Und ewig lockt das Edelholz](#)

Three-Brotherhood-Alliance and "Operation1027"

- [taz, Nov 23, S. Hansen: Rebellen auf dem Vormarsch](#)
- [taz, Nov 2023, S. Hansen: Mehrfrontenkrieg holt Junta ein](#)
- [F.A.Z., Nov 2023, T. Fähnders, Kampf von den Dörfern bis in die Städte](#)
- [SZ, Nov23, D. Pfeifer: Was für ein bahnbrechender Sieg](#)
- [Süddeutsche Zeitung, Dez 23, D. Pfeifer: Verlieren die Generäle die Kontrolle?](#)
- [Spiegel, Nov 24, G. Fahrion: Myanmars Volk ist bereit, Bitterkeit zu essen](#)
- [Die Zeit, Dez. 23, V. Hölzl, Bewaffneter Widerstand gegen die Junta](#)

2024

General:

- [Tagesschau \(ard\) v. 15.12.23, Vom Koch zum Kämpfer](#)
- [taz, 4.1.24, N. Reimer, Pagoden und Maschinengewehre](#)
- [Deutsche Welle März 24, Befreit aus Myanmars Online-Betrugsfabriken](#)

Compulsory military service:

- [Spiegel, Feb 24, M. Stöhr: Jeder junge Mensch ist jetzt in Gefahr](#)
- [FAZ, 9.3.24, T.Fähnders: Die Jugend will nicht als Kanonenfutter enden](#)
- [Deutsche Welle, März 24, Unentdeckt nach Thailand](#)
- [Weltspiegel \(ARD\), März 24, Myanmars Wehrpflicht treibt junge Generation in die Flucht](#)

A people fighting against the military junta:

- [taz, 4.1.24, S. Hansen: Die Macht der Generäle beginnt zu wanken](#)
- [taz, Bildergalerie vom Widerstand in Myanmar](#)
- [F.A.Z. 1.2.24, T. Fähnders: Wir machen weiter bis zum Sieg](#)
- [F.A.Z., 13.3.24, T. Fähnders: Wo junge Menschen entschlossen in den Kampf ziehen](#)
- [Stiftung Asienhaus: Myanmar im Widerstand, März 2024](#)
- [ARTE, 1.3.24, Die Armee der Rebellen](#)
- [iz3w v. 2.3.24, Junge Menschen haben Angst, zwangsrekrutiert zu werden](#)
- [SZ, Jan 23, D. Pfeifer, Wenig Hoffnung auf Frieden nach 3 Jahren Terror](#)