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## Research Methodology and Process

As a research method for this report, we conducted analyses based on data and events collected from the database of Burma News International (BNI)-Myanmar Peace Monitor (MPM). By preparing necessary research questions, we conducted interviews with leaders of the resistance forces involved in “Operation 1027” along with military and political observers.

In cooperation with the Kachin News Group (KNG), which is a network member of BNI, we conducted field interviews with residents of Namhpatkar Township, Namkham Township, 105 - Mile (Muse) and Kutkai Township in northern Shan State.

The references for this report were collected from BNI-MPM’s Weekly News Reviews (WNR), as well as political analyses, statements and reports from local and foreign media.

Events and data for this report were collected between 27 October 2023 and 31 March 2024.

## Objective of the Report

"Operation 1027" was launched by the Three Brotherhood Alliance (3BHA) on 27 October 2023. The military alliance captured several military bases within days. The 3BHA took complete control of Chinshwehaw, Hpawnghseng, Theinni and Kyukoke (Pan Sang) in the first seven days of the operation. It forced thousands of soldiers to surrender. It was said that Operation 1027 awakened the revolutionary strength of the Spring Revolution forces.

This report aims to analyse the objective and trajectory of "Operation 1027", as well as its limitations and dynamics, based on the events and data. We have made efforts to visualize the importance of Operation 1027 for the Spring Revolution with its goals of eliminating the military dictatorship and building a federal democratic union and the impact of Operation 1027 on political objectives such as equality and self-determination, synchronized movements and coordination by other resistance forces along with Operation 1027, as closely

as possible. This report documents the military junta's losses during Operation 1027, the role played by the Chinese government and the voices of the local people living in northern Shan State.

Following the ceasefire in northern Shan State, known as the "Haigeng Agreement", "Operation 1027" is still moving forward as military bases and towns are continually captured by resistance forces. Alongside "Operation 1027," the trajectory of the Spring Revolution is also moving forward. This report presents data and events reflecting this.

## What is Operation 1027?

“Operation 1027” was initiated by the 3BHA, which is comprised of the Myanmar National Truth and Justice Party/Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNTJP/MNDAA), Palaung State Liberation Front/Ta'ang National Liberation Army (PSLF/TNLA) and United League of Arakan/Arakan Army (ULA/AA). Dr. Nyo Twan Awng, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the ULA/AA, said that “the 3BHA had been preparing for almost five years to launch this large-scale operation. With the adequate preparations for this operation, we were able to plan it secretly. In Operation 1027, we were able to carry out attacks in a strategic, collective, surprised and synchronized manner.”<sup>1</sup>

He said that “Operation 1027 faced delays due to the COVID-19 pandemic. He added that the 3BHA had been consulting each other for four years, making preparations through military strategy.

“The 2021 military coup has changed the public’s views towards armed conflict against the junta. The public’s views and participation have brought strength to us. In the history of Myanmar’s revolution, I think only 3BHA could carry out coordinated attacks on the military council (Myanmar Army),” said Dr. Nyo Twan Awng.<sup>2</sup>

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1 Exclusive interview with Dr. Nyo Twan Awng, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of AA, for the report, BNI-MPM, 29 March 2024

2 Exclusive interview with AA Deputy Commander-in-Chief Dr. Nyo Twan Awng, for the report, BNI-MPM, 29 March 2024

The MNTJP/MNDAA, PSLF/TNLA and ULA/AA, People's Defense Forces (PDFs), Mandalay (MDY)-PDF and other resistance forces—such as the Bamar People's Liberation Army (BPLA), the Karenni Nationalities Defense Force (KNDF) and the People's Liberation Army (PLA), joined “Operation 1027” in Chinshwehaw, which is located in the Kokang Special Region-1 of northern Shan State, on 27 October 2023.

Maung Saungkha, the Commander of the BPLA, said that “He did not know anything about “Operation 1027” even though some BPLA members were sent to northern Shan State for military training, about one and a half months before “Operation 1027.”

“We didn't know that it would become such a big wave. We didn't expect it. But we can say that it was a successful operation that we did not expect,” added Maung Saungkha.”<sup>3</sup>

“We have reached northern Shan State just to obtain military equipment and gain military experience. It is difficult to estimate the success of Operation 1027,” Maung Saungkha explained.

“In drafting the overall strategy, there is not so much leadership of the small forces that emerged in the Spring Revolution. Our troops work according to their agenda and their command. According to their agenda, we had to follow their instructions as to which town our troops will be responsible for and which town our troops will be captured. In terms of fighting strategy, we made coordination with the guidance of our allies.”

## **Aggregate Strength and Goals**

The 3BHA is a resistance alliance formed to coordinate militarily rather than politically. In the last 60 years of Myanmar's revolutionary history, political and military alliances have been formed. However, we haven't seen many coordinated attacks or military operations against the junta (Myanmar military).

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<sup>3</sup> Exclusive interview with BPLA commander Maung Saungkha for the report, BNI-MPM, 23 February 2024

“Our 3BHA is a model for the Spring Revolution which emerged after the coup,” added Dr. Nyo Twan Awng.<sup>4</sup>

Dr. Hla Kyaw Zaw is a military and political analyst, who is also a Central Executive Committee (CEC) member of the Burmese Communist Party (BCP). He said that “Operation 1027” motivated the people of Myanmar. It is very grateful that Operation 1027 could enable the current Spring Revolution to become a turning point throughout the anti-dictatorship movement that began on 7 July 1962.

“It is not difficult for the Spring Revolution against the military junta to achieve success if the forces of the PDFs, the BPLA and the PLA led by [the BCP] are united to fight the junta. It shows that we are getting closer to victory,” added Dr. Hla Kyaw Zaw.<sup>5</sup>

The 3BHA announced that it launched “Operation 1027” with the goals of safeguarding the lives and properties of civilians, asserting rights to self-defence, and maintaining control over territory. These goals include responding to ongoing artillery attacks and airstrikes perpetrated by the junta, and eradicating military dictatorship, which is what the Myanmar people want. The 3BHA has also stated that it is combating online fraud which has plagued the China–Myanmar border area. Its aim is to suppress the junta and its militia groups which operate online scam and gambling (Kyar Phyant) operations.

Brigadier General Tar Bone Kyaw, the General Secretary of the PSLF/TNLA, said: “Our overall goal is to speed up our fighting to overthrow the military dictatorship in Myanmar. We will be able to swiftly overthrow the [junta] if the remaining armed resistance organizations in our respective regions fight together.”<sup>6</sup>

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4 Exclusive interview with AA Deputy Commander-in-Chief Dr. Nyo Twan Awng, for the report, BNI-MPM, 29 March 2024


5 Exclusive interview with military and political analyst Dr. Hla Kyaw Zaw, for the report, BNI-MPM, 27 February 2024

6 Interview with Brig-Gen Tar Phone Kyaw, General Secretary of PSLF/TNLA, DVB, 8 November 2013


## Military Momentum and Shifts

According to BNI-MPM's records, there were 878 armed clash events across the country in 157 days from 27 October 2023 to 31 March 2024. This is significantly higher than the armed clash events recorded during the same period before "Operation 1027" began. Take a look at the fighting between the 3BHA and the junta, there were 43 armed clash events in 157 days before the launch of "Operation 1027." The number of armed clash events in 157 days after "Operation 1027" reached 274, more than a five-fold increase compared with the previous period.<sup>7</sup>

Armed clash events between junta and resistance forces (1 May 2023 - 31 March 2024)




Armed clash events between junta and 3BHA (1 May 2023 - 31 March 2024)



Fighting spread across the country following "Operation 1027" until 31 March 2024. Arakan State, Sagaing Region and Kachin State had the most intense armed conflict. In northern Shan State, the fighting subsided following the signing of the Haigeng Agreement.

<sup>7</sup> Myanmar Armed Conflict Dashboard, BNI-MPM Data, 27 Oct 2023 to 31 Mar 2024



Arakan State, where the ULA/AA is active, tops the list of regions with the most intense military conflict. It had 195 events. This was followed by Sagaing Region, where the PDFs/LDFs operates. It had 144 events. Then Shan State, where “Operation 1027” was launched. It had 135 events.

Fighting also took place in Kachin State, where the Kachin Independence Organization/ Kachin Independence Army (KIO/KIA) and the Kachin People's Defense Force (KPDF) is active, in Chin State, where the Chin National Front/Chin National Army (CNF/CNA) and the Chinland Defense Forces (CDFs) are active, and in Karen State, where the Karen National Union/Karen National Liberation Army (KNU/KNLA) and the PDFs are active.

The 3BHA said that "Operation 1027" would be successful if the offensive could be extended nationwide. The 3BHA encouraged all to participate in some way, as "Operation 1027" was meant to become a nationwide military operation.<sup>8</sup>

## **Capture of Military Bases/Towns, Seizures of Arms and Ammunition**

According to BNI-MPM records, the resistance forces took control of up to 53 towns from the junta during "Operation 1027"—18 towns in northern Shan State, nine in Chin State, nine in Arakan State, five in Karenni (Kayah) State, five in Sagaing Region, three in Kachin State, two in southern Shan State and one each in Karen State and Bago Region (East).


The 3BHA, which launched "Operation 1027," was able to take control of 26 towns in northern Shan State and Arakan State—11 by the ULA/AA, eight by the PSLF/TNLA and seven by the MNTJP/MNDAA.

In addition, seven towns were captured by the CNF and CDF allied forces. Six were captured by the Karenni National Progressive Party/ Karenni Army (KNPP/KA) and the KNDF. Five were captured by the KIO/ KIA. Two were captured by the KNU/KNLA and Karen allied forces. One was captured by the Pa-O National Liberation Organization/ Pa-O National Liberation Army (PNLO/PNLA). The United Wa State Party (UWSP) was handed control of two towns captured by the 3BHA even though it did not publicly participate in "Operation 1027."

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<sup>8</sup> Statement about 19th day "Operation 1027".

The National Unity Government (NUG) and its allied forces were able to take control of four towns. However, the junta regained control of Kawlin, Sagaing Regon, which was controlled by the NUG for more than 90 days. This means that the NUG and allied forces controlled three towns rather than four. **(The towns occupied by the resistance forces and the events are listed separately in the table.)**



The 3BHA seized eight tanks, 16 armoured vehicles, and two MLRS vehicles in the three months since it launched “Operation 1027”. The 3BHA also seized at least 20 cannons, including long-range howitzers.

It took control of 36 military hilltop camps and headquarters, including the Kutkai strategic camp, the No.16 Military Operations Command (MOC), the No.125 and 289 Light Infantry Battalions, the No.129 Light Infantry Division and Laukkai MOC.<sup>9</sup>

On 4 January 2024 (Independence Day), six brigadier generals—Acting Chair of Kokang Self-Administered Zone Brig-Gen Tun Tun Myint, Commander of the Laukkai Regional Operations Command (ROC) Brig-Gen Moe Kyaw Thu, Commander of No.55 Light Infantry Division and three brigadier generals who are commanders of No. 12, 14 and 16 MOC—along with more than 200 military officers, surrendered to the 3BHA. On 11 January, Commander of No. 19 MOC Brig-Gen Zin Myo Swe was also captured by the ULA/AA while attempting to flee a battle in Arakan State.

Mizzima News estimated that the number of officers and others who surrendered reached 6,065 after “Operation 1027.” Among them, northern Shan State accounted for around 4,000, Arakan State for 1,101, Mon State for 566, Karen State for another 566, Kachin State for 210, Karenni (Kayah) State for 76, Chin State for 66 and Bago Region for 66.<sup>10</sup>

The juntas led by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing has not officially released any statement about the losses of towns, military bases and military equipment.

Military and political analyst Dr. Hla Kyaw Zaw said that during “Operation 1027,” the junta faced insurmountable losses. “The junta faced political, military, financial and territorial losses. The army has also lost its dignity on the international stage. They have no battle strategy,” said Dr. Hla Kyaw Zaw.<sup>11</sup>

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9 Junta's humiliating losses in 3 months of Operation 1027, Irrawaddy, 31 January 2024

10 List of junta soldiers who surrendered after Operation 1027, Mizzima, 12 April 2024

11 Exclusive interview with military and political analyst Dr. Hla Kyaw Zaw, for the report, BNI-MPM, 27 February 2024

## Military and Political Losses for Military Junta

During “Operation 1027,” the junta’s loss of more than 50 towns is said to be the most significant. Take Arakan State for example, the junta lost its border guard forces along with its border trade businesses. The junta’s departments, including administrative mechanisms, are unable to operate in towns where its military bases are lost.

Dr. Nyo Twan Awng, the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the ULA/AA said: “With the losses of weapons and ammunition, it is like the military council donates the weapons to us. The worst thing is that the military council soldiers are no longer willing to fight and will flee when the EROs come.”.<sup>12</sup>

Dr. Nyo Twan Awng believes that the junta has lost the public's support, while its diplomacy and credibility on the international stage has declined.

More importantly, the junta has lost the support of the Bamar ethnic people, he said.

Dr. Naing Aung, the military and political analyst, said that during “Operation 1027,” not only the 3BHA but other resistance forces launched offensives against the junta in their respective regions. So, the junta easily faced battlefield losses in Arakan State, and the Kokang Self-Administered Zone in northern Shan State. At the same time, the junta has not received any kind of support from China, which has always intervened in Myanmar affairs and has defended the previous juntas.

“Myanmar’s political ties with China have also weakened. And we know that the international community thinks, the Myanmar army cannot be disintegrated. It won't break down. It's not something that can be replaced if it breaks down. This has greatly reduced the idea that we have to be comfortable with the army,” said Dr. Naing Aung.

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<sup>12</sup> Exclusive interview with Dr. Nyo Twan Awng, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of AA, for the report, BNI-MPM, 29 March 2024

“The military loss was massive. The morale among junta soldiers has declined. Trust has declined under the junta’s leadership. We have seen that sometimes what we thought was a big steel palace turns out to be a sand palace when the layers are removed.”<sup>13</sup>

Maung Saungkha, the Commander of the BPLA, said that the junta’s losses are due to corruption within the army. In particular, there is a huge gap between the combat force listed and presented above and the combat force on the ground.

“When we study the enemy, a military column has less than 70 members. According to the setup, a battalion has a strength of nearly 300 members. In fact, the number of soldiers who go to the frontline is less than 70. When we scout the enemy’s column, the enemy doesn’t have that much strength,” added Maung Saungkha”.<sup>14</sup>

## Limitations of Operation 1027

Dr. Naing Aung, the military and political analyst, said that the objectives of "Operation 1027", to fight until the end of military dictatorship and the elimination of online scams and gambling (Kyar Phyant), is seen as a special feature. Eradicating military dictatorship, is the desire of the Myanmar people. But it is not the will of the Chinese government, he added.

“The political limitations of the military operation it that it could not be too defiant against China's stance from the outset, he said.”<sup>15</sup>

Dr. Hla Kyaw Zaw said: “The facts such as the Chinese government’s words, involvements and interventions are considered to be operational limitations as northern Shan State, where Operation 1027 was launched, is located on the China-Myanmar border.”

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13 Exclusive interview with political analyst Dr. Naing Aung for the report, BNI-MPM, 20 February 2024

14 Exclusive interview with BPLA commander Maung Saungkha for the report, BNI-MPM, 23 February 2024

15 Exclusive interview with political analyst Dr. Naing Aung for the report, BNI-MPM, 20 February 2024

“Despite insufficient weapons, the arms seized from the camp will become ours. We can overcome many such difficulties, but due to the geographical location, China's border is a big limitation. I think this is the main limitation.”<sup>16</sup>

“Operation 1027” was more successful than expected despite some limitations, said Dr. Nyo Twan Awng, the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the ULA/AA. “We couldn't implement the operation we wanted to shape because we had to calculate and work on the stability of the neighbouring country's border,” he added.<sup>17</sup>

On 2 November 2023, Wang Wenbin, the spokesperson for the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said that China was closely following the conflict in northern Myanmar and urged all parties to immediately stop the fighting.<sup>18</sup>

## Haigeng Agreement and the Role of Chinese Government

Due to China's intervention, the 3BHA and the junta's National Solidarity and Peacemaking Negotiation Committee (NSPNC), held a third round of talk in the Haigeng Hotel, located in Kunming, China on 10-11 January 2024. The results are referred to as the “Haigeng Agreement.”

The 3BHA issued a follow-up result on the “Haigeng Agreement”<sup>19</sup> at 9:30 p.m. on 12 January 2024. It contained seven points. Two points to be followed by individual groups, three points by both sides and two follow-up agreements.

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16 Exclusive interview with military and political analyst Dr. Hla Kyaw Zaw, for the report, BNI-MPM, 27 February 2024

17 Exclusive interview with AA Deputy Commander-in-Chief Dr. Nyo Twan Awng, for the report, BNI-MPM, 29 March 2024

18 China urges relevant parties to stop fighting, RFA, 2 November 2023

19 Follow-up agreements of Haigeng Agreement, 3 Brotherhood Alliance Telegram, 12 January 2024

The two points to be followed by individual groups are: the 3BHA agreed not to launch offensive attacks on military bases and strategic hills in northern Shan State. In turn, the junta agreed not to carry out airstrikes and shelling on the areas occupied by the 3BHA in northern Shan State.

The three points to be followed by the both sides are: (1) to ensure an immediate ceasefire between the two armies at 9 pm on 11 January 2024; (2) to ensure that there is no exchange of fire or confrontations between the troops of both sides; (3) to make a resolution through dialogue in the event of disputes and demand (attacks).”

The 3BHA composed of the MNDA, the TNLA and the AA with the junta agreed to avoid harming the security of Chinese citizens in the China-Myanmar border region and to not destroy Chinese investments in Myanmar. It also agreed that both parties will continue to discuss measures for an immediate ceasefire, while all other issues can be included in follow-up agreements.

The “Haigeng Agreement” shows China’s concern without taking into account the security and survival of civilians in northern Shan State.

Dr. Naing Aung said that China favoured the 3BHA in regards to “Operation 1027” that China did not trust the junta because it did not crack down on online scams and gambling (Kyar Phyant). “I think they need to strive harder to show who can really protect both the medium-term and long-term economy and can maintain interests related to China. They need to show that border trade can be operated in the occupied territories. This is the interest of both sides. Maintaining border security is a medium-term interest,” said Dr. Naing Aung.<sup>20</sup>

The interests of the Chinese government can be roughly divided into global, regional and domestic interests. One of the objectives of “Operation 1027”, was the eradication of Kyar Phyant. This can be seen as an attempt to resolve the grievances from the people in China.

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<sup>20</sup> Exclusive interview with political analyst Dr. Naing Aung for the report, BNI-MPM, 20 February 2024

According to the Global Security Initiative (GSI), which Chinese President Xi Jinping himself proposed to the United Nations, "Either between countries or inside countries, let's meet in the middle to discuss and find a solution. It can also be considered that he made an appearance for peace for its neighbouring country, Myanmar.

The Chinese government submitted a peace proposal for the Ukraine-Russia war and intervened in the Hamas-Israel conflict. Dr. Hla Kyaw Zaw pointed out that the Chinese government may have become involved in the Myanmar issue as peace has been achieved through China's intervention in the Saudi Arabia-Iran conflict. However, there are still unresolved issues for the Chinese government, including the Taiwan issue.

"China is working to bring it to a political table higher than the ceasefire. China seems to be working for its dignity on the international stage and solving the problem as a peace broker. We must continue to do what we have to do," said Dr. Hla Kyaw Zaw.<sup>21</sup>

The Chinese government always stands by Myanmar taking into account its border stability, investments, national interests, Paukphaw relations with Myanmar, land border and strategic trade.

Dr. Nyo Twan Aung, the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the ULA/AA, said that the goal of "Operation 1027" is to eradicate Kyar Phyant (online scams and gambling), which is also a desire of the Chinese government.

"Operation 1027 initiated by our 3BHA helped a lot in the fight against Kyar Phyant, especially in Laukkai on the China-Myanmar border. It can be said that our operation could crack down Kyar Phyant gangs in Laukkai. It also had an impact on those involved in the Kyar Phyant businesses, who were working elsewhere," added Dr. Nyo Twan Aung.<sup>22</sup>

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21 Exclusive interview with military and political analyst Dr. Hla Kyaw Zaw, for the report, BNI-MPM, 27 February 2024

22 Exclusive interview with AA Deputy Commander-in-Chief Dr. Nyo Twan Aung, for the report, BNI-MPM, 29 March 2024

However, there is still much doubt as to whether the temporary ceasefire in northern Shan State with the “Haigeng Agreement” reached through the intervention of China will prevent the momentum and spread of “Operation 1027.”


The Chinese government will continue to be busy with the questions about how many objectives of “Operation 1027” were accomplished? Would the junta honestly accept its territorial losses? Where has the military front in “Operation 1027” moved? More interventions by the Chinese government are likely.

Dr. Hla Kyaw Zaw, who views the “Haigeng Agreement” as helpful, said: “The revolutionaries have breathed a sigh of relief. They can rebuild themselves. As for the military, it has not recovered even though there has been a ceasefire for a year. They have nothing to worry about.”

## **Operation 1027’s Shift after the Haigeng Agreement**

According to the BNI-MPM records, “Operation 1027” reached its peak at a time when the “Haigeng Agreement” was reached. Since the operation till 31 March 2024, there were 274 armed clash events between the junta and the 3BHA. However, only 28 percent of the momentum of “Operation 1027” could be halted as the ceasefire only applied to northern Shan State. The military momentum of Operation 1027 led by the ULA/AA and the allied forces accounted for over 67 percent of the military fronts in Arakan State and Paletwa Township of Chin State.

**Armed clash events between junta and 3BHA  
(7 October 2023 - 31 March 2024)**



Source : BNI-MPM Data

Dr. Hla Kyaw Zaw, the military and political analyst, is impressed with the operational strategies of the 3BHA. She believes that the 3BHA will continue to overthrow the military dictatorship as stated in its goals even though a ceasefire was brokered by China.

“The ceasefire seemed to kill the momentum of the victory. However, there is good and bad. Thanks to the ceasefire, the troops could be regrouped. The AA has opened two roads from the beginning. Not only on the Chinese border but also on the Indian border. Even though the AA had to stop fighting on the China-Myanmar border, the launch of operations on the India-Myanmar border is a strategic step,” added Dr. Hla Kyaw Zaw.<sup>23</sup>

<sup>23</sup> Exclusive interview with military and political analyst Dr. Hla Kyaw Zaw, for the report, BNI-MPM, 27 February 2024

Neighbouring countries want to see a cessation of hostilities and stability in Myanmar. This would help with their economic projects and future security interests within the country. Waging a revolution for the total liberation of Myanmar is an endeavour that must continue, said Major General Twan Mrat Naing, the Commander-in-Chief of the ULA/AA.

"As for the people of Myanmar, we can only build a better future for our people and achieve lasting peace after being liberated from this military dictatorship," he added.

"The ongoing battles in northern Myanmar and along the China-Myanmar border are directly impacting China's border security. We understand this is due to concerns over their national interests and security interests of their citizens, which is closely tied. They would prefer nationwide stability and peace. But, we also have to find ways to accomplish what is necessary for our own country's cause while avoiding head-on clashes with others," he said.<sup>24</sup>

Mr. Jason Tower, the Country Director for the Burma program at the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), said that "Operation 1027" could bolster China's leverage over the junta. It could also create spillover conflicts into other regions of Myanmar. "The success of this military operation has emboldened other anti-junta forces as well," he added.<sup>25</sup>

## **Significance of Operation 1027 for Defensive War**

Operation 1027 has been hugely significant and impactful not only for the Spring Revolution, but for all the people and armed organizations seeking liberation from the military dictatorship across the country.

"The main highlight of this offensive is that coordinated attacks by an allied front like the 3BHA is more effective than individual groups

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24 Interview with AA Commander-in-Chief General Twan Mrat Naing, BBC, 7 February 2024

25 Interview with Mr. Jason Tower, Director for Burma at USIP, DVB, 23 December 2023

taking on the junta separately. If you really dare to fight, you really win," said Dr. Nyo Twan Awng.

He added that: "The momentum from this offensive continues to drive subsequent operations as the resistance forces continue to fight the junta." <sup>26</sup>

Resistance forces in Karenni State, such as the Karenni Army (KA), the Karenni National People's Liberation Front (KNPLF) and the PDFs, launched an offensive called "Operation 1107" when they attacked and captured a junta outpost in Pan Tein village of Mese Township, located along the Myanmar-Thailand border, on 7 November 2023.

"We initiated Operation 1107 to synchronize with all armed groups nationwide," said Yebaw Lawrence Soe, the KNPLF spokesperson. <sup>27</sup>

As part of the resistance movement to topple the military dictatorship, the allied Karenni forces jointly launched "Operation 1111" at 5am on 11 November 2023. The Karenni State Interim Executive Council (IEC) said in a statement on 11 November that the operation aimed to destroy the junta's administrative machinery and to bring about the end of military dictatorship. <sup>28</sup>

In coordination with the 3BHA "Operation 1027," the resistance forces, including the NUG, intensified its offensives in their respective territories. The Central Command and Coordination Committee (C3C) formed between the "K3C", which consists of the KIA, the KA, the KNU, and the CNF, along with the support of the NUG.

At the National Defence and Security Council meeting held on 8 November 2023, the junta discussed the 3BHA 'Operation 1027'. Senior General Min Aung Hlaing mentioned the resistance attacks on Chinshwehaw, and Kunlong, as well as the joint attack on the Mandalay-

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26 Exclusive interview with AA Deputy Commander-in-Chief Dr. Nyo Twan Awng, for the report, BNI-MPM, 31 March 2024

27 Karenni resistance force launches Operation 1107, Myanmar Now, 9 November 2023

28 IEC urges preparation to evacuate to safe places during Operation 1111, Kantarawaddy Times, 11 November 2023

Lashio communication route near Naungcho as subsequent events following “Operation 1027.” The junta chief said that the MNDAA, the TNLA, the KIA, the AA, and PDFs were involved in the attacks. The MNDAA made advance preparations within UWSA-controlled territory. Acting President Myint Swe, a former military general, warned that the failure to resolve the border issues could lead to the disintegration of the country.

Maung Saungkha, the commander of the BPLA, analysed “Operation 1027” as an exemplary event in the last three years of the Spring Revolution.

"Building on this wave, it's crucial for us to create more such waves [of offensives]. But that will also need more time." <sup>29</sup>

The unity and cohesion of the 3BHA goes beyond just being signatories and allies on paper – it is forged in blood and sweat on the battlefield, added Maung Saungkha.

"The coordination has been quite robust. There's a clear chain of command. For instance, in the Kokang area, the AA is also present. But the strategy is the Kokang's. There's clarity between them," he explained.

## **Equality, Self-determination and Objectives of Operation 1027**

The roots of the conflict lie in the lack of equality, justice and self-determination for ethnic nationalities in Myanmar. Therefore, Ethnic Revolutionary Organizations (EROs) have been striving to achieve these objectives through armed conflict. Even before the Spring Revolution of 2021, the EROs pursued these goals through various approaches - military means and political dialogue.

"The political goals of us EROs, including national equality and the right to self-determination to shape our own destinies, are what we aim

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<sup>29</sup> Exclusive interview with BPLA commander Maung Saungkha for the report, BNI-MPM, 23 February 2024

to realize. To be frank, all EROs want a situation akin to full self-determination. Our organization is no exception," said Dr. Nyo Twan Awng. He believes that "Operation 1027" aligns with the common objectives sought by all EROs.

However, given the current political landscape, Dr. Nyo Twan Awng added that some time will be needed to reconcile any divergence from these shared political goals. "If and when the military dictatorship ends (or if there is a transitional situation again), there may arise political dialogue between the resistance forces. How convergent can we be to reach a consensus? This will depend on time, as well as the political will and intentions of the organizations involved. But we will keep fighting to realize the political aspirations desired by the people of Arakan and all of Myanmar with optimism."<sup>30</sup>

The "Operation 1027" objective of "rooting out the military dictatorship," which is the desire of the people, aligns with the current objectives of the Spring Revolution. But there is a diversity of approaches regarding the political vision of building a future federal democratic union.

Maung Saungkha, the Commander of the BPLA, said: "I can't definitely say there will be a Union. But for those wanting to rebuild the Union, it can't be a 'holding together' Union, it has to be a 'coming together' one. Moreover, whether there will be a Union or not depends on whether the Bamar and other ethnic nationalities want to live together."

He added: "'Of course, I too want a Union where there is mutual trust and 'coming together.' But we shouldn't be dogmatic that it absolutely has to be that way. Perhaps politics first divides into nation-states. Then the individual territories and self-governing regions come together again, which could lead to a stronger Union."<sup>31</sup>

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30 Exclusive interview with AA Deputy Commander-in-Chief Dr. Nyo Twan Awng, for the report, BNI-MPM, 29 March 2024

31 Exclusive interview with BPLA commander Maung Saungkha for the report, BNI-MPM, 23 February 2024

## Operation 1027's Potential Impact on Federal Democratic Union

When asked: "Does Operation 1027 have an impact in terms of moving towards a federal democratic union?" Dr. Nyo Twan Awng, the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Arakan Army, responded: "There would be more or less impact."

During the Spring Revolution, as EROs gain territorial dominance, the question arises whether they will secede as separate nation-states with their own sovereignty, or join a Union of statelets. The other option is to become a full-fledged federal union that guarantees equality and self-determination within the nation's existing boundaries.

"The pre-colonial geographical situation in our country before the British is also worth considering. But we shouldn't assume the current map is set in stone either. Perhaps a structure where all ethnic groups possess their sovereignty recognized by all other forces of the plains, and then negotiate the extent of powers to be bestowed upon the government at the centre, could bring us closer to an answer," said Dr. Naing Aung.<sup>32</sup>

For a genuine federal democratic union to emerge in Myanmar, Dr. Naing Aung recommends the approach of consolidating the fundamental rights of self-determination, sovereignty, and the aspirations of the ethnic nationalities.

"The people of the plains need to deliberate whether to form a Bamar State along geographical lines. Negotiate with the ethnic groups - if they agree, incorporate them into the Union they shape. If not, go your own way. Instead of constant conflicts within a shared fence, why not peacefully coexist as neighbours? This is also worth considering," he added.

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<sup>32</sup> Exclusive interview with political analyst Dr. Naing Aung for the report, BNI-MPM, 20 February 2024

Meanwhile, the BPLA is contemplating the concept of a Bamar State to foster harmony among future members of the Union, explained Maung Saungkha.

"From my interactions with them, it seems they are aligned within the current framework of a federal democratic union. They are progressive leaders," added Maung Saungkha, who has close ties with the 3BHA.<sup>33</sup>

## Voices from Operation 1027 Conflict Zones

For this report, in collaboration with the Kachin News Group (KNG) field reporters, BNI-MPM conducted interviews with eight residents of Namphatkar, Kutkai, Muse (105-Mile) and Namhkam Townships which are in the conflict zones of "Operation 1027."

Nam Hkam Sawng, 31, from Maw Hit village in Kutkai Township had to flee her home at least three times. "During the fighting, we would tremble with fear at the sound of gunfire. The children would cry and we didn't know which direction to run. We had no choice but to flee. Families got separated, with some left behind at home. It was so sudden we couldn't even take clothes or food. We suffered immensely."

Nam Hkam Sawng added: "I want political stability, no more gunfire sounds. I want schools reopened for our children's future. I need a good political situation to earn a livelihood. I want smooth transportation. I just want peace."

Nawng Ting, 56, from Maw Hit village said when heavy weapons landed: "We couldn't help the village at all, we could only flee to save our own families. For those injured by the fighting and the destroyed homes, how will they be aided? Or will they be left as is? I want to demand compensation for the losses."

Kai Htang, 49, is a farmer from Ward 1 of Namkham said: "We had no forewarning of the fighting breaking out. I was focused on my farmwork.

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<sup>33</sup> Exclusive interview with BPLA commander Maung Saungkha for the report, BNI-MPM, 23 February 2024

Suddenly the battles erupted, we couldn't even harvest the paddy we planted and had to abandon the crop.

"If possible, I want help to prevent such fighting. Because when battles occur, we can't properly harvest the paddy and our agricultural work gets disrupted. So I absolutely don't want any fighting, I want peace."

Seng Nan, 27, is from Ward 2 of Namkham. She revealed that without prior notice, fighting broke out in her village which forced her to take shelter inside a bunker in her residential compound.

"While hiding in that bunker the intense battles raged on with incessant explosions, I suffered mental trauma being so terrified. As a youth, I very much want the country to have peace as soon as possible. I'm traumatized and lost as a young person. I want peace as soon as possible."

Dai Naw, 46, is from Namhpatkar. She was displaced from her home during Operation 1027. "During the fighting, there were a lot of difficulties. I had to flee, without even a motorcycle, walking through the rain. I went from the area of fighting to a safer place. Then they fired from planes and heavy weapons, so I had to go to another secure area. With the elderly also there, getting food and shelter was very difficult," added Dai Naw.

"I want peace as soon as possible. I don't want fighting in the villages. It's the civilians who suffer losses lives and property. I want peace," stated Dai Naw.

Ying Swi, 51, was displaced from her home during the fighting between the KIO/KIA and junta troops on 17 November 2023. "The journey on foot was very tiring. The route was extremely long. We didn't have much food for the journey, it was very difficult. We suffered hardships time and again. I just wish there would be no more fighting in our area. I wish to have good schools and clinics for the children."

Reverend Brangseng, 60, is a Christian minister from Ton Hkar in Muse (105-Mile). He is unable to work and can't return home yet due to

the situation. He wishes to help rebuild civilian homes that were destroyed during the conflict. "Only when there is equality for all of us in the country, will the entire nation be peaceful," said Reverend Brang Hseng.

Reverend Tan Baung Lwam Zaung, 43, is also a Christian minister. He lives in Mong Yu village (105-Mile). He said he had to flee with his family due to the fighting.

"Whoever comes to power, I wish they are an armed group that provides justice that the people need and protects the civilians," said Reverend Tan Baung Lumzawn.

For the report, MPM visited areas affected by armed conflict during Operation 1027, as well as areas where clashes occurred between the KIO/KIA and junta troops. Of the eight civilians interviewed, there were five women and three men. Based on the findings, their common aspiration was for peace and justice.

Dr. Naing Aung, the military and political analyst suggests that when ethnic armed organizations gain territorial dominance, they should prioritize gaining the overwhelming support and welcoming embrace of the local populace, as well as ensuring justice is served for the civilians who were victims.

"We should create opportunities, encourage, and pave the way for the people to be able to live peaceful, happy lives that they desire within the areas under our control," he said.<sup>34</sup>

## Operation 1027 and Trajectory of the Spring Revolution

Dr. Miemie Winn Byrd, a retired U.S. Army lieutenant colonel from the US Defense Department's Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, said that close cooperation between the 3BHA is key for the revolution to succeed.

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34 Exclusive interview with political analyst Dr. Naing Aung for the report, BNI-MPM, 20 February 2024

"There are some misunderstandings between them. If they focus on the common enemy, prioritize the common enemy, once that enemy is gone, it will be much easier to resolve the remaining issues. The most crucial factor to reach the 'end point' from the 'tipping point' is collaboration." <sup>35</sup>

Dr. Miemie Winn Byrd added that greater cooperation is needed between all EROs, the defense forces under the NUG, and all armed resistance groups nationwide.

Brigadier General Tar Bone Kyaw, the General Secretary of the PSLF/TNLA, said: "We coordinate closely with the NUG. The battalions and forces under the chain of command of the NUG's Ministry of Defence (MOD) are working together to jointly implement Operation 1027 as much as possible. Be it the PDFs under the MOD or unaffiliated PDFs, they are all waging armed revolution in unison nationwide." <sup>36</sup>

According to the BNI-MPM records, in the 38-months since the 2021 military coup from 1 February 2021 to 31 March 2024, there were a total of 4,385 armed clash events across Myanmar. Nearly 100 percent (98.5%) of these clash events occurred between the junta and resistance forces, while only 1.5 percent were clash events between different resistance groups. Therefore, the momentum of Operation 1027 and the Spring Revolution is likely to continue militarily.

Looking at the battlefronts during the three years of the Spring Revolution, Sagaing Region saw the highest number of armed clash events at 1,025, making it the most intense conflict zone. Kachin State, Shan State (North), Karen State, Magway Region and Chin State had over 300 clash events each, making them the second most intense conflict zones. Karenni (Kayah) State, Tanintharyi Region, Arakan State and Mon State had over 200 clash events each, making them the third

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
35 Interview with Dr. Miemie Winn Byrd, Retired Lt Colonel, US Defense Department's Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, Yangon Khit Thit, 18 January 2024

36 Interview with PSLF/TNLA General Secretary Brig-Gen Tar Bone Kyaw, DVB, 8 November 2023

most intense conflict zones. Southern Shan State, Bago Region (East) and Mandalay Region also witnessed over 100 clashes.

Even after the “Haigeng Agreement” was signed on 11 January 2024 during “Operation 1027,” (from 27 October 2023 to 31 March 2024) the resistance against the junta troops continued unabated despite a lull in fighting in northern Shan State.

#### Over 100 clash events occur each month since launch of Operation 1027



"To be honest, we don't want to stop fighting yet. We want to continue the offensive together until the political situation desired by the people of Myanmar is achieved. We're winning battle after battle. Whenever we attack one of the junta's big or small camps, we can capture it in just a week or ten days, sometimes 3-4 weeks at most. We still want to try to take over one by one the junta camps in areas like Muse (105-Mile), Lashio and Pyin Oo Lwin, which we have planned to do," said Dr. Nyo Twan Awng, the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the ULA/AA.<sup>37</sup>

<sup>37</sup> Exclusive interview with AA Deputy Commander-in-Chief Dr. Nyo Twan Awng, for the report, BNI-MPM, 29 March 2024

The “Haigeng Agreement” was just a deal to prevent further loss of territories. While the agreement halted clashes in northern Shan State, the AA offensive began on 13 November 2023 in Arakan State.

"After the Haigeng Agreement, Operation 1027 has seen the AA leading joint offensives and coordinated attacks nationwide together with the EROs in Kachin, Karen and Karenni, as well as GZ (Generation Z) armed resistance groups, though the momentum was slightly impacted by the agreement. But our political objectives remain entirely unchanged," added Dr. Nyo Twan Awng.

While the 3BHA military strategy of Operation 1027 seems well-prepared, the military operations of other resistance forces remain in a state of ‘just seizing the opportunity’ when the junta troops are overstretched or strained. Alongside Operation 1027, ‘Operation 1111’ was launched in Karenni State. In Kachin State, the KIO/KIA and allied forces launched vigorous military activities. However, due to insufficient political understanding, trust, and coordination, a unified, nationwide strategy of offensives has yet to materialize, according to Dr. Naing Aung.<sup>38</sup>

"For example, when we say ‘synchronized’, we all must be in synchronization. Fighting in Arakan, fighting in Chin, fighting in Kachin, fighting in northern Shan, southern Shan, Karen, Karenni, Mon, Dawei, Myeik, Sagaing and Magway. In areas without armed clashes, there will be urban guerrilla activities. At the same time, public strikes will be waged as much as possible. If we collectively intensify pressure, it will strain the enemy more. The success of the operation and collaboration depends on strong leadership of the EROs, which form the backbone," stated Dr. Naing Aung.

"It's like riding on someone else's boat to victory. Once we get off, we can't keep going. It's just not satisfactory. This isn't just about the

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38 Exclusive interview with political analyst Dr. Naing Aung for the report, BNI-MPM, 20 February 2024

ammunition shortage but how much political deal was negotiated," said Maung Saungkha, the Commander of the BPLA.<sup>39</sup>

"There will still be long-term issues to discuss. But we can't be so preoccupied with them that we let up pressure on the common enemy," he added.

## Overall Analysis

The total elimination of the military dictatorship, which is the desire of the people of Myanmar, is one of the objectives of "Operation 1027." It can also be considered the common goal of all resistance forces nationwide except the junta. However, it is understood that political goals such as equality and self-determination will require lengthy negotiations.

Looking at the camp and town seizures within weeks and months, the seized military weapons and equipment, and the surrender of hundreds of junta soldiers, the momentum of "Operation 1027" has continued strong. At the same time, it can also be said that it has received overwhelming support from all EROs, which are the resistance forces born out of the Spring Revolution, and the people of Myanmar who are resisting the 2021 military coup.

While the "Haigeng Agreement" halted the momentum of "Operation 1027", it also helped prevent the loss of 17 towns seized by EROs in northern Shan State. In addition to northern Shan, the junta has lost control of over 50 towns to resistance forces in Kachin State, Sagaing Region, Chin State, Arakan State, Karen State, Karenni State, and southern Shan State post-Operation 1027," even though it has yet to confirm the losses. The "Haigeng Agreement" is viewed as a confirmation of losses to EROs by the junta.

China will continue intervening in Myanmar's armed conflicts to safeguard its economic interests and the safety of its citizens. It remains

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<sup>39</sup> Exclusive interview with BPLA commander Maung Saungkha for the report, BNI-MPM, 23 February 2024

to be seen which side China will choose between the resistance forces and the junta.

While the “Haigeng Agreement” halted the momentum of “Operation 1027” in northern Shan State, the Three Brotherhood Alliance and allied forces demonstrated military activities from Mandalay Region, Arakan State and Paletwa Township in Chin State to Magway Region. Other resistance forces like the KIO/KIA, KNU/KNLA, CNF/CNA, KNPP/KA and PNLO/PNLA and the People's Defense Forces/Local Defense Forces (PDFs/LDFs) also participated in the operation.

Political consensus and coordinated operations are urgently needed between the EROs and the Spring Revolution forces, including the NUG, to achieve equality and self-determination rather than just dismantling the military dictatorship. The 3BHA-led “Operation 1027” exemplified the revolutionary strength of “unity, solidarity and cooperation”, offering valuable lessons for the urgent resolution of national unity issues.”

“Operation 1027” is crucially important not just for the Spring Revolution, but for all armed resistance groups and the people of Myanmar seeking to chart a path to liberation from the military dictatorship. It has also shed light on how to approach the trajectory and goals of the Spring Revolution.

Dr. Nyo Twan Awng stated: “The main highlight of this offensive is that coordinated attacks by an allied front like the 3BHA is more effective than individual groups taking on the junta separately. If you really dare to fight, you can really win.”

Page-11 (Resistance-controlled towns and events are listed separately in the table)

Date	Seized territories	EROs/PDFs	Description
24-Jun-2023	Mese	KNPP/KA	The joint force of the 4K consisting of KA, KNDF, KNPLF, KNU/KNLA and PDFs launched attacks on all military junta camps in Mese Township on 13 June and seized control of the town on 24 June.
2-Nov-2023	Chinshwehaw	MNDAA	The 3BHA (MNDAA, TNLA and AA) launched Operation 1027 on 27 October, and seized complete control of Chinshwehaw, Hpawnghseng, Kyukoke (Pang Hseng) and Theinni towns on 2 November.
2-Nov-2023	Hpawnghseng	MNDAA	The 3BHA (MNDAA, TNLA and AA) launched Operation 1027 on 27 October, and seized complete control of Chinshwehaw, Hpawnghseng, Kyukoke (Pang Hseng) and Theinni towns on 2 November.
2-Nov-2023	Kyukoke (Pang Hseng)	MNDAA	The 3BHA (MNDAA, TNLA and AA) launched Operation 1027 on 27 October, and seized complete control of Chinshwehaw, Hpawnghseng, Kyukoke (Pang Hseng) and Theinni towns on 2 November.
2-Nov-2023	Theinni	MNDAA	The 3BHA (MNDAA, TNLA and AA) launched Operation 1027 on 27 October, and seized complete control of Chinshwehaw, Hpawnghseng, Kyukoke (Pang Hseng) and Theinni towns on 2 November.
6-Nov-2023	Kawlin	NUG-PDF	The KIA and PDFs launched attacks on the military junta camp and township police station in Kawlin town in Kawlin Township. The joint forces seized the town on 6 November. The military junta reclaimed control of the town, the Kawlin Revolution – KR confirmed on 13 February.
7-Nov-2023	Khampat	NUG-PDF	PDFs launched attacks on junta troops in Khampat in Tamu Township on 4 November and seized complete control of the town on 7 November.

7-Nov-2023	Monekoe	MNDAA	The MNDAA and AA attacked the Monekone strategic hilltop outpost on 5 November and seized complete control of the town in Muse Township on 7 November.
12-Nov-2023	Kunlong	MNDAA	The MNDAA launched the military operation to capture Kunglong in northern Shan State on 1 November, attacking military junta camps and its administrative offices. The MNDAA seized control of the town on 12 November.
13-Nov-2023	Rikhawdar	CNF-CDF	On 13 November, the joint force of CNF/CNA, CDF- Zanniatram, PDA – Tedim, CDF – Thantlang and CDF – Hualngoram attacked and captured two military outposts based in Rikhawdar on Trade Route 2 on the India-Myanmar border and seized complete control of the town.
13-Nov-2023	Nan Mei Khon	KNDF	The KNDF launched attacks on Nan Mei Khon in Demoso Township on 11 November and seized control of the town on 13 November.
13-Nov-2023	Moebye	KNDF	The KNDF launched attacks on Moebye in Pekon Township on 11 November and seized control of the town on 13 November.
20-Nov-2023	Injangyan	KIO/KIA	On 20 November, junta soldiers and police members from two military junta camps and a police station in Injangyan Township withdrew from the town.
22-Nov-2023	Shwepyiaye	NUG-PDF	Joint PDF forces launched attacks on Shwepyiaye town in Homalin Township on 21 November. The joint forces seized control of the town and captured eight junta soldiers on 22 November.
24-Nov-2023	Lailenpi	CNF-CDF	Joint Chinland defense forces launched attacks on military junta bases in Lailenpi town in Matupi Township on 20 November and seized control of the town on 24 November.
28-Nov-2023	Konegyan	MNDAA	-On 28 November, the MNDAA seized control of Konegyan town on Myanmar-China border in northern Shan State after the entire Infantry Battalion 125 based in the town surrendered by raising a white flag.

13-Nov-2023	Nan Mei Khon	KNDF	The KNDF launched attacks on Nan Mei Khon in Demoso Township on 11 November and seized control of the town on 13 November.
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28-Nov-2023	Konegyan	MNDAA	-On 28 November, the MNDAA seized control of Konegyan town on Myanmar-China border in northern Shan State after the entire Infantry Battalion 125 based in the town surrendered by raising a white flag.
29-Nov-2023	Rezua	CNA-CDF	The CNA and CDFs launched 'Operation 1027' on Rezua town in the Zotung area of Chin State on 26 November and seized control of the town on 29 November.
30-Nov-2023	Waibula	CNF-CDF	On 30 November, Chinland defense forces seized control of Waibula town in Falam Township.
30-Nov-2023	Hnaring	CNF-CDF	On 30 November, Chinland defense forces seized control of Hnaring town in Thantlang Township.
30-Nov-2023	Surkhua	CNF-CDF	On 30 November, Chinland defense forces seized control of Surkhua in Hakha Township.
30-Nov-2023	M'kuiimnu	CNF-CDF	On 30 November, Chinland defense forces seized control of M'kuiimnu in Mindat Township.

4-Dec-2023	Mone	KNU/KNLA	The KNLA and allied resistance forces launched attacks on military junta camps in Mone town in Kyaukkyi Township on 2 December and seized control of the town on 4 December.
5-Dec-2023	Monglon	PSLF/TNLA	On 5 December, joint TNLA forces seized control of Monglon town in Kyaukme Township.
13-Dec-2023	Maw Luu	KIO/KIA	Joint forces of KIA, ABSDF, and PDF-Indaw seized control of Maw Luu town on 13 December.
15-Dec-2023	Namhsan	PSLF/TNLA	On 15 December, joint TNLA forces seized control of Namhsan town.
18-Dec-2023	Namkham	PSLF/TNLA	The TNLA and allied forces launched attacks on Namkham town on 27 October and seized control of the town on 18 December.
22-Dec-2023	Mantong	PSLF/TNLA	On 22 December, the TNLA and allied forces seized control of Mantong town.
28-Dec-2023	Namtu	PSLF/TNLA	The TNLA launched attacks on Namtu town on 25 December and seized control of the town on 28 December.
31-Dec-2023	Mongngaw	PSLF/TNLA	-The TNLA launched attacks on Mongngaw town in Kyaukme Township on 29 December and seized control of the town on 31 December.
4-Jan-2024	Laukkai	MNDAA	On 4 January, the MNDAA seized control of Laukkai town.
7-Jan-2024	Kutkai	PSLF/TNLA	-On 7 January, the 3BHA (MNDAA, TNLA, AA) seized control of Kutkai town.
10-Jan-2024	Hopang	UWSP/UWSA	The 3BHA handed over Hopang and Panglong, the towns they seized on 5 January, to the UWSA on 10 January.
10-Jan-2024	Panglong	UWSP/UWSA	The 3BHA handed over Hopang and Panglong, the towns they seized on 5 January, to the UWSA on 10 January.
14-Jan-2024	Paletwa	ULA/AA	The ULA/AA launched attacks on Paletwa town on 13 November and seized control of the town on 14 January.

16-Jan-2024	Samee	ULA/AA	-On 16 January, the AA seized control of Samee town in Paletwa Township.
24-Jan-2024	Pauktaw	ULA/AA	-The AA launched attacks on Pauktaw town on 19 January 2024 and seized control of the town on 24 January.
21-Jan-2024	Mabein	KIO/KIA	The KIO and allied PDFs launched attacks on Mabein town on 20 January 2024 and seized control of the town on 21 January,
28-Jan-2024	Mawchi	KNDF	On 28 January, the KNDF announced that it had seized control of Mawchi town without having to fight after the military junta abandoned its camps in the town on 26 January 2024.
28-Jan-2024	Hsihseng	PNLO/PNLA	On 28 January, the PNLO/PNLA announced that it had captured LIB 424 and seized control of the entire Hsihseng town.
28-Jan-2024	Ywarthit	KNDF	On 28 January, the KNDF announced that it had seized control of Ywarthit town in Bawlakhe Township.
6-Feb-2024	Minbya	ULA/AA	On 6 February, the ULA/AA announced that it had seized control of Minbya town.
6-Feb-2024	Taungpyo	ULA/AA	The AA launched attacks on both Taungpyo (Let Wae) and Taungpyo (Let Yar) camps of the military junta on 4 February 2024, and seized control of the town on 6 February.
7-Feb-2024	Kyauktaw	ULA/AA	On 7 February 2024, the AA seized control of Kyauktaw town.
8-Feb-2024	Mrauk-U	ULA/AA	On 8 February, the AA seized control of Mrauk-U town in Arakan State.
10-Feb-2024	Sinbo	KIO/KIA	On 10 February, the KIA seized control of Sinbo town in Myitkyina Township.
12-Feb-2024	Shadaw	KNDF	On 12 February 2024, the KNDF seized control of Shadaw town in Karenni (Kayah) State.
15-Feb-2024	Myebon	ULA/AA	On 15 February 2024, the AA seized control of Myebon town in Arakan State.

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**The main highlight of this offensive is that coordinated attacks by an allied front like the 3BHA is more effective than individual groups taking on the junta separately. If you really dare to fight, you can really win**

