PERSECUTION OF MUSLIMS IN BURMA

BHRN Report

This report is based evidence collected by BHRN since March 2016 and exposes the institutional persecution of Muslims under the new civilian government.
Contents

Executive Summary 4
Introduction 8
About BHRN and Methodology 10
Acknowledgements 10
Overview of the violence between 2012 and 2017 12
Historical Background
   Religion in Burma 14
   Ethnicity in Burma under Ne Win, 1962-1988 15
   Persecution of religious minorities under the SLORC/SPDC regimes, 1988-2011 15
   Rise of ultra-nationalist Buddhist movements under the USDP, 2011-2016 16
   The National League for Democracy and the ‘Muslim issue’ 17
Current situation with regards to Muslims in Burma 17
1. Problems for Muslims obtaining ID cards 20
   a) Ma Thidar, Shwebo Township, Sagaing Division 22
   b) Ko Min Oo, Okkan Township, Yangon Division 22
   c) Saw Kyaw Htoo, Hlaing Bwe Township, Kayin State. 22
   d) Ko Kyaw Thu, Shwe Gun Township, Kayin State 22
   e) Maung Thu Kha, Yangon City 23
   f) Maung Than Htike, Yangon City 23
Analysis 23
2. Authorities blocking the rebuilding of damaged mosques 24
   a) Muslims barred from returning to mosques in Meikhtila 25
   b) Rebuilding of mosque in Meikhtila blocked 25
   c) Muslims relocated to Kama Maung in Karen State barred from place of worship 26
   d) Authorities refuse permission to rebuild mosques in Bago Division 26
   e) Madrasa not permitted to reopen in Bago Division 26
   f) Buddhist nationalists pressure Yangon authorities to close place of worship 27
   g) Authorities block gatherings for worship inside private residences in Ayeyarwady Division and Yangon City 27
   h) Authorities block repair of cyclone-damaged mosque in Ayerarwady Division 27
   i) Mosque sealed off in Ayerarwady Division, worship banned 27
   j) Muslim worship banned in parts of Yangon City 28
   k) Authorities order demolition of 50-year-old Muslim school in Mon State 28
Analysis 28
### 3. Examples of religious intolerance
- a) Pressure on authorities to block Muslim religious days
- b) Seizure of cattle bought for Eid sacrifice in Yangon City
- c) Muslim vendors near revered Buddhist pagoda ordered to leave

### Analysis

### 4. Conditions for Muslims displaced or confined by the violence
- a) Access to healthcare among IDPs in Rakhine State
  - Kyauktaw and Minbya
  - Sittwe
  - Kyaukphyu
- b) Access to education among IDPs in Rakhine State
  - Sittwe
  - Kyauktaw
- c) Problems faced by Muslim IDPs in Meikhtila

### Analysis

### 5. Spread of ‘Muslim-free' villages

### Analysis

### 6. Launch of military operations against Rohingya in Rakhine State
- a) Win Maw, 13, Maungdaw Township
- b) Hnin Hlaing, 16, and Mya Win, 14, Maungdaw Township
- c) Ko Mratt, Maungdaw Township
- d) Ye Thu, 40, Maungdaw Township
- e) U Aung Kyaw, 46, Maungdaw Township
- f) U Tint Swe, 50, and Daw Ma Hla Win, Maungdaw Township

### Conclusion
- Recommendations to the Burmese/Myanmar Government
- Recommendations to the international community and UN
- Appendix 1: IDP Table
- Appendix 2: Official documents referring to restrictions on Kaman in Thandwe
- Appendix 3: Official documents referring to restrictions on Yangon Shwe Pyi Thar
- Timeline
1. Executive Summary
Five years after violence broke out between extremist Buddhists and Muslims in western Burma, displacing tens of thousands of Muslims and precipitating waves of attacks in central Burma, conditions for Muslims (including those who are not Rohingya) throughout the country have worsened. More than 120,000 members of the Rohingya Muslim minority group in Rakhine State remain in displacement camps, while those outside are subjected to increasingly severe restrictions on their ability to travel and to access education and healthcare.

But the post-violence political landscape in Burma has also given rise to more subtle forms of persecution that have not made international headlines, and which have received backing from the government, elements of the monkhood and ultra-nationalist civilian groups. While the outright violence has decreased in frequency, persecution has continued in an institutionalised manner. Across the country, “Muslim-free zones” have been formed, while Muslim places of worship have been shuttered or rendered unusable. Muslims in general continue to be denied ID cards, and the Rohingya in particular have been subjected to campaigns of violence carried out by the military.

This report draws on more than 350 interviews conducted by the Burma Human Rights Network (BHRN) over an eight-month period. Testimony was collected from individuals in more than 46 towns and villages across the country, from Karen State in the east to Rakhine State in the west, and throughout central Burma. The findings fall into six main categories that together provide compelling evidence of the ongoing systematic persecution of Muslims well into the era of pseudo-civilian rule. The report highlights that the persecution is not restricted to the treatment of Rohingya Muslims.

BHRN has documented multiple instances in which Muslims of all ethnicities have been refused ID cards, also known as National Registration Cards (NRCs). The ways in which this manifests varies, but commonly reported problems include the flat-out denial of an NRC card to Muslims; the requirement that Muslims provide extensive, and often difficult to obtain, documentation that proves a family lineage dating back to before 1824; and the refusal by immigration authorities to register a Muslim person as solely Bamar, the majority ethnicity in Burma. BHRN believes that the denial of an NRC in Burma carries both material and ideological implications. Someone who fails to show an NRC when requested by police or another authority is likely to face harassment, and a penalty of a fine, or imprisonment, or both.

Authorities have also persistently blocked the rebuilding of mosques and madrasas that have been either damaged, destroyed or sealed in recent years. Denying a religious group access to a place of worship contravenes a fundamental right to freedom of expression and religion. In Burma, the refusal by authorities to allow the rebuilding of destroyed mosques and the bar on Muslims returning to their places of worship appears to be part of a calculated strategy to deny religious expression for Muslims.

There has also been an increase in instances of religious intolerance directed largely at Muslims
(but with other religious minority communities facing similar problems). Ceremonies to mark Muslim holy days have been blocked by authorities following pressure from ultra-nationalist Buddhists groups, such as Ma Ba Tha. Muslims face frequent harassment and are the subject of debasing propaganda campaigns by organised networks of nationalists.

BHRN has also found that following the violence of 2012 in Rakhine State, Muslims—both those inside displacement camps and outside—have faced increasingly acute restrictions on their access to education and healthcare that are enforced by the state. Around 120,000 remain confined to camps, thereby reinforcing the sense that Muslims are a security threat that needs controlling. This provides a foundation for possible future violence. There is also a blockade on Muslims accessing some hospitals, a form of racialised healthcare that denies emergency treatment to individuals solely on the grounds of their ethnicity and/or religion, in clear contravention of international human rights law.

Since the first wave of violence in 2012, BHRN has documented at least 21 so-called “Muslim-free zones”—villages where inhabitants, backed by local authorities, have erected signboards warning Muslims against entering the village. While the segregation measures enacted in Rakhine State have received some international attention, little focus has been directed to analogous processes such as these in central Myanmar.

Finally, BHRN has collected extensive testimony detailing the human cost of a military campaign launched by the Myanmar army in response to attacks by armed Rohingya groups on police outposts in northern Rakhine State in October 2016. The response by the military, which conducted a sweep of Rohingya villages, deployed helicopter gunships to fire on villages and, according to some witnesses interviewed by BHRN, used either rocket-propelled grenades or mortars, left dozens dead and caused tens of thousands to flee into Bangladesh. BHRN has collected first-hand testimony from those who experienced the violence and who spoke of the lasting physical and psychological damage caused by it.

The different strategies of persecution of Muslims documented in this report are part of an historical process that gathered momentum following the 1962 military coup in Myanmar. However, as BHRN has shown, these have continued into the era of pseudo-civilian rule, with the ruling National League for Democracy so far having shown few signs of a concerted effort to elevate the status and security of Muslims in the country. The government’s efforts to bring about an end to conflicts based on identity, whether ethnic or religious, have so far failed to net any substantial results. This report makes clear that the more subtle methods of persecution occurring today can be as damaging, if not fatal, as the more outright expressions of violence seen in recent years.

The themes covered in this report are as follows:

1. Problems for Muslims obtaining ID cards

Under Burmese law, citizens must renew their government ID cards (known as ‘NRCs’) at set ages throughout their lives. Research by the BHRN reveals systematic refusal to allow Muslims to receive an NRC. The way in which this manifests varies, but commonly reported problems include the flat-out denial of an NRC to Muslims; the requirement that Muslims provide extensive, and often difficult to obtain, documentation that proves a family lineage dating back to before 1824; and the refusal by immigration authorities to register a Muslim person as solely Bama, the majority ethnicity in Burma. The denial of an NRC in Burma carries both material and ideological implications. Someone who fails to show an NRC when requested by police or another authority is likely to face harassment, and a penalty of a fine, or imprisonment, or both.
2. Authorities blocking the rebuilding of damaged mosques

A large number of mosques across Burma have either been damaged or destroyed entirely in the last few years. Numerous reports have surfaced of authorities refusing to allow Muslims to repair their mosques. Denying a religious group access to a place of worship contravenes a fundamental right to freedom of expression and religion. In Burma, the refusal by authorities to allow the rebuilding of destroyed mosques and the bar on Muslims returning to their places of worship appears to be part of a calculated strategy to deny religious expression for Muslims.

3. Examples of religious intolerance

In the lead up to an event to mark Prophet Day in Yangon, January 2017, for which permission was granted by the authorities, a crowd of about 300 people gathered outside the venue, including monk U Thusita, and were told that Muslims intentionally committed rapes and killings of members of other religions: “If Muslims wanted to practice interfaith harmony then they should join with other religions to eat pork curry”. The event venue cancelled it at the last minute. A similar event in Pyay Township in Bago Division was also cancelled following pressure from local nationalist groups.

4. Conditions for Muslims displaced or confined by the violence

The violence of June and October 2012 in Rakhine State in Western Burma forced about 150,000 civilians, the vast majority Rohingya Muslims, into IDP camps. IDPs suffer acute restrictions on access to education and healthcare, enforced by the government. Muslims outside of camps in Rakhine state endure severe travel restrictions. The confinement of Muslims to camps, ghettos and villages reinforces the sense that Muslims are a security threat that needs controlling. This provides a foundation for possible future violence. There is also a blockade on Muslims accessing some hospitals, a form of racialised healthcare that denies emergency treatment to individuals solely on the grounds of their ethnicity and/or religion, in clear contravention of international human rights law.

5. Spread of ‘Muslim-free’ villages

There has been a sharp rise in the number of villages across Burma that have declared themselves ‘no-go zones’ for Muslims. BHRN has documented the existence of at least 21 villages spread across the country where locals, with permission from the relevant authorities, have erected signboards warning Muslims not to enter.

6. Launch of military operations against Rohingya in Rakhine State

On 9th October 2016, three police outposts were allegedly attacked in the Northern Rakhine State. In response, the military deployed troops to the region and began a sweep of Rohingya villages in which helicopter gunships were used and, according to some witnesses interviewed by BHRN, either rocket-propelled grenades or mortars.

Recommendations

- The Burmese government should accept and fully cooperate with the UN mandated Fact Finding Mission.
- Designation of race and religion should be removed from all ID cards.
- Travel restrictions for Rohingya people must be removed immediately.
- Repeal the so-called Protection of Race and Religion laws.
- Withdraw all troops from Rohingya areas.
1. Introduction

Data collected by the Burma Human Rights Network in the period since shows that persecution of Muslims has worsened rather than improved.
Since 2012 Burma has experienced multiple waves of violence between Buddhist extremists and Muslim communities. What initially began as an apparently localised conflict between two ethnic minority groups, the Buddhist Rakhine and Muslim Rohingya, in the west of the country quickly evolved into sporadic fits of violence between extremist Buddhists and Muslims in towns and cities across the whole country. By the end of 2015, more than 25 urban areas had been affected. Accompanying the violence was the rise of several ultra-nationalist Buddhist movements, some led by monks that launched boycott campaigns against Muslims and were successful in lobbying parliament to pass a series of laws that rights group believe heavily discriminate against religious minorities in Burma.

The violence began more than a year and a half into the transition from military to civilian rule. Despite the subsequent election to power of a civilian government in March 2016, a development hailed by the international community as a major step towards democratic consolidation, data collected by the Burma Human Rights Network in the period since shows that persecution of Muslims has worsened rather than improved. The result is that the gradual downwards trend in conditions for religious minorities since the military coup in 1962 continues, despite a major shift in the mode of governance in Burma. Rather than engendering a move towards religious equality and communal harmony, the transition to democracy has instead allowed popular prejudices to influence how the new government rules, and has amplified a dangerous narrative that casts Muslims as an alien presence in Buddhist-majority Burma.

This report organises evidence collected by BHRN since March 2016 into six different themes that cover both institutional and explicit forms of persecution under the new civilian government. Among them are: a growing refusal by authorities to grant identity cards (ID) cards for Muslims; restrictions faced by Muslims in building and repairing mosques; the creation of ‘Muslim-free villages’ across Burma, and an ongoing, highly-organised boycott of Muslim-owned businesses. The implications of recent violence against the Muslim Rohingya minority are also examined. Analysed together, they suggest a concerted effort to Other the Muslims of Burma. Moreover, the evidence suggests not only an inability by the new government to counter this trend, but in some cases active participation by it in the removal of political representation for Muslims.
About BHRN and Methodology

The Burma Human Rights Network (BHRN) was founded in 2012 works for human rights, minority rights and religious freedom in Burma. BHRN has played a crucial role advocating for human rights and religious freedom with politicians and world leaders.

Freedom and Human Rights for All from Birth

BHRN is funded by the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), Unitarian Universalist Service Committee (UUSC), and private individuals. We have members across Burma including in Rakhine State and the Bangladesh border. We also have journalists and activists working in the field. Any information we receive is checked for credibility by experienced journalists in the organisation. We publish press releases and reports after our own investigations.

Kyaw Win – Founder & Executive Director of BHRN
kyawwin78@gmail.com
T: +44(0) 740 345 2378
www.bhrn.org.uk
kyawwin@bhrn.org.uk
facebook.com/bhrnu
@bhrnu

© 2017 BURMA HUMAN RIGHTS NETWORK

Acknowledgements

This report was written by journalist, Francis Wade and Executive Director of BHRN, Kyaw Win, with Dr Thomas MacManus of the International State Crime initiative (ISCI, www.statecrime.org) at Queen Mary University of London’s School of Law. BHRN are grateful to Mark Farmaner, Director of Burma Campaign UK, for his detailed comments on an earlier draft.
Overview of the violence between 2012 and 2017
The first wave of attacks in June 2012 began following the widely reported (by government controlled press) rape and murder of a Rakhine Buddhist woman by three Muslim Rohingya men in Rakhine State on 28 May 2012. Mobs violence erupted in several towns across the state, causing tens of thousands, mostly Rohingya, to flee to displacement camps. A second wave of violence began on 22 October 2012 with orchestrated attacks by Rakhine mobs on Rohingya communities in nine towns across the state. In the intervening period, a number of statements were released by Rakhine civilian and monk groups that called for Rohingya to be expelled from the country, and for Buddhists to sever all contact with them.

The first instance of mass violence outside Rakhine State in Central Burma began in March 2013 in the town of Meikhtila and left 44 people dead. Following a brawl in a Muslim-owned gold shop, extremist Buddhist mobs—many apparently brought in from outside the town—attacked Muslim neighbourhoods. Some 12,000 residents, the majority Muslim, fled to displacement sites outside of town. It wasn’t until the third day that the government announced a state of emergency. Until then, the police presence in the town had been low, and police had done little to intervene to stop the mob attacks.

Throughout 2013 and up until May 2014, when similar violence erupted in Mandalay, Burma’s second largest city, there were numerous instances of attacks on Muslim communities in towns across the country. The attacks then abated for some time, before recommencing in June and July 2016 when extremist Buddhist mobs razed mosques in Kachin State and Bago Division.

Immediately after coming to power, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi renewed efforts to broker peace with warring ethnic armies in the north and east of the country. She also set up a commission headed by former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan to address the deep-seated communal tensions in Rakhine State. However, following deadly attacks by what appeared to have been armed Rohingya militants on police outposts in northern Rakhine State on 9 October 2016, the military launched a crackdown. After forming an operation zone and blocking the movement of Rohingya, allegations surfaced that troops had raped and killed Rohingya men, women and children as it searched for militants. The operation was stepped up after a second round of attacks on police outposts on 4 November, and several thousand Rohingya have since fled to Bangladesh. The civilian government, which is eager not to antagonise the independent military and to appear to take sides with the Rohingya, whom many Buddhists in Burma believe to be illegal immigrants from Bangladesh, has responded that the army is acting in accordance with the rule of law.

“The attacks against the Rohingya population in the area ... seems to have been widespread as well as systematic, indicating the very likely commission of crimes against humanity (as the High Commissioner concluded already in June 2016)”

Historical Background

The presence of the Muslim community can be traced back to the ninth century, when traders from Persia and India set up small communities along the western and southern coastline.
Religion in Burma

The vast majority of the population (90%) in Burma is Buddhist. Christianity forms the second largest religious community (6%), and Islam the third (4%). The presence of the Muslim community can be traced back to the ninth century, when traders from Persia and India set up small communities along the western and southern coastline. Burma has no state religion, although since independence the government has channelled significant funds towards the teaching of Theravada Buddhism and has elevated it as the de facto state religion.

Burma is divided into seven divisions and seven states, the latter of which are home to the country’s ethnic minority groups. According to the government, Burma has 135 indigenous ethnic groups. The majority is the Burman, or Bama, who are predominantly Buddhist. Minority groups like the Karen, Kachin and Chin, who live in the seven border states, have significant Christian communities.

Ethnicity in Burma under Ne Win, 1962-1988

The subject of ethnicity and religion in Burma are closely intertwined. Burma won its independence from British rule in 1948 and became a parliamentary democracy. A coup in 1962 brought into power the military, headed by General Ne Win, who pursued a narrative of the Buddhist Bama as rightful owners of the nation, and all others as subordinate to them. The general set about purging the country of foreign influence, by banning foreign missionaries and expelling Indian and Chinese immigrants in their hundreds of thousands. Ne Win then began a campaign of ‘Burmanisation’, the term given to the regime’s efforts to assimilate ethnic minorities into the majority Burman sphere (and sometimes called ‘Irrawadyisation’). This involved the planting of Burman officials in administrative posts in ethnic minority regions, the forced marriage of ethnic minority women to Burman troops, the forced teaching of Burmese language in schools in minority communities, and military campaigns against ethnic minority rebel groups. He also barred Muslims from all top administrative and military posts, and in 1982 enacted a new Citizenship Act based on the 135 indigenous groups that excluded the Rohingya from citizenship and effectively rendered them stateless.

Persecution of religious minorities under the SLORC/SPDC regimes, 1988-2011

The State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), and it’s continuation State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), which took power following Ne Win’s fall in 1988, widened the Burmanisation campaign further to target religious minorities. It developed networks of schools in Christian-dominated regions that were accused of forcibly converting poor Christian students to Buddhism. It also conducted numerous mass conversion ceremonies in rural Christian
areas, where villagers would be granted a National Registration Card (NRC)—the principal form of identification in Burma, which displays the carrier’s ethnicity and religion—in return for their conversion to Buddhism. During military campaigns in Christian areas, churches have been burned and crosses destroyed. In northern Rakhine State, which is majority Muslim, it developed a network of model Buddhist villages where prisoners and homeless were relocated to in a bid to dilute the Muslim population there. In addition, over the past two decades it has become harder for Muslims to apply for NRC cards. Immigration authorities have been known to either flatly refuse NRC cards for Muslims, or have otherwise demanded that no Muslim can apply as a ‘pure’ Bama, but instead must add a nationality onto their cards that corresponds to a country where Muslims are populous, such as India, Bangladesh or Pakistan. This is due to a perception that Muslims cannot be native to a majority Buddhist country.

**Rise of ultra-nationalist Buddhist movements under the USDP, 2011-2016**

In the wake of the 2012 violence, a prominent ultra-nationalist monk-led group known as 969 arose that encouraged Buddhists to boycott Muslim-owned businesses, and whose monks sermonised on the threat that Islam posed to the health of Buddhism in Burma. These sermons, delivered across the country, and coupled with anti-Muslim propaganda circulated on social media, had often preceded attacks on Muslim communities. The movement came about in response to perceptions that the violence of 2012 was the start of a campaign by Muslims, particularly the Rohingya, to ‘Islamise’ the country. The narrative went that the Rohingya were seeking citizenship in an attempt to gain a foothold in western Myanmar, from where they would begin the Islamisation of Myanmar with the help of additional Bengali who would cross into Myanmar knowing that they could gain citizenship. This narrative became so powerful that it quickly extended to the Muslim community in Myanmar as a whole, regardless of whether or not they were from the Rohingya ethnicity.

Another group, the Organisation for the Protection of Race and Religion, known better by its local acronym, Ma Ba Tha, formed in the middle of 2013 and developed a membership base of Buddhist nationalists that stretched into the millions. It was jointly led by monks and laymen, and issued similar warnings about the threat that Islam posed to Buddhism. By 2016, Ma Ba Tha had offices in around 250 of the country’s 330 Townships. It, and affiliated nationalist groups that formed around the same time, began to set up Sunday Schools where Buddhist children would learn about Buddhist values. But reports began to emerge that numbers of these schools were also preaching an anti-Muslim agenda. Ma Ba Tha quickly grew in influence to a point at which it was able to pressure parliament to pass a package of four laws, known informally as the ‘Race & Religion Laws’, that rights groups claimed discriminated against religious minorities and women. Among the laws was a requirement that whomever wished to convert to another religion must seek official permission beforehand, and that marriages between Buddhists and non-Buddhists would be subjected to public opinion.

Ma Ba Tha also pursued a campaign begun by 969 to boycott Muslim-owned businesses, which had begun with the production of ‘969’ stickers bearing the movement’s logo that were stuck on Buddhist-owned stores and taxis. This was done in order to distinguish Buddhist from Muslim-owned business, and to signal which services Buddhists should be using. One of its chief proponents, the monk U Wirathu, called repeatedly for Buddhists to shop only at Buddhist-owned stores. In one sermon given in December 2012 in the town of Meikhtila, which descended into violence in March the following year, U Wirathu warned followers that if money goes to Muslim businesses, Muslims “will use that money to manipulate women, forcefully
convert those women into their religion, and the children of them will become enemies of the state.” In June 2013, Burma’s then religious affairs minister, Sann Sint, told media that he saw nothing wrong with the boycott, and said it was “up to the consumers.” In 2014, Ma Ba Tha led a boycott campaign of the Qatari telecoms company Ooredoo, which had been granted a license to develop the telecommunications sector in Burma, on account of the fact that Qatar is a Muslim-predominant country. In April 2015, the company was forced to stop its building of telecoms towers in a northern Yangon suburb after a local campaign. The campaign hit Muslim businesses hard but the actual levels of loss of revenue is difficult to determine. In the Irrawaddy delta, dozens of Muslim-owned cattle slaughterhouses went out of business after local authorities sold their licenses to an association led by Ma Ba Tha members, following a campaign that tied the killing of cows to Muslim cruelty. The involvement of local authorities suggest a degree of collaboration between authorities and ultra-nationalist movements in Burma. Under Thein Sein’s government Rakhine nationalists, 969 and Ma Ba Tha operated with a freedom that other activists didn’t come close to enjoying, implying a least tacit support for the movements.

### The National League for Democracy and the ‘Muslim issue’

Towards the end of 2015, elections took place in Burma that saw the National League for Democracy (NLD), led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, win office and thereby dislodging the military-aligned Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) from government. In the run-up to election, Ma Ba Tha had encouraged supporters to vote for the USDP as the party that would best safeguard Buddhism. At the same time, the NLD came under attack from Buddhist nationalists who spread images on social media of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi wearing a hijab, and warned that an NLD government would empower the country’s Muslim community, to the detriment of Buddhism. As a result of the pressure applied on the NLD from the Buddhist nationalist lobby, and likely in a bid to appease them in return, no Muslim candidates were permitted to run for the NLD in the 2015 elections. After NLD’s landslide victory, they didn’t appoint a single Muslim government Minister. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi has consistently failed to try to change societal attitudes and senior NLD leaders have been allowed to make anti-Rohingya statements.

The apparently symbiotic relationship between the military-aligned USDP and Ma Ba Tha led to allegations that the movement had the tacit backing of the military, and was seeking to slow, or derail, the transfer of power to a civilian government in order that the military could retain its political power. A similar theory has been put forward to explain animosity between Buddhists and Muslims, given that in many cases the violence appeared to have been organised, with mobs brought into towns from outside. Speculation arose that forces within the military had engineered the violence, or allowed it to take hold, in order to show to the Burmese population that the country wasn’t yet ready for the military to step back.

### Current situation with regards to Muslims in Burma

Although the current situation in Rakhine State remains highly volatile, the frequency of violent episodes between extremist Buddhists and Muslims in central Burma, although still occurring sporadically, has decreased since 2014. Since the election victory of the NLD, ultra-nationalist groups like Ma Ba Tha are less vocal. However, the violence catalysed a more subtle form of persecution of Muslims in Central Burma which this report will examine. Persecution has continued in an institutionalised manner, with the government blocking repairs to Muslim places of worship that were damaged in the violence, refusing to register Muslims as native to Burma,
and blocking access to education and healthcare for Muslims in Rakhine State in particular. As well as giving an overview of the military operations in Rakhine State that began in October 2016 and continue to the time of writing, this report will set out a number of patterns of persecution that have emerged since the violence began in 2012 and are ongoing despite the transfer of power to a civilian government.

**The themes covered in this report are as follows:**

1. Problems for Muslims obtaining ID cards
2. Authorities blocking the rebuilding of damaged mosques
3. Examples of religious intolerance
4. Conditions for Muslims displaced or confined by the violence
5. Spread of ‘Muslim-free’ villages
6. Launch of military operations against Rohingya in Rakhine State
1. Problems for Muslims obtaining ID cards

---

Research by the BHRN reveals systematic refusal to allow Muslims to receive an NRC.
Under Burmese law, citizens must renew their ID cards – NRCs – at set ages throughout their lives. The NRC is obligatory for all citizens in Burma and it records the bearer’s ethnicity and religion. Without an NRC, individuals find it difficult obtaining housing, formal work, graduating from university, and are likely to face persistent harassment from authorities. Burmese law has three grades of citizenship: full citizen, associate citizen, and naturalized citizen. To qualify for full citizenship, one must have a lineage in Burma going back to before 1824, when British rule began. Rights for associate citizens and naturalised citizens are severely curtailed.

A number of Muslims have reported difficulties over the past year obtaining the NRC. Although religion has no de jure bearing on citizenship in Burma, Muslims have since the era of Ne Win often been treated as second class citizens, and under Ne Win were by and large subordinated to Buddhists in government positions. While Muslims faced difficulties in obtaining NRCs prior to the 2012 violence, anecdotal evidence suggests this has worsened since the violence, and had the effect of further casting Muslims as foreign to Myanmar on account of their religion alone.

The way in which the difficulties manifest varies, but commonly reported problems include the flat-out denial of an NRC card to Muslims; the requirement that Muslims provide extensive, and often difficult to obtain, documentation that proves a family lineage dating back to before 1824; and the refusal by immigration authorities to register a Muslim person as solely Bama, the majority ethnicity in Burma. Instead they are required to add another nationality to their NRC, usually one of a Muslim-majority country like Bangladesh or Pakistan, regardless of the fact that the applicant has no family (or any other) connections with that country. There have also been reports of a multi-tiered application process, whereby upon refusal by Township-level immigration authorities, applicants are referred to state- and region-level authorities, and then onto the Central Immigration Department. The latter department includes officials from the Ministry of Defence, the Foreign Affairs Ministry and the Ministry of Labour, Immigration and Population.

Several Burmese Muslims relayed experiences of difficulties obtaining ‘pink’ citizenship cards, and some legal experts in Yangon and Manadalay have detailed instances where Muslims were told they may have to obtain National Verification cards to replace white cards, which are a lower status form of ID that does not provide full citizenship. These accounts paint a picture of a general move by the government towards reducing the citizenship status of Burmese Muslims throughout the country.

The issuing of NVC cards is especially problematic because it removes a number of rights from its holder, including freedom of movement and the ability to get a passport. A lawyer in Yangon told BHRN about cases where Muslims were arrested and charged simply for going from one township to another without permission from their local authorities. The same lawyer has detailed cases of Muslims who have been arrested for not obtaining permission from their local immigration offices when simply travelling between townships. At least 16 people are currently facing up to two years in jail with fines, and in one case faces hard labour. Whereas
Pink Card holders can easily obtain a passport and travel the world freely, the NVC scheme would make it difficult for Muslims even to visit friends or work in another township. These efforts by the Burmese authorities signify a coordinated plan to disenfranchise, monitor and restrict the movement of non-Rohingya Muslims in the country.

Burmese non-Rohingya Muslims are reporting that they are being pressured, and in some cases forced, to accept NVC cards in the major cities of Yangon and Mandalay. The BHRN has spoken with human rights lawyers and Muslims inside of Burma who are closely following the issue. Some Burmese Muslims have told BHRN that in spite of having enough evidence they were only able to obtain a Pink Card after paying high fees, which were more expensive than most in the country could afford.

Research by the BHRN reveals systematic refusal to allow Muslims to receive an NRC. This refusal effectively renders people stateless, in contravention of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Burma’s treaty obligations under the United Nations Convention of the Rights of the Child. These are blatant violations of international law.

Some of the cases are highlighted here below to give a small sample of the large data set collected by BHRN researchers inside Burma. All witness names in this report have been changed for security reasons.

a) Ma Thidar, Shwebo Township, Sagaing Division

Ma Thidar applied for a new NRC at the local immigration office in Shwebo Township in January 2016. Upon submitting the application she was told by the immigration officer in charge that she would be unable to register as solely Burmese, and would be required to add an additional nationality. The officer told her that there are no Muslims among the ‘Burmese race’ and that she must have family ties to another country. The officer told her that people in Burma of Muslim faith must record on their NRC a nationality such as ‘Indian & Burma’, or ‘Pakistan & Burma’. They added that there are no Burmese who Christian either – “all Myanmar are Buddhists.”

b) Ko Min Oo, Okkan Township, Yangon Division

Ko Min Oo applied for a NRC in 2016. The second-year university student, whose parents and paternal grandparents are registered as Bama on their NRCs, was told by the assistant immigration official in Okkan that the application would need to be referred to a higher-level immigration department on account of the fact that his maternal grandmother’s name is Muslim, and that she is registered as a ‘Bengali’. The mother of Ko Min Oo has been required to make repeated trips to the immigration office but is yet to successfully obtain an NRC for her son.

c) Saw Kyaw Htoo, Hlaing Bwe Township, Kayin State.

Saw Kyaw Htoo explained how no Muslims from the Township of Hlaing Bwe in Kayin State have been allowed to register for an NRC in recent years. Ever since the uprising of 1988, Muslims in the locale have been systematically denied cards by immigration authorities. Saw Kyaw Htoo’s grandson is among those refused a card. When Muslim elders appealed to authorities, they were told that action would be taken to grant them NRCs but this has not materialised.

d) Ko Kyaw Thu, Shwe Gun Township, Kayin State

Muslims face a similar problem in Shwe Gun Township in Kayin State. One interviewee reported that around half the town’s Muslim population does not have an NRC. Some people have been forced to pay a bribe of around USD$75 (average annual income in Myanmar is less than
USD$2,000) in order to acquire one, where a decade ago the bribe was closer to USD$1. Others have been flatly refused, even when a bribe is offered. In another village in Hpa-an Township in Kayin State, one interviewee said that only five Muslims in the whole village had NRCs, while all Buddhists have them.

e) Maung Thu Kha, Yangon City

Maung Thu Kha, from Yangon, finished his university degree in 2011 but was barred from graduating. Officials at the University of Yangon told him that in order to receive his graduation certificate, he needed to produce an NRC. Both his parents hold full citizenship and three of his four grandparents are full citizens. However, he and his three siblings are without an NRC. Maung Thu Kha first applied for a card in 2010 and has tried a number of times since but has consistently been refused. When his father applied on his behalf, he was asked to pay a bribe that he could not afford. (Often bribes for an NRC can reach up to USD$150). On other occasions Maung Thu Kha was asked to provide supporting documents that he did not have. The lack of an NRC has meant that he was unable to vote in the 2015 elections. Although he had held a temporary registration card, known as a 'white card', prior to the 2010 elections, and which had allowed him to vote, these were withdrawn under the President Thein Sein administration.

f) Maung Than Htike, Yangon City

Maung Than Htike has been unable to obtain a graduation certificate on account of not having an NRC. Although he passed final year exams at the Government Technical College in Yangon in 2015, he has not attempted to collect his certificate, given that he has been told he would be forced to produce his NRC. He first submitted an application for an NRC when he was aged 12 but has been unable to provide a so-called ‘Form 1’, which displays evidence of the parents’ citizenship status. From his father’s side he is able to provide adequate documentation but because his mother is from Sittwe, where violence occurred between extremist Buddhists and Muslims in 2012, this has proven harder. Travel for Muslims to and within Sittwe is heavily restricted, if not outright forbidden, and thus he has been unable to visit the immigration office to obtain the evidence he needs. Recently he paid someone 90,000 kyat (USD$69) to collect it on his behalf but the documentation has not arrived.

Analysis

The denial of an NRC in Burma carries both material and ideological implications. Someone who fails to show an NRC when requested by police or another authority is likely to face harassment and a penalty of a fine or imprisonment or both. If the individual hails from an identity group that is already treated with suspicion by authorities, as Muslims in Burma are, then the response to the failure to produce an NRC is likely to be even more severe. The fact that the difficulties for Muslims obtaining NRCs have increased since the violence of 2012 reflects an emboldened sense among authorities in Burma that Muslims are not and cannot be indigenous to the country. This Othering of a religious group at a time when inter-religious tensions are high can have serious consequences for the group in question. It amplifies the idea, vocalised repeatedly by ultra-nationalist groups like Ma Ba Tha, that Muslims are not only foreign to Burma, but a threat to Burma’s Buddhist culture. Any sign that Muslims are becoming stronger in the country by being granted a status equal to that of Buddhists will increase the anxiety felt by Buddhists, hence there appears to be an attempt underway to weaken their position in society, and in doing so stem the threat they allegedly pose to Bama Buddhist supremacy.
2. Authorities blocking the rebuilding of damaged mosques

According to an eyewitness, the mob that destroyed the mosque had brought with them tools, including a handsaw, in order to dismantle the structure.
During the violence between extremist Buddhists and Muslims after 2012, a large number of mosques across the country were either damaged or destroyed entirely. In the intervening time, numerous reports have surfaced of authorities refusing to allow Muslims to repair their mosques. This is not an entirely new phenomenon – after Cyclone Nargis in 2008, Muslims were only allowed to make minor repairs to damaged mosques, and were completely barred from rebuilding destroyed mosques. This occurred at the same time that significant resources were channeled into rebuilding damaged Buddhist places of worship. The government has tended to explain away the dramatic increase in hostility towards the Muslim community in Burma since 2012 as the result of communal tensions. However, the decision to continue the blockade on the rebuilding of mosques is evidence that authorities are complicit in the persecution of Muslims by denying them a place of worship in contravention of Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Significant pressure on authorities also appears to be coming from ultra-nationalist Buddhist groups. The following examples of problems surrounding access to, or renovation of, mosques are indicative of a widespread issue. These examples have been chosen because they are indicative of the various barriers to worship faced by Muslims, but by no means is it exhaustive. The government of Burma is failing not only to uphold its own laws but also its international obligations, acting in violation of numerous United Nations Human Rights Council and United Nations General Assembly resolutions and ignoring the recommendations made by United Nations Special Rapporteurs. BHRN has frequently documented instances from across the country of authorities turning down applications to build or renovate Muslim religious buildings.

a) Muslims barred from returning to mosques in Meikhtila

In March 2013 the town of Meikhtila in central Burma was wracked by violence between extremist Buddhists and Muslims that left about 40 dead, the majority of whom were Muslims. Since then, locals have reported that eight mosques in the town are still sealed off leaving the Muslim community with few places of worship. This is despite there having been no official order to have them closed down. A group of four residents seeking permission to have them reopened have been unsuccessful, in part because, they claim, authorities are being pressured by members of the hardliner Buddhist group Ma Ba Tha. A number of residents expressed hope that under the new government of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi the authorities would drop the blockade on the mosques but this still has not materialised.

b) Rebuilding of mosque in Meikhtila blocked

The Kyopin Kauk mosque in Meikhtila sustained significant damage during the March 2013 violence between extremist Buddhists and Muslims. The trustees of the mosque said permission to rebuild the mosque and the nearby Islamic school had initially been permitted by authorities but later revoked after a protest by Ma Ba Tha.
A similar situation played out in Ywa Tan village in Yamethin Township in Mandalay Division, following violence there in March 2013 that damaged mosques. Although a request to repair the mosque was submitted by Muslim elders to the Religious Affairs Department in August 2016, this has still not been granted.

c) Muslims relocated to Kama Maung in Karen State barred from place of worship

In the mid-1990s, Muslims were relocated from Ta Khut Phoe village in Karen State to Kama Maung village, after it was destroyed by the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA—now known as Democratic Karen Benevolent Army) on the counsel of a monk, U Thuzana, known to have been close to the then military junta. Upon relocation to Kama Maung, authorities did not allow Muslims to build a new permanent mosque. Permission to build temporary mosques were granted, but these were later ordered to be demolished. Authorities then allowed villagers to rebuild the mosque, but having been completed, block Muslims from worshipping there, and stated that it could only be used as a school. Police later came and closed the building and left villagers with no place in which to worship.

d) Authorities refuse permission to rebuild mosques in Bago Division

Authorities in the town of Moe Nyo in Bago Division have refused permission to rebuild a mosque that was destroyed during a bout of religious violence in the town in April 2013. Around 40 Muslim households exist in the town, and residents have said that tensions still exist between Buddhists and Muslims. Trust in authorities is already low among Muslims, some of whom claim that police joined the side of the Buddhist community and took part in the violence. Ma Ba Tha has a strong following in the town, according to Muslim residents. A letter of request to rebuild the mosque was submitted soon after it was destroyed in 2013, and then again in 2015 when it was sent to the office of President Thein Sein, as well as Township and district level officials. However, permission has not been granted and Muslims in Moe Nyo must travel 25km to Minhla in order to worship at the mosque there.

In the town of Nattalin, also in Bago Division, Muslims have faced similar difficulties in having the town's sole mosque, which was destroyed in the 2013 violence, rebuilt. According to an eyewitness, the mob that destroyed the mosque had brought with them tools, including a handsaw, in order to dismantle the structure. A request letter was sent to authorities soon after to have the mosque rebuilt, but as yet no response has been given and residents say that tensions remain high between Buddhists and Muslims there.

e) Madrasa not permitted to reopen in Bago Division

A Muslim school in the town of Ohthe Kone in Bago Division that was affected by violence in 2013 has been denied permission to reopen, despite the petitioning of the local General Administration Department by Muslim residents of the town. During the violence, which occurred on 23 and 24 March 2013, the town's Jamia mosque was destroyed and some 40 Muslim families were forced to flee. Muslim residents have reported that although there had not been a repeat of the violence and that business relations had resumed, there were persistent fears of another flare-up. An elder at the mosque said that since the violence, members of Ma Ba Tha had been monitoring whoever entered and left the mosque, and would ask staff at the mosque for details on the guests' identity and log their vehicle registration. Staff at the mosque fear this will be used as a pretext to launch another round of violence.
f) Buddhist nationalists pressure Yangon authorities to close place of worship

In October 2015, the General Administration Department order trustees of a madrasa in Tharkayta in Yangon to ban worship in one of the school’s buildings, claiming it should only be used as a place of study. The decision came following pressure from Buddhist nationalist groups. Muslims have complained that the government’s refusal to allow places of worship to be built for the Muslim community there had meant they were required to worship in religious school buildings. A year later, in October 2016, nationalists raided another religious school and threatened elders that it should only be used for study, not worship. The area has a history of suppressing Muslim freedom of worship and expression: in 2014, prominent Muslim figureheads U Mya Aye and the late U Ko Ni were prevented from speaking at an event in nearby North Okkalapa by monk U Thusita, who claimed that as Muslims, they were not indigenous to Burma. The event was then cancelled.

g) Authorities block gatherings for worship inside private residences in Ayeyarwady Division and Yangon City

In Talaut Lat village in Maubin Township in Ayeyarwady Division, Muslims have used the residence of a local woman to pray during Ramadan. In 2016, a monk from Zeyar Thidi monastery, U Pyinnya Wun Tha, reportedly requested that authorities disallow the gathering, claiming that locals considered it a threat to peace and stability in the village. Other nationalists in the region have also raised the issue of security threats from Muslim worship in the past year. A group known as Ayeyarwady Myanaung Nationalist Network, operative in Myan Aung Township, asked authorities to impose ban on the use of loudspeakers during the morning call to prayer. The group said on its social media page that use of the loudspeaker caused alarm at local schools and in the hospital. The group said that if authorities failed to impose a ban, it would ask its supports to create similar noise or attack the mosques.

A similar situation occurred in Yangon’s Shwe Pyi Thar Township in 2016, when local Muslims applied for permission to gather at local homes to worship. Authorities granted permission for only six of 11 requested homes to be used, despite those 11 homes having been used for worship since the 1990s. The five remaining homes were then sealed off. This has meant that there are now only five places of worship for the town’s 20,000-strong Muslim population, none of which are actual mosques.

h) Authorities block repair of cyclone-damaged mosque in Ayeyarwady Division

In Kyone Ma Nge Township in Ayeyarwady Division, Muslims are required to ask permission from the General Administration Department before repairing the mosque. However, since the local mosque was damaged by Cyclone Nargis in 2008, no repairs have been allowed. According to the secretary of the mosque, request for permission was first submitted in 2010, but the authorities said the documents submitted were not complete. The mosque roof, which was ripped off in the cyclone, remains in a state of disrepair.

i) Mosque sealed off in Ayeyarwady Division, worship banned

A mosque that was sealed off in 2001 by authorities in Be Yet village in Kyan Khin Township, Ayeyarwady Division, remains off-limits to Muslims. A trustee of the mosque said that when Muslims in the village tried to enter into the mosque for prayers during Ramadan in September 2011, a complaint was lodged with the police. Subsequently, authorities issued an order to ban worship at the mosque.
j) Muslim worship banned in parts of Yangon City

In 2015, authorities imposed a ban on worship at eight Islamic schools in Tharkayta Township in Yangon after complaint was lodged that mass prayers were being conducted in the schools. Officials from the local General Administration Department asked the trustees of the schools to sign an undertaking that prayers would not be conducted in the schools.

k) Authorities order demolition of 50-year-old Muslim school in Mon State

Authorities in Shwe Hlay village in Mon State have ordered the demolition of a 50-year-old Muslim school on the grounds that it was built without permission. The order was given in November 2016 and claimed that it was built not on the land designated for construction of religious buildings, but farmland. Muslim elders say that the school was built on land donated by a Muslim in 1967 to use specifically for building a school, to be run as a trust. Authorities have consistently refused permission for refurbishments to be made.

Analysis

Denying a religious group access to a place of worship contravenes a fundamental right to freedom of expression and religion. In Burma, the refusal by authorities to allow the rebuilding of destroyed mosques and the bar on Muslims returning to their places of worship appears to be part of a calculated strategy to deny religious expression for Muslims. While the denial is not consistent across all Muslim communities in Burma, there is a pattern that suggests the violence has provided a pretext to further limit access to Muslim places of worship. After the coup of 1962, the government implemented a ban on renovations to mosques and madrasas in Northern Rakhine State and across Burma. Moreover, in contrast to the significant level of state funding that goes towards the upkeep of Buddhist infrastructure in the country, Islamic holy sites receive no state funding. Any attempt to limit religious activities for one group, whilst supporting it for another, as the government appears to have done in barring access to mosques, amounts to religious persecution in contravention of national and international law.
3. Examples of religious intolerance

The rise of Buddhist nationalist groups like Ma Ba Tha has been accompanied by an increase in instances of reported harassment of Muslims.
The rise of Buddhist nationalist groups like Ma Ba Tha has been accompanied by an increase in instances of reported harassment of Muslims. These nationalist groups have been able to pressure local authorities into blocking activities by interfaith harmony groups and celebrations of Muslim religious days, as well as campaigning for a nationwide boycott of Muslim-owned businesses. Around 7,000 Buddhist Sunday Schools, or Dhamma Schools, have been set up by Ma Ba Tha across the country. It is believed that alongside education on Buddhist cultural values, children who attend these schools are encouraged to cease buying goods from Muslim-owned stores and given instruction as to how Islam threatens Buddhists values in Myanmar. The economic boycott has had far-reaching consequences. Its most successful campaign so far has been the closure of Muslim-owned cattle slaughterhouses, predominantly in the Ayeyarwady Delta area, where from 2015 onwards, owners of slaughterhouses who tried to renew their licenses were told by authorities that these had been sold to associations linked to Ma Ba Tha.

The following are examples of instances of religious intolerance:

a) Pressure on authorities to block Muslim religious days

In the lead up to an event to mark Prophet Day in January 2017, members of the Myanmar Nationalist Network, a prominent Buddhist group that agitates against Muslims in Myanmar, pressured authorities to block a celebration at a hall in Tharkayta Township in Yangon. Statements were circulated on the group’s popular social media pages. Permission was granted, but on the day of the event, members of the group pressured the owner of the hall to stop it. Around 300 members then gathered outside the hall playing loud music, before sermons were given in the evening by several monks, including monk U Thusita, in which the Qur’an was heavily criticised and crowds were told that Muslims intentionally committed rapes and killings of members of other religions. “If Muslims wanted to practice interfaith harmony then they should join with other religions to eat pork curry”, their listeners were told.

Another Prophet Day event scheduled to be held in a mosque in January 2017 in Pyay Township in Bago Division was also cancelled, despite authorities initially permitting it to take place. Following pressure from local nationalist groups, members of the General Administration Department met with a local monk committee and nationalist groups and agreed to shorten the period of the ceremony to 30 minutes. But on the day of the event, U Thusita and around 100 followers gathered outside the mosque, handed out leaflets and prevented people from entering.

b) Seizure of cattle bought for Eid sacrifice in Yangon City

There have been numerous instances reported of nationalist groups seizing cattle that had been bought to sacrifice during Eid. In September 2016, members of the Patriotic Monks Union accompanied by Ziwita Dhana, a Ma Ba Tha affiliate, seized cattle and prevented its
transportation to the site of sacrifice. In Yangon, around 270 cattle in total were recently seized in a campaign led by nationalist monks U Thusita and U Parmoukkha, both closely aligned with Ma Ba Tha. Muslim cattle owners have also been arrested and placed on trial under Section 5 of the Emergency Commodity and Service Act.

c) Muslim vendors near revered Buddhist pagoda ordered to leave

In April 2016, members of the Patriotic Monks Union descended on Muslim stalls near Shwedagon Pagoda in Yangon, Myanmar’s most revered Buddhist site, and ordered them to leave. Products were seized and at least three Muslim vendors were physically attacked. To reclaim their seized property, the vendors were told to bring recommendation letters from the local ward administration, police and their mosque, as well as a signed undertaking not to open any stalls near the pagoda again. Despite complaints to police and the Ministry of Religious Affairs, no action has been taken against the perpetrators.

Analysis

The hate-speech and discriminatory campaigns of ultra-nationalist monks have become emboldened by the impunity and growing support that they enjoy. Complaints to the government continue to go unanswered.
4. Conditions for Muslims displaced or confined by the violence

Camp elders report that people are dying due to malnourishment.
The violence of June and October 2012 in Rakhine State in Western Burma forced tens of thousands of civilians, the vast majority Rohingya Muslims, into IDP camps. In the aftermath of the October 2012 violence the camps accommodated more than 150,000 people at any one time, although these have reduced somewhat over time. Now there are round 120,000 living in camps, mostly around the state capital of Sittwe. Around 12,000 people, the majority Muslims, were also forced into camps when the violence erupted in Meikhtila in March 2013. Only one small camp remains on the edge of Meikhtila, housing just over 100 people.

“Based on 2017 preliminary data showing an increase in children requiring treatment of acute malnutrition, it is estimated that 80,500 children under the age of five are expected to be in need of treatment for acute malnutrition within the next 12 months”


The Muslims displaced by the Rakhine State violence have suffered acute restrictions on access to healthcare and education, while those in the remaining camp in Meikhtila are being denied permission to return to the land on which their homes were built. One significant effect of the Rakhine State violence was the segregation of both communities, with Muslims barred from entering towns like Sittwe, Kyauktaw and Mrauk U. In Sittwe, barricaded ghettos formed to house those who hadn’t fled to camps; in Kyauktaw and Mrauk U, Muslims were entirely banished from the towns and confined to outlying villages.

Prior to the violence, Rohingya had suffered acute travel restrictions that had been enforced only on them. In order to travel from one Township to another, Rohingya had been required to obtain a permit from immigration authorities known as Form 4 (used in other parts of Burma for foreigners), for which they were required to pay anything up to USD$8 each time. If a Rohingya is caught at a police checkpoint without a Form 4, they are either returned to their Township or arrested. The form would state where they were going, whose house they would be staying in and for how long. Any breach of these stipulations – even if they travelled for medical treatment and were required to stay longer than planned in hospital – would be met with a fine, and possible arrest.

The tightening of travel restrictions, coupled with the segregation measures enacted following the 2012 violence, have compounded problems for Rohingya in accessing vital services. There is also evidence that Kaman Muslims, who also live in Rakhine State and are recognised as citizens, have been required to apply for a ‘Form 4’ (see Appendix 2 for a picture of form 4, and other official documents referring restriction on Kaman in Thandwe) to travel since the violence. The following are examples of the effects of these restrictions, which are further exacerbated by shortages of vital resources, both in Rakhine State and across locations in Burma where Muslims have been displaced by the violence. The table in the Appendix gives a fuller list of these.
a) Access to healthcare among IDPs in Rakhine State

Kyauktaw and Minbya

Kyauktaw Township in Northern Rakhine State was struck by violence in October 2012. Since then, Muslims have been blocked from visiting the town’s hospital and marketplace, and instead must seek permission from local authorities to travel to either Myaung Bwe hospital or Sittwe hospital with a police escort that they must pay for. Peik Thei village, about 1km south of Kyauktaw, has no medical facility beyond the presence of an untrained local medic. Patients must travel about 16km to visit the nearest accessible hospital, in Myaung Bwe, but in order to do this they must get permission from both the village and Township authority as well as the immigration department. Shwe Hlaing village, about 3km from Peik Thei, also has no clinic. For minor illnesses, villagers buy medicine from the local drugstore. These drugs are often poorly stored and out of date.

In the Da Tha IDP camp near the town of Minbya in Rakhine State, inhabitants receive only two visits per month from health officials who stay for two hours each time. During the months of April and May 2016, no health officials visited. In that period, one person died of diarrhea. In order for inhabitants to reach Myaung Bwe hospital, they are forced to pay 100,000 kyat (USD$75). One man in the nearby IDP camp of Latma, also in Minbya Township, reported that there is insufficient water in the well—the main source of water for the camp—and that inhabitants were forced to take water from a nearby stream, which carried a high risk of illness.

In other camps people have reported arbitrary restrictions on access to healthcare. Inhabitants of Aung Daing village in Minbya Township, which has been granted recognition by the government as an IDP camp, are allowed to travel to Myaung Bwe hospital only in the mornings and afternoons. They are forbidden from staying overnight, regardless of the seriousness of the case. Instead they are required to sleep in nearby Muslim villages, and then return in the morning if necessary.

In Pya Mu village in Kyauktaw Township, inhabitants have reported that the only source of drinking water is rainwater, as well as a pond in the nearby Ahle Mu village.

Sittwe

The majority of the IDP camps in Rakhine State are located near the capital Sittwe and house people from across the state. International NGOs administer the camps and provide healthcare to inhabitants, who are unable to leave except when they are granted referral to Sittwe hospital. This usually only occurs in cases of severe illness or childbirth.

In Thakae Pyin camp, which is home to around 8,500 people, there is one clinic staffed by one doctor from the health department and one assistant doctor, as well as a nurse and five assistant nurses. They are present only two days of the week, and for two hours at a time. Inhabitants of the camp receive monthly food rations from the World Food Programme (WFP) as follows: 50 tins (condensed milk tins) of rice, eight tins of beans, one litre of cooking oil. There is no electricity, and wood is used for stoves. There is no private washing space and people often wash near the well-used for drinking water. At the Say Tha Ma Gi camp, only 7,000 of the camp’s 12,000 inhabitants are registered and receive food aid.

Aung Mingalar quarter is one of only two remaining Muslim quarters in Sittwe, and is guarded by armed police. Residents are unable to leave the neighbourhood, except to go to the IDP camps by arrangement with the authorities. Food assistance struggles to make it in, and instead must be bought from markets inside the IDP camps and transported back to the quarter. The majority of people inside Aung Mingalar survive on donations from relatives elsewhere. Doctors
from a joint governmental and INGO committee visit three times a week and stay for two hours each time. These doctors are unable to refer patients to Sittwe hospital, and instead send them to the hospital inside Thakae Pyin camp. One doctor has reported receiving threats from Rakhine nationalists for treating Muslim patients.

At the Da Paing camp near Sittwe, residents have complained that there is no medical clinic and instead they must travel to Thakae Pyin camp for treatment. This means that the clinic in Thakae Pyin must serve more than 15,000 people, all of whom, given the conditions they live in, are at high risk of falling ill.

**Kyaukphyu**

The main camp near the town of Kyaukphyu, where the Muslim neighbourhood was razed in October 2012, is Kyauk Ta Lone and houses 1,163 people. Soldiers and policemen guard the entrance points.

Inhabitants have complained that drinking water supplied to the camp is unfit for consumption. Electricity is supplied only between 7pm and 10pm, and camp shelters are covered in tin sheets that make the shelters very hot. When the government launched the citizenship verification process in May 2016, inhabitants said they were barred from leaving the camp to collect water from nearby wells. There is one clinic here but no doctor to service it. IDPs rely on a health worker and nurse drawn from the camp community. Camp elders reported that numbers of people had died due to malnourishment, while many people who are living in flooded areas have complained about numbness in their bodies. Since the rainy season of 2016, large areas of the Kyauk Ta Lone camps remained under water for long periods of time.

(Full demographical data on Kyauk Ta Lone camps are available from BHRN on request.)
b) Access to education among IDPs in Rakhine State

Sittwe

In Maw Thi Nya IDP camp, home to around 3,000 people, there are two primary schools run by INGOs with a total of eight teachers. More than 800 students study between them. Middle and high school students must travel to Thakae Pyin camp for their schooling. In Thakae Pyin camp, inhabitants report a shortage of teachers – there are only 20 of them, all of whom are volunteers.
In Aung Mingalar quarter there is one middle school. Around 1,000 students attend, and are taught by 15 Rakhine teachers appointed by the government, as well as 10 volunteer teachers from the quarter. However, because all Muslims since 2012 have been barred from attending Sittwe University, the only university in Rakhine State, there is no option available to pursue education after high school and no possibility to sit state exams.

Kyauktaw

In Peik Thei village there are two primary schools, one middle school and one high school. In Shwe Hlaing village, primary school students must attend the school in Peik Thei, compounding the problem with overcrowding there. Middle and high school students must travel to Pauktaw town. For this they must pay 200 bushels of paddy, equivalent to about USD$600.

c) Problems faced by Muslim IDPs in Meikhtila

Around 100 Muslims remain in a small IDP camp next to a football stadium on the outskirts of Meikhtila. In October 2016 they and a number of other families displaced by the violence of 2013 were prevented from returning to their damaged or destroyed homes inside Meikhtila. Camp residents reported that members of Ma Ba Tha had objected to their return. In one incident on 1 October, a group of Ma Ba Tha supporters gathered outside the home of a family of Muslims from the camp and blocked their entrance. Ma Ba Tha then petitioned local authorities not to allow their return. This has reportedly occurred in a number of wards in Meikhtila, including Wunzin, Yan Myo Aung and Minglar Zung Zeya. Authorities have justified their refusal on the grounds that it would create religious tensions. While the family reported the incident to police, there has been no official action. In total, 140 Muslim families in Meikhtila have been refused permission to return to their homes.

The inhabitants of the camp at the football stadium have however been ordered by authorities to vacate the grounds to live in shelters built by the government. The government has built 300 measuring about 4.5m x 6m.

Analysis

Muslim IDPs, in Rakhine State in particular, suffer acute restrictions on access to education and healthcare. The restrictions, while apparently supported by many Rakhine Buddhists, are enforced by the NLD-led government who are continuing Thein Sein-era policy. These restrictions are fatal. The blockade on Muslims accessing certain hospitals amounts to a form of racialised healthcare that denies emergency treatment to individuals solely on the grounds of their ethnicity and/or religion and is in contravention of international law. The ban on Muslims attending the only university in the state means their education comes to an end after completing high school. This restriction, reserved only for Muslims, limits the social mobility of individuals within the group, again solely on the basis of their ethnicity and/or religion. This is a form of institutionalised persecution that appears motivated by a desire on the part of the Burmese government, supported by the majority of Rakhine, to further lower the status of Muslims in Rakhine State, and thereby elevate that of Rakhine. The confinement of Muslims to camps, ghettos and villages reinforces the sense, already popular among Rakhine, that Muslims are a security threat that needs controlling. This provides a foundation for possible future violence directed at them.

The refusal to allow Muslim families displaced by the violence in Meikhtila in March 2013 to return to their homes signifies an effort by Ma Ba Tha, in collusion with authorities, to rid some neighbourhoods in the town of their historic Muslim presence. The fact that, following the petitioning of Ma Ba Tha, authorities in Meikhtila then justified their refusal to allow Muslims to return on the grounds that it would create religious tensions shows both a prioritisation of Buddhist wellbeing over that of Muslim, and a capitulation to ultra-nationalist forces.
5. Spread of ‘Muslim-free’ villages

Since the violence of 2102, there appears to have been a rise in the number of villages across Burma that have declared themselves no-go zones for Muslims. Prior to 2102 there had been a number of towns that had placed official restrictions—namely, those enacted by local authorities—on access for Muslims, both in Rakhine State and Kayin State, but these have grown in number in response the popular narrative of Muslims as a threat.

BHRN has documented the existence of at least 21 villages spread across the country where locals, with permission from authorities, have erected signboards warning Muslims not to enter.
FIGURE 4: OAK TADAR BLOCK, YATSAUK TOWNSHIP, SHAN STATE
Situated at Yat Sauk Township, Oak Thadar Block, Zaw Gyi roundabout
Muslim free Zone
1. Muslim are not allowed to stay over night
2. Muslim are not allowed to buy or rent properties
3. No one is allowed to marry with Muslim

Patriotic Youth Organisation

FIGURE 5: BOTAESU VILLAGE, EAST YAYTARSHAE TOWNSHIP, PEGU

FIGURE 6: KYIKE HTAW WATERFALL GATE, NEAR MYINE GYI NGU, KAREN STATE
FIGURE 7: MI CHAUNG LAKE VILLAGE, YAYTAWSHAE TOWNSHIP, PEGU
FIGURE 7 TRANSLATION OF THE SIGNPOST
Islam prohibited Zone
Within the perimeter of Mi Chaung Lake Village
1. Muslim are not allowed to stay over night
2. Muslim are not allowed to buy or rent properties
3. No one is allowed to marry with Muslim

FIGURE 8: OYINN VILLAGE, NGATHAYAUK TOWNSHIP, MANDALAY
FIGURE 8 TRANSLATION ON THE SIGN
[brown section] Orin Village is populated with purely Buddhist people.
[yellow section] We strictly prohibit Muslim (786) from intermingling, living in the village and trading in this village.
[red section] Do not regret later on when your race and religion wiped out, but be vigilant and defend it now.

FIGURE 9: LOCAL AUTHORITIES SEARCHING MUSLIM VENDORS IN KONE THAR VILLAGE, MINN BUU TOWNSHIP, MAGWE DIVISION
FIGURE 10: KONE THAR VILLAGE
FIGURE 10 TRANSLATION OF THE SIGNPOST
Kalar (Muslim) are not allowed to enter Kone Thar Village.

FIGURE 11: THAUNG TANN VILLAGE, NYAUNG TONE TOWNSHIP, IRRAWADDY DIVISION
Figure 11 TRANSLATION OF THE SIGNPOST
Islam prohibited Zone
1. Muslim are not allowed to stay over night
2. Muslim are not allowed to buy or rent properties
3. No one is allowed to marry with Muslim
Patriotic Youth Organisation
Thaung Tann Village

FIGURE 12: PHA YAR GYI KONE VILLAGE, KYAUNG KONE TOWNSHIP, IRRAWADDY DIVISION
Figure 12 TRANSLATION OF THE SIGNPOST
1. Muslim are not allowed to settle or staying over night
2. Muslim are not allowed to buy or rent properties (only among Buddhist)
3. No one is allowed to marry with Muslim (for male / female must abide by it)
4. Anyone breach the local rule will be labelled as a traitor and punished by the local people

Anti Muslim slogan
Do not feed Tiger and do not give any space to Kalar (Muslim)
If you try to feed Tiger it will eat you
If you give any space to Kalar, your country, race and religion will be eliminated
FIGURE 13: IN KYINN PIN VILLAGE, SHWEBO TOWNSHIP, SAGAIN DIVISION
FIGURE 13 TRANSLATION
Islam prohibited Zone
1. Muslim are not allowed to stay over night
2. Muslim are not allowed to buy or rent properties
3. No one is allowed to marry with Muslim
Patriotic Youth Organisation
Villagers of In Kyinn Pin

FIGURE 14: YATHAR VILLAGE, MYIN CHAN TOWNSHIP, MANDALAY DIVISION

FIGURE 15: YATHAR VILLAGE, MYIN CHAN TOWNSHIP, MANDALAY DIVISION
FIGURE 15 TRANSLATION:
Kalar (Muslim) Do Not Welcome in Yathar Village.
FIGURE 16: SINMATAW VILLAGE, KYAUKTANN TOWNSHIP, YANGON.
FIGURE 16 TRANSLATION:
This is Buddhists village
Other religion not allowed
We are honest
Racially superior
Sinmakaw Village is
Must be a purely Buddhist Village

FIGURE 17: SHWE NYAUNG TOWN, TAUNGGYI TOWNSHIP, SHAN STATE

FIGURE 18: SAE GYI VILLAGE, YA ME THIN TOWNSHIP, MANDALAY DIVISION
FIGURE 19: GENERAL HOSPITAL ENTRANCE, MINN PYAR TOWNSHIP, RAKHINE STATE
FIGURE 19 TRANSLATION: WE WELCOME POLICE AND ARMY BUT NOT KALAR (MUSLIM)

FIGURE 20: HIN KHWAT LAKE VILLAGE, THARSI TOWNSHIP, MANDALAY DIVISION
FIGURE 20 TRANSLATION: ENTIRE THIS VILLAGE FollowS ONLY BUDDHISM

FIGURE 21: SAE MYAUNG BLOCK, NGWAY TAUNG VILLAGE, DEMAWSOE TOWNSHIP, KAYAR STATE
FIGURE 22: TA KAUNG BO VILLAGE, PHA’AN TOWNSHIP, KAREN STATE
FIGURE 22 TRANSLATION:
Kalar are not allowed to sell goods in the Takung Bo village.

FIGURE 23: THA PYAY SANN VILLAGE, YAY NAN CHAUNG TOWNSHIP, MAGWAY DIVISION
FIGURE 23 TRANSLATION:
Islam prohibited Zone
1. Muslim are not allowed to stay over night
2. Muslim are not allowed to buy or rent properties
3. No one is allowed to marry with Muslim
Patriotic Youth Organisation
Villagers – Tha Pyay Sann Village

FIGURE 24: MA U LAE VILLAGE, YAYSAKYO TOWNSHIP, MAGWE DIVISION
FIGURE 25: MA U LAE VILLAGE, YAYSAKOY TOWNSHIP, MAGWE DIVISION.
THE RULES IMPOSED RESTRICTING MUSLIMS FROM ENTERING THE VILLAGE

FIGURE 26: ANN THARR SAN PYA VILLAGE, MINN PYAR TOWNSHIP, RAKHINE STATE

FIGURE 27: SIKE KHAUNG SAN PYA VILLAGE, SISINE TOWNSHIP, SHAN STATE.
Analysis

The violence that began in 2012 triggered an intensified effort among Buddhist nationalists to determine who did and did not belong in Burma. While segregation measures were enacted in Rakhine State, with the government stressing that separation of the two communities was required for security reasons, elsewhere in the country a grassroots campaign to keep Buddhist and Muslim communities apart grew in strength while the government failed to act. ‘Muslim-free villages’ are perhaps the most explicit example of this. The banishing of Muslims from Buddhist villages appears to be motivated by a perception that the presence of Muslims, both within the country as a whole and also in hyper-local settings, is diluting the strength of Buddhism and therefore is threatening. These villages have become symbolic bastions of Buddhist purity.
6. Launch of military operations against Rohingya in Rakhine State

“The military killed my husband with a knife when he was standing in front of the house.”
On 9 October 2016, three police outposts were attacked in the Northern Rakhine State in the Township of Maungdaw. Police have alleged that the attackers are members of a militant Rohingya outfit known as Al Yaqin. Footage has circulated online that shows a group of armed men speaking in the Rohingya dialect calling themselves Al Yaqin, claiming responsibility for the attack and urging more Rohingya to take up arms.

In response, the military deployed troops to the region and began a sweep of Rohingya villages in which helicopter gunships were used and, according to some witnesses interviewed by BHRN, either rocket-propelled grenades or mortars. Human Rights Watch released satellite imagery on 21 November that showed razed Rohingya villages and estimated that 1,250 Rohingya homes have been burned down since 9 October. The government initially claimed that Rohingya, whom it refers to only as “Muslims in Rakhine State”, are burning their own homes to garner international attention and said the international media was exaggerating the severity of the situation. The government and security forces have blocked access to Northern Rakhine State for independent media, and for several months following 9 October maintained a blockade on aid reaching Rohingya villages and areas where displaced Rohingya have fled. The UN had said that 160,000 people are without aid inside the ‘operation zone’ where the military sweep is taking place but by early 2017 limited aid provisions had been restored. Reports disseminated by Rohingya advocacy groups of soldiers carrying out rape and extra-judicial killings of Rohingya were vigorously denied by the government and the military, which claim the allegations are fabricated to draw more international sympathy for Rohingya. However, a report by the UN Organisation for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), released in February 2017 and based on interviews with more than 200 Rohingya who fled to Bangladesh, documented allegations of abuses by security forces that could amount to crimes against humanity, including the deliberate killing of young children and the rape of women. These have been supported by video interviews that have emerged online in which Rohingya state that family members have been raped, beaten and killed since the ‘clearance operation’ began on 9 October. Two UN officials who conducted interviews with Rohingya also said that up to 1,000 Rohingya had been killed since 9 October. Close to 100,000 are estimated to have either fled to Bangladesh or be internally displaced in Rakhine State.

The following section presents six testimonies of Rohingya who have fled to Bangladesh since the military operations began:

a) Win Maw, 13, Maungdaw Township

Fighting began near Win Maw's village on 12 November. He was unsure who was involved but learnt that up to 100 Rohingya were arrested soon afterwards. On 13 February, Win Maw was hit by an unknown object after a helicopter gunship fired on his village. The object hit him on the right shoulder, and images seen by BHRN of Win Maw show a deep wound, six inches long and one inch wide, that appears to have become infected. He remained in his village for four
days before fleeing across the Naf River to Bangladesh on 17 November. Before he fled he saw houses in his village being torched by the military while their occupants were still inside. “They tied people to poles inside the homes then burnt down the homes,” he said. Two people he knew died this way. A numbers of Rohingya were shot by soldiers who were in the area searching for militants but according to Win Maw, all of those shot were civilians. He also saw Rohingya women being forced by soldiers to stand naked in the sun for hours. One of these was gang-raped by up to 10 soldiers. On 17 November he paid a ‘steamer boat’ USD$6 to be taken across the river to Bangladesh and fishermen then smuggled him into the country. He said Burmese troops shot at him as he fled across the river. His parents remained in Myanmar and he is now being cared for by Rohingya in a camp for displaced Rohingya. Win Maw has been unable to contact his parents and is unsure whether they are alive or dead.

b) Hnin Hlaing, 16, and Mya Win, 14, Maungdaw Township

Hnin Hlaing and Mya Win are sisters from a village in Maungdaw Township, and were interviewed on 19 November, having fled to Bangladesh around 4 November:

“The military entered our hamlet, brought together all the women and took them to the Fugar Par forest and cordoned us in the middle of the forest,” Hnin Hlaing said. “They beat some women very badly while asking ‘Where are the guns that were taken from our barracks? Tell us or we will rape you and kill you.’”

The forest was close to a military barracks. Only a handful of soldiers had escorted some IDPs into the woods but she says she saw four women she knew being raped by those soldiers, and was able to name them. After the soldiers were called away, she and her sister were able to escape: “After we fled the military went to our homes and beat our parents badly for not getting us.” She clarified that the military was trying to detain them after they had fled and assaulted her parents as part of this effort. The women asked not to be photographed by BHRN, saying they were afraid that photos may appear publicly and then they would be unable to find a husband.

c) Ko Mratt, Maungdaw Township

Ko Mratt witnessed soldiers enter his home on 14 October and shoot dead family members. He told BHRN:

“At around 3pm the military entered my home and killed my mother, who is 70 years old. My sister who was delivering a child and another sister who is also seven months pregnant, my son who is four years old, and my nephew who is five years old, were shot and killed by the military. My wife also was shot when the bullet passed through my son, who was on her lap at the time. My home was burnt down. My possessions were all looted. Even now we have no clothes.”

Shortly afterwards he fled to Cox’s Bazar in Bangladesh, having collected enough money from neighbours to pay for the travel. A doctor had seen to his wife, and retrieved fragments of the bullet, although 18 fragments remain inside her. He now has no money left.

Ko Mratt’s story was corroborated by Mohammed Aarif, an imam from the same village as Ko Mratt in Maungdaw Township. He witnessed the killing of the family first-hand, and said that the incident occurred because the family refused to allow a group of soldiers to enter their home shortly after one of the women had given birth, due to cultural sensitivities surrounding childbirth. The soldiers then burst into the home, possibly believing militants were hiding inside, and despite seeing the women and children inside they killed most of them indiscriminately. Reports indicate that the family was placed into a mass grave the following day, which Mohammed
Aarif corroborated. In the same grave were six other people that Mohammed Aarif identified by name, including two young children. He had seen the bodies in the grave. One of the women in the grave was killed when police attacked her with a knife, and three of them were shot. He said that following the initial attack on police outposts by Rohingya militants on 9 October 2016, the military conducted a series of village attacks on his village.

“The military entered the village and when the people ran away they burnt down their houses” using petrol, Ko Mratt said. He described how the military and police looted the village: “I saw everything. Their belongings were looted. They took 14 large bags of rice. They took cows. When people tried to stop them they shot at the people.” He said that Rakhine villagers were involved in the looting. He also saw a woman from a nearby village shot and killed. The police and army had arrived in a group, along with Rakhine civilians, but he was too far away to see who from the group had fired the gun.

d) Ye Thu, 40, Maungdaw Township

Ye Thu was forced to flee his village in Maungdaw Township on 13 November 2016, along with his three brothers and two children. At around 3.30am on 13 November their village came under fire from helicopter gunships and an unknown ground-level source. The next morning he saw a large deployment of soldiers approaching the village, and fled to nearby bushes. From there he saw soldiers burning most of the 450 homes in the village, at times using what appeared to be a rocket-propelled weapon that sent an incendiary device onto the roofs of houses. Soldiers began arresting and killing villagers. His nephew, cousin and daughter in law were all killed. Rakhine civilians then began looting cows and goats from the village. Ye Thu, along with his brothers and sons, then went into hiding in a forest in Maungdaw Township.

e) U Aung Kyaw, 46, Maungdaw Township

U Aung Kyaw and his wife fled to Bangladesh from their village in Maungdaw Township with their five children around 15 October, shortly after the military was reported to have attacked the village. He says that his home was burnt down. “We hardly escaped with our lives. We faced many hardships to come here.” He witnessed soldiers looting food from Rohingya homes throughout the village. He also believes he saw Rakhine civilians involved in the looting. His family tried to find shelter in neighbouring villages after the attacks but they were rejected. They said they believed shortage of rations and security concerns were to blame for this rejection. They remained hiding in paddy fields for another seven days without any proper access to food or aid. They decided to go to Bangladesh where they had relations who could take them in, but much of the waiting was due fear of being caught as they crossed the border. They eventually crossed overland at night and were not intercepted by Myanmar or Bangladeshi authorities.

f) U Tint Swe, 50, and Daw Ma Hla Win, Maungdaw Township

U Tint Swe and his family of 16 people fled to Bangladesh on 6 November, after his village (the same as that mentioned in above) was attacked. After the military burned his home around 13 October he moved into another house in the village. He was interviewed on 13 November along with his niece from a location in Bangladesh. His niece recounted how soldiers had poured petrol on the homes before setting them alight, and then shot at escaping villagers. She then ran away. There were no militants in the village at that time, she stated. Other testimonies collected by BHRN affirm this, with eyewitnesses who fled claiming that the military initially
blamed those villagers for cutting down trees and blocking the roads before they attacked them. This appears to be why they thought militants were inside the village.

Ma Hla Win said she witnessed her husband being killed by soldiers: “The military killed my husband with a knife when he was standing in front of the house.” U Tint Swe described how the military looted the village:

“The cows and goats from the villagers were taken and killed by the military. I saw them kill them and cook them to eat. I watched from far away. I saw them stealing bags of rice. They threw the rice away.”

The family members all clarified that the biggest reason they left was because they were afraid they would starve if they stayed, given the destroyed food stocks. Once they had raised enough money they left by paying approximately $US225 to an ‘oarsman’ to transport nine of them to Bangladesh.
Conclusion
Nearly five years after violence first broke out between Muslims and extremist Buddhists in western Burma, before commencing in towns and cities across the country, Muslims continue to suffer discrimination at the hands of the state, the monastic order and civilians. Sporadic violence, restrictions on access to education and healthcare, and curtailment of the right to freedom of religion are also ongoing. Persecution of the Muslim community, although having worsened since 2012, is part of a historical continuum of rights abuses against the religious minority that can be traced to the coup of 1962 and the military’s subordination of Muslims to a social status beneath that of Buddhists.

This campaign of persecution has continued over the transition to joint NLD-Military rule, and most noticeably in Rakhine State where the government has proven either unwilling or unable to prevent the military from carrying out extensive rights abuses of Rohingya Muslims. This is despite the fact that the NLD government appointed a commission, headed by former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, to address the problems between Rakhine and Rohingya in western Burma, and despite the fact that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi said in September 2016 that national reconciliation and harmony was a priority for the new government.

In November 2015, shortly after its election victory, a close aide of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, U Win Htein, told media that Rohingya would not be a priority of the new government. When the military began its operation in Northern Rakhine State following the 9 October attacks on police outposts, the government came under criticism from both neighbouring countries and the US and EU for its refusal to condone the heavy-handed response of troops in the area, to address allegations that a series of egregious abuses had been committed against the population, and for its refusal to allow independent media into the so-called ‘operation zone’ where the military were searching for participants in the 9 October attacks. The government replied that the military was acting in accordance with rule of law. In response to the criticism, the government in early December 2016 set up a commission specifically to investigate military abuses allegedly committed in Northern Rakhine State. However, the commission will be led by a senior general in the army, and as such has been criticised for lacking independence and its report is generally seen as a whitewash.

The NLD has never spoken up in defence of the human rights of the Rohingya and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s government has kept in place all laws and policies which discriminate against Rohingya. The NLD appears to be fearful that antagonising the country’s most powerful institution would weaken any potential for the military, which still controls three ministries and occupies a quarter of parliamentary seats, to step further away from political affairs in Burma. Given that the vast majority of the Burmese population appear to hold a deep-seated antipathy towards the Rohingya, the party also knows that any criticism of the military would be read by the public as a sign that the NLD supports the Rohingya, whom many in Burma believe to be illegal immigrants. At the time of writing, reports continue to emerge of widespread military abuses against Rohingya in Northern Rakhine State, while the government still refuses to publically criticise its operations.
That latest violence in Rakhine State has drawn the bulk of international attention in the latter months of 2016. However, the persecution of Muslims elsewhere in Burma that increased following the 2012 violence has continued in a more institutionalised form. This report demonstrates that key elements of the persecution are state-led: the refusal of authorities to grant Muslims citizenship and to allow renovations of mosques; official restrictions on their access to healthcare and education; official support for economic boycott campaigns led by Ma Ba Tha, as well as the Ma Ba Tha-led effort to block displaced Muslims in Meikhtila from returning to their homes.

This has continued into the era of civilian rule in Burma, and suggests the democratic transition is far from a fix-all for the persecution of minorities. Rather, it has allowed the airing of hostile public opinion towards Muslims to affect government policy towards Muslims. The new NLD government will need to take a stronger stand on religious persecution. The continued stigmatisation faced by Muslims, aided by the state in Burma, greatly increases the potential for group violence to recommence in the future. This will undermine the fragile progress made by the government on other measures of reform, and risks emboldening the military.
Recommendations to the Burmese/Myanmar Government
(1) The Burmese government should accept and fully cooperate with the UN mandated Fact Finding Mission. The Mission should be afforded full and unfettered access to all the locations that they intend to investigate.

(2) Designation of race and religion should be removed from all ID cards.

(3) The Legislative should draft new laws to more effectively restrict racial discrimination and perpetrators of discrimination must be held accountable under the current legal regime.

(4) The State must ban extremist groups, enforce a ban on hate speech and restrict vigilante group from interrupting the practice of religion by minorities while ensuring that the freedoms of association and speech are maintained.

(5) The Ministries of Defence, Border Affairs and Home Affairs, and local administrations should be under the jurisdiction of the civilian wing of the government and not under military rule.

(6) The government should work with Dhamma schools and Madrasas (without compromising their independence) in order to monitor and avoid the spread of religious extremism.

(7) Travel restrictions for Rohingya people must be removed immediately.

(8) There are several newly built townships where the majority Muslim population lacks sufficient places to worship due to government restrictions. All minority religions should be given the space to worship, proportional to the size of the local population.

(9) Religious premises that have been destroyed or damaged should be allowed to rebuilt or repaired without exception or restriction.

(10) Government offices and posts should opened to all, and steps should be taken reflect the racial and religious diversity of Burma.

(11) Repeal the so-called Protection of Race and Religion laws.

(12) Lift all restrictions on domestic and international humanitarian assistance in Rakhine State.

(13) Extend official and unconditional invitations to the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief and the UN Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance to visit Burma.

(14) Implement the recommendations of the Rabat Plan of Action on the prohibition of advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence, which was adopted by experts including the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and Opinion and the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief in Rabat, Morocco in October 2012.

(15) Withdraw all troops from Rohingya areas.
Recommendations to the international community and UN
(1) Aid agencies under UN auspices must ensure that food distribution criteria in Rakhine state takes account of restrictions on movement, which is prohibiting Rohingya population from gainful employment.

(2) Malnutrition and child morbidity and mortality is reaching catastrophic levels and this matter should addressed immediately.

(3) Southeast Asian countries, especially those neighbouring Burma, should put pressure on the Burmese government and military to stop the persecution of the Rohingya.

(4) ASEAN countries, who already recognise that the Rohingya issue is becoming a threat to regional stability, should act to prevent the radicalisation of people in the region.

(5) Make it clear to the government of Myanmar that continued support from the international community is conditional on lifting all restrictions on humanitarian aid in Rakhine State and other parts of the country.

(6) Organise a high level international conference in Myanmar in co-operation with the government of Myanmar to share international expertise on tackling hate speech and religious intolerance, and building religious harmony, with a view to developing a plan of action to address these issues.

(7) Use all mechanisms at their disposal to ensure that the government and military in Myanmar fully complies with international law and its international treaty obligations.
Appendix 1
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Rations</th>
<th>Access to healthcare</th>
<th>Access to education</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IDP camps in Sittwe district</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Accommodation: Many IDPs here live in bamboo huts with tin roofing, which becomes very hot in the summer. There is no electricity, and people use wood for fuel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thakyae Pyin</td>
<td>5,656 (plus 2,942 in host family).</td>
<td>One month ration per person: 50 tins of rice (size of condensed milk can), eight tins of beans and one litre of cooking oil. There is no water shortage.</td>
<td>There is one clinic, staffed by a doctor and one assistant. Six nurses visit two days a week, for two hours each time.</td>
<td>There is a village school staffed by 20 volunteer teachers. There are an additional 25 primary schools in the camp that are run by NGOs.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Say Tha Ma Gyi</td>
<td>12,178</td>
<td>Only 7,000 IDPs are registered in this camp, meaning that the remaining 5,000 do not receive food rations.</td>
<td>There is a clinic in the camp but it only gives tablets to patients, and cannot undertake any substantial treatment.</td>
<td>There are around 50 teachers employed at 13 primary schools. Students here can study up to fourth grade. For middle school, they must attend a nearby village.</td>
<td>Accommodation: Many of the roofs of huts are in a dilapidated state and leak when it rains. Numbers of huts are in the process of being renovated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maw Thi Nya</td>
<td>3,362</td>
<td>One month ration per person: 50 tins of rice (size of condensed milk can), seven tins of beans and one litre of cooking oil. Some complain that the beans cause vomiting and hypertension. Each family receives 25 bars of bathing soap, 18 bars of washing soap, six packets of sanitary napkins and four tubes of toothpaste every three to six months. Water comes from a well.</td>
<td>There is no clinic. Patients must go to a hospital situated a 10-minute walk away</td>
<td>There are two primary schools run by NGOs, with eight teachers for more than 600 students. Middle and high school students must study at a nearby village.</td>
<td>Accommodation: There is no electricity at the camp. Some use solar panels.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Population</td>
<td>Rations</td>
<td>Access to healthcare</td>
<td>Access to education</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baw Du Pha</td>
<td>4,861</td>
<td>Inhabitants receive standard quantity of rice, cooking oil and beans. Some say the beans are inedible. Soap and toothpaste is distributed, but women say they have received no sanitary pads for a year.</td>
<td>There is one clinic, but doctors only visit for two hours a day.</td>
<td>There are 19 primary level schools with 1,480, but four teachers in each.</td>
<td>Accommodation: A number of houses are deteriorating, but work is being done on them by UNHCR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Da Paing</td>
<td>8,189 (plus 2,951 in host family)</td>
<td>Food rations are provided, but 67 families do not receive them. There are around 50 water wells but this is not enough to provide for the whole camp, so there are periodic water shortages. There are occasional delays in the provision of food rations, resulting in temporary food shortages.</td>
<td>There is no clinic. Patients must go to the hospital near Thakae Pyin camp.</td>
<td>There are three temporary primary schools with around 1,000 students in attendance, and 11 teachers.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non IDP communities in Sittwe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aung Mingalar quarter</td>
<td>Estimated 4,000 people.</td>
<td>Due to tight restrictions on inhabitants leaving the neighbourhood in downtown Sittwe and on vendors entering the neighbourhood to sell goods, inhabitants rely on donations from relatives elsewhere.</td>
<td>Doctors from a joint committee formed by the government and NGOs visit three times a week, for two hours each time. If they need hospitalisation they must first go to a small hospital near Thakae Pyin, before then being referred to Sittwe hospital. Doctors have reported receiving threats after treating Muslims.</td>
<td>There is one middle school, attended by some 1,000 students, with 10 volunteer teachers. High school students must attend private classes, for which they pay.</td>
<td>Security: There are eight police checkpoints around the neighbourhood. In the past, people who left the neighbourhood would be jailed for three months, but no one has attempted to leave for some time. Accommodation: There is functioning electricity and water.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Population</td>
<td>Rations</td>
<td>Access to healthcare</td>
<td>Access to education</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IDP camps in Kyaukphyu</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyauk Ta Lone</td>
<td>1,274</td>
<td>Inhabitants receive monthly rations of: 54 tins of rice, one liter of cooking oil and seven tins of beans. Occasionally the government provides additional oil and packets of noodles. Rakhine sometimes arrive at the camp entrance to sell vegetables, but are not allowed inside. There is a well for water, but in summer there are long queues and insufficient water. The water distributed in the camp smells of sulphur and many complain of not wanting to drink it.</td>
<td>There is one clinic but no doctor present. Among the IDPs is one health worker and one nurse who provide the healthcare. If the problem is serious they can be referred to the hospital in Kyaukphyu town where they must pay for treatment. Medicine can be bought from Rakhine who visit the camp entrance to sell food, or otherwise from guards. Camp elders reported that numbers of people had died due to malnourishment.</td>
<td>There are 304 students from primary school to high school level. There is a government appointed teacher and assistant teacher, as well as an additional 16 teachers paid by the UN.</td>
<td>Accommodation: The huts are covered with a tin roof, which becomes very hot in summer. Periodic flooding occurs. Electricity is provided between 7pm and 10pm, although streetlights are on throughout the night. Security: Numbers of inhabitants who have left the camp in search of firewood have been arrested. There are 25 soldiers and 70 policemen stationed permanently inside the camp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IDP camps in Kyauktaw</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Din (near Nay Pu Khan village)</td>
<td>614</td>
<td>514 of the camp’s inhabitants receive food rations.</td>
<td>Doctors from the Myanmar Medical Association visit the camp twice a month. A camp resident said they stay only for three hours a day and only prescribe tablets. Patients requiring hospital treatment must travel by boat to Sittwe hospital, but in order to do this must receive a special referral by health officials and pay for the transport themselves.</td>
<td>There is no school, and students must travel to a nearby village school, where teachers’ salaries are paid by villagers. They can study there up to middle school, and for high school must go to a nearby village.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Population</td>
<td>Rations</td>
<td>Access to healthcare</td>
<td>Access to education</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apauk Wa tract (Ah Le Mu and Pya Mu villages, recognized as IDP sites)</td>
<td>Ah Le Mu = 850  Pya Mu = 720</td>
<td>Ah Le Mu = 520 people receive food rations  Pya Mu = no one receives food rations.</td>
<td>Ah Le Mu = doctors from an NGO visit once a month for treatment.  Pya Mu = patients must go to Kyauktaw for treatment.</td>
<td>Ah Le Mu = one primary school for 200 students.  Pya Mu = one primary school for 180 students. The village’s 25 middle school students must attend a nearby village.</td>
<td>Security: farmers are blocked from tending to their farms by Rakhine who have fenced them off with barbed wire.  Livelihoods: A flood in 2016 washed away 30 houses. Without funds to rebuild houses, inhabitants have had to live in shelters attached to their homes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non IDP communities in Kyauktaw</td>
<td>15,000 spread across seven villages.</td>
<td>Inhabitants cannot attend Kyauktaw hospital. In emergencies, patients must get a referral to Sittwe hospital, which requires permission from the village and Township administrator, as well as the immigration department. Inhabitants said this often only happens when the condition of the patient is already very bad.</td>
<td>There are two primary schools, one middle school and one high school (housed in a religious building). Exams must be sat in a military barracks three miles from the village.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Population</td>
<td>Rations</td>
<td>Access to healthcare</td>
<td>Access to education</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ka Di Har Yar village</td>
<td>864</td>
<td>Water is drawn from a pond, which can sometimes run dry. Then water is taken from a river. There is no clinic in the village, so patients must go to a local unskilled medic. They are not allowed access to Kyauktaw hospital.</td>
<td>One government primary school for 280 students, with five teachers from the village. Middle school students travel to a village across the road, which is facing a shortage of teachers. High school students must go to a self-reliant school in another village which demands fees of 200 bushels of paddy (about USD$600).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shwe Hlaing village</td>
<td>1,028</td>
<td>Villagers must travel to Peik The village to buy food. Drinking water is available during rainy season, but scarce in hot season, and so they must drink stream water. The WFP provided food rations until June 2016, when they stopped due to budget constraints.</td>
<td>No clinic at the village. For minor illnesses, people buy medicine from the local drug store. If serious, they go to the local medic in Peik The village. They are banned from Kyauktaw hospital.</td>
<td>There is one self-reliance primary school, with classes up to fourth grade. The school has five UN-funded teachers and 323 students. Middle and high school students must go to schools elsewhere in Kyauktaw Township and Pauktaw Township, for which they must pay 200 bushels of paddy (about USD$600). Around half of the students have dropped out through lack of funds.</td>
<td>Livelihoods: majority of villagers are fishermen and casual labourers. Before 2012 casual labourers could go to nearby Rakhine villages to work, but this is no longer possible on security grounds. Fishermen who fish near Rakhine villages are often attacked by catapult. Security: Travel outside of their village by road risks attack by Rakhine, so instead must use waterways.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Population</td>
<td>Rations</td>
<td>Access to healthcare</td>
<td>Access to education</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP camps in Minbya</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Accommodation: Houses are built with bamboo and palm leaves for the roof, which leaks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peik The (Minbya)</td>
<td>1,447, (121 recognised as IDPs)</td>
<td>WFP provide food rations for IDPs once a month. Each person gets six and a half tins of rice and one liter of cooking oil. There is no water shortage.</td>
<td>There is no medical clinic in the village. Those who can afford it go to Myaung Bwe hospital in Mrauk U Township, 10 miles away. Health officials visit IDPs in the village once a month, and only give tablets. Sometimes they don't visit for months. IDPs must go to the town to buy medicine.</td>
<td>There is a primary school for 219 students, but not enough teachers. There is no middle or high school.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Da Tha</td>
<td>10,625, 10,337 of which are recognized as IDPs.</td>
<td>WFP provides monthly food rations to the recognized IDPs. The remainder survive on rice and banana tree trunk soup. IDPs grow vegetables and fish in a stream, although there is a scarcity of fish now.</td>
<td>Doctors from Myanmar Health Association visit twice a month and stay for two hours each time, giving only tablets. There have been occasions when they have gone two months without visiting, and people have died from preventable illnesses such as diarrhea as a result. No medicine is available in the village, and emergency patients must go to Myaung Bwe hospital. To do so, they must pay police a bribe of 100,000 kyat ($74) at checkpoints along the way.</td>
<td>There is one school run by an INGO, attended by 323 primary school students and four teachers. Since 2012 there has been no middle school, so students use private tuition. Two local teachers teach 24 students at fifth and sixth grade. Authorities are yet to grant permission for seventh and eighth graders to go to school.</td>
<td>Security: it is not safe for fishermen to fish in streams outside of their village.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Population</td>
<td>Rations</td>
<td>Access to healthcare</td>
<td>Access to education</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naw Naw village</td>
<td>1175</td>
<td></td>
<td>There is no clinic at the village, and patients must go to a nearby village. For major illnesses they must travel to Myaung Bwe hospital. They are not permitted to visit Mrauk U hospital.</td>
<td>There is one self-funded school that teaches up to sixth grade. There are 221 students and four teachers. Above sixth grade, students must go to a school in a nearby village.</td>
<td>Security: Following attacks by Rakhine on fishermen near a Rakhine village, Muslim fishermen can only use streams near to Naw Naw. Livelihoods: IDPs can no longer go into Minbya to trade, and must do so through Rakhine in nearby villages. For this they must pay charges ranging from 10,000 kyat ($7.40) to 100,000 kyat ($74).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tha Yat Oat village (IDP)</td>
<td>1663</td>
<td></td>
<td>The WFP provided food rations to all IDPs up until June 2016, and since then only a reduced amount of some rations to widows and widowers. That has left nearly 1000 people without rations. There are four village wells, but in summer they can dry up, causing a water shortage.</td>
<td>A clinic was opened in 2014 but doctors didn’t arrive until June 2016. Immunisation is done regularly. For minor diseases, patients must go to a local untrained medic; for major problems, they go to Myaung Bwe hospital, 10 miles away, which preferences people who can pay.</td>
<td>There are four primary schools built by an INGO, which 300 students attend. There are seven teachers. Students must pay 150 bushels of paddy to attend (about USD$450). Students frequently drop out because they cannot afford fees. Security: Fisherman restrict themselves to local streams following attacks from Rakhine outside of their villages.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latma</td>
<td>5907</td>
<td></td>
<td>There is one well, but not enough water in it to sustain the whole village and so they must use a stream for water.</td>
<td>There is no clinic. Treatment comes from a local medic (poorly trained), or otherwise Myaung Bwe hospital in an emergency.</td>
<td>There is one self-reliant primary school for 50 students, with six teachers, and one middle school for more than 40 students, with four teachers. Livelihoods: Villagers used to go to nearby Rakhine villages to trade, but this is no longer possible.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Population</td>
<td>Rations</td>
<td>Access to healthcare</td>
<td>Access to education</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aung Naing</td>
<td>2509</td>
<td>WFP had been providing rations to all families, but as of August 2016 began to provide only to poor families, meaning only 350 people now receive rations. Cooking oil rations have been reduced by half. For water, people rely on a pond, but the water is not potable. They sometimes get drinking water from a salt-water stream at low tide, which they boil for drinking.</td>
<td>There is one clinic. Two or three doctors from the Myanmar Health Association attend once a month, for two hours. For serious problems, patients go to Myaung Bwe hospital, a mile away, but cannot travel at nighttime regardless of the severity of the problem. They cannot stay there overnight.</td>
<td>One primary school and one middle school for a total of 590 students. Teachers are appointed by an INGO. High school students are taught by people in the village, who receive their salary from students.</td>
<td>Livelihoods: Main jobs are farming, and also causal labour. There has however been a severe shortage of labour jobs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Hto Tann</td>
<td>750 (476 recognised as IDPs)</td>
<td>The 376 IDPs had received food rations until July 2016, but these were cut and instead food rations are only available to widows and widowers and disabled people.</td>
<td>Treatment was provided by MSF but this stopped two years ago. The Myanmar Red Cross Society was supposed to provide treatment, but this has not occurred. Treatment instead comes from a local untrained medic. Serious diseases require treatment in Myaung Bwe hospital, but this needs permission from the head of 100 households (local administrator). They cannot stay there overnight, and must stay in nearby Muslim villages.</td>
<td>There is one primary school funded by an INGO for 173 students. The government provides no assistance. Middle and high school students must go to nearby Sat Kyar village, which costs 150 bushels (about USD$450) of paddy per year, causing high drop out rates.</td>
<td>Farming is a chief source of income, but the risks of travel make tending to farms far away highly problematic. It is the same for fishermen, while causal labour is scarce. Travel: To travel, villagers must get permission from the head of 100 households, which must then be shown to a nearby police post. Villagers cannot use the main road, but instead must use mountain roads.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Population</td>
<td>Rations</td>
<td>Access to healthcare</td>
<td>Access to education</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-IDP communities in Minbya</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sin Kyi Pyin village</td>
<td>2,430</td>
<td></td>
<td>There is no medical clinic. Medicine is bought from local stores inside the army barracks.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Security: People who leave the village to fish often come under attack from Rakhine. Seven people were killed in one incident, and three in another. Livelihoods: Fishermen sell their catch to soldiers in the nearby barracks. Accommodation: around 50 people do not own their houses, and instead must live with other families. Many homes have water leaking through the roof. There is no electricity in the village, and villages use wood for fuel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sat Kya village</td>
<td>1,775</td>
<td></td>
<td>There is no clinic in the village, and only poorly trained health workers. For serious diseases, patients must travel to Myaung Bwe hospital.</td>
<td>There is one post-primary school where 457 students study under eight government appointed teachers. Because of the teacher shortage, classes only go up to fourth grade. There is a high school in the village.</td>
<td>Livelihoods: Majority of people are casual labourers. The restrictions on leaving the village make finding work difficult. Travel to another Rohingya village is possible, but dangerous.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Population</td>
<td>Rations</td>
<td>Access to healthcare</td>
<td>Access to education</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tan Cheit</td>
<td>2650</td>
<td></td>
<td>There is no clinic in the village. Medicine can be bought at a local store and there are untrained medics. Serious patients must go to Myaung Bwe hospital, either via motorbike or boat, which costs 1,000 kyat ($0.74) per trip. They can only go to Sittwe hospital if the doctor at Myaung Bwe gives a recommendation, and then they must travel by boat, with a police transport at the other end.</td>
<td>Two primary schools. One is government-run, with more than 300 students and six teachers. The other is an INGO school, for 103 students and six teachers. Middle and high school students must go to nearby Satkya village, which demands 200 bushels of paddy and 50,000 kyat ($37) for fees and living costs. Thirty students attend the middle school, and 10 attend the high school. Many students have had to drop out.</td>
<td>Travel: No travel allowed outside of village, so they are reliant on Rakhine nearby to buy products for them. Security: Fishermen must fish close to village, given threat of attack if they go near Rakhine villages.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ha Ra Pai</td>
<td>1050</td>
<td></td>
<td>There is no clinic and patients use untrained medics, or go to Myaung Bwe if serious.</td>
<td>There is a post primary school up to grade six. There are 450 students, and eight teachers. Seven of the eight are Rakhine who visit the school twice a week, in whose place two volunteer teachers assist. The village’s 12 middle and high school students travel two miles to Setkya village for school and to sit exams.</td>
<td>Livelihoods: Fishing is restricted to this village for security reasons, while casual labourers can go to Rakhine villages but can only work on the outskirts of the villages.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Population</td>
<td>Rations</td>
<td>Access to healthcare</td>
<td>Access to education</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IDP sites in Mrauk U</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaing Taw village</td>
<td>1,200+</td>
<td>Patients can only stay in Myaung Bwe</td>
<td>There is one self-reliant primary school up</td>
<td></td>
<td>Livelihoods: Fishing is restricted to this village for security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>hospital from 8am to 5pm. Those who</td>
<td>to fourth grade for more than 150 students</td>
<td></td>
<td>reasons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>need emergency treatment after 5pm</td>
<td>and five teachers from the village. Because</td>
<td></td>
<td>Accommodation: Five homes were destroyed by landslides in July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>require police protection.</td>
<td>the school is not recognized by the</td>
<td></td>
<td>2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>government, the students cannot</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>go onto state middle school. Instead, those</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>who can afford it send their children to</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>middle and high schools in nearby Muslim</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>villages. Since 2012 middle and high school</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>students have had to discontinue</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>their studies.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IDP sites in Myebon</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myebon Township IDP site</td>
<td>2915</td>
<td>WFP provides monthly food rations: 54</td>
<td>There is one middle school, but not enough</td>
<td>There is one</td>
<td>Accommodation: There is no electricity and some houses are in a state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>tins of rice, one litre of cooking</td>
<td>room for 1,000 students. Teachers are</td>
<td>middle school, but</td>
<td>of disrepair.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>oil and seven tins of beans per person.</td>
<td>appointed for all classes apart from</td>
<td>not enough room</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>primary classes. UNICEF and government</td>
<td>for 1,000 students.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>jointly provide support. Four government</td>
<td>Teachers are</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>appointed teachers are working in the</td>
<td>appointed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>school. Other 14 volunteer teachers are</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>also appointed.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Population</td>
<td>Rations</td>
<td>Access to healthcare</td>
<td>Access to education</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP sites in Pauktaw</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nghat Chaung camp</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>WFP provided food rations, but they sometimes arrived late. Water comes from a pond that often dries up during summer, causing a water shortage.</td>
<td>Doctors from MSF come to the camp twice a week and stay for two hours at a time. Severe weather problems can mean that some months, doctors do not visit.</td>
<td>There is one primary school.</td>
<td>Security: in the past people who have left the camp to search for firewood have been beaten by police upon inability to pay a bribe.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-IDP sites in Ponnagyun</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ka Di</td>
<td>2040</td>
<td>There is one pond in the village, but water is scarce during hot season.</td>
<td>There is one health worker in the village. For serious illnesses, patients must go to the clinic in Peik The village, four hours away.</td>
<td>There is one government primary school, with classes up to seventh grade. Because of the danger of traveling outside of the village, middle school students must now study in the village. There are 568 students for both primary and middle, with six qualified teachers in the village. For those above grade seven, they must travel to a self-reliant school in Peik The village, Kyauktaw, which costs 250 bushels of paddy a year (about USD$750).</td>
<td>Livelihoods: The main source of income is fishing but the stream nearby has gradually decreased in volume and fishermen are unable to travel more than five minutes away from the village for security reasons. This makes earning a viable income difficult.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Population</td>
<td>Rations</td>
<td>Access to healthcare</td>
<td>Access to education</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP sites in Ramree</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Accommodation: The floors of the camp are in poor condition and supporting pillars are weak.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tan Ywar Mosque</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>WFP provided monthly food rations: 54 tins of rice, one liter of cooking oil and seven tins of beans pulses per person. Some refuse to eat the beans because they cause hypertension. Oxfam provides soap and sanitary towels. There is a drinking well inside the mosque but water is scarce in summer.</td>
<td>There is a Muslim nurse who can treat minor illnesses. For major illness, they must go to the Ramree Township hospital.</td>
<td>There is a primary school and middle school in the camp. A total of 32 students are studying there. High school students go into the town.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP sites in Rathedaung</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Livelihoods: One farmer said that his farmland had been handed over to Rakhine, and he was therefore unable to farm it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ah Htet Nan Yar</td>
<td>1,400</td>
<td>Food rations stopped after June 2016, and so inhabitants need to go round nearby villages once a week to ask for food donations.</td>
<td>There is no clinic. Patients with serious problems visit a clinic run by an INGO in a village three miles away.</td>
<td>There is no school at the camp, and students attend a school in the nearby village.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chaing Ka Li</td>
<td>1483</td>
<td>Food rations are being provided by a local organisation, but children born after the local organisation took over from the WFP in 2015 are not on the ration list. Around 350 are without rations. During hot season water is scarce.</td>
<td>There is no provision of healthcare assistance at the camp. Patients with serious illnesses must attend a clinic run by MSF in a village 3 minutes away, for which a travel permit is required.</td>
<td>There is one primary school for 146 students. The 50 middle school students must go to a shelter built by an NGO. High school students attend a school in a nearby village. Stipends provided by an INGO for teachers stopped in 2016 due to budget constraints, and so teachers and students must raise the money themselves.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Population</td>
<td>Rations</td>
<td>Access to healthcare</td>
<td>Access to education</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tha Pyay Taw</td>
<td>3252</td>
<td></td>
<td>There is only midwife in a nearby Rakhine village who visits to give vaccinations,</td>
<td>There are 600 primary school students and 50 middle school students. There are eight</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>but if more treatment is needed, villagers must travel to her. Serious problems</td>
<td>government-appointed teachers, but they do not visit regularly due to security</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>must be treated at a hospital three miles away but the patient cannot stay</td>
<td>concerns. Therefore people who passed their matriculation exams are being</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>overnight. For additional treatment, patients have to go to Buthitaung town,</td>
<td>used as teachers, even if not properly qualified. There are four primary school</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>for which a travel permit is required from the immigration officer based at the</td>
<td>teachers and five middle school teachers whose salaries are raised by the village.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>border guard police force office.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 2
The seal of the Township General Administration Department, Thantwe

Township General Administration Department
Thantwe Township
Year 1373 Waxing Day of Wagaung (2) Myanmar Era
2011 August (1)

Localised Order (1/2011)

1. The Bengali people living in Thantwe Township can be allowed to travel to out of the Township and State/Region only after obtaining travel permit (form 4) according to the regulations.

2. We hereby announce that if the authorities found out those who travel without having travel permit (form 4) they will be liable to be prosecuted in accordance with the existing law.

S/d Township Administrator

Distribution
To all Ward / Village Administrators
Copies to
District Administrator, District Administration Office, Thantwe
District Head, District Immigration and Citizenship Registration Department, Thantwe
Township Head, Township Immigration and Citizenship Registration Department, Thantwe
Office Copy /File
To
Chairman
Township Motor Transport Administration Committee
Thantwe

Subject: To monitor on leaving cars

This letter is to notify to strictly prohibit Muslims boarding on the highway buses and passenger buses travel between Thantwe-Taung Gyup- Yangon and Thantwe- Gwa- Yangon until further notice.

S/d District Administrator
(U Htun Wai Pa/5372)

Copies to
Office Copy
Files
Subject- To control on travels by Muslims

Reference- District General Administration Department, Thantwe District Thantwe Township dated 24-10-2012 letter number 3/32-7/ Se 6

1. Reference made to the above, it was notify to strictly prohibits Muslims boarding on the highway buses and passenger buses travelling between Thantwe-Taung Gyup- Yangon and Thantwe- Gwa- Yangon until further notice.

2. Therefore it is reminded to strictly follow the instruction in the reference letter

Remark. Two copies of the reference letter is attached

S/d On behalf of Chairman
(Htun Htun Naing- Vice Chairman)

Chairman

Line Number 4
1. Passenger Bus station
2. Commodities Truck station

Copies to
1. District Administrator, District Administration Office Thantwe District, Thantwe Township
2. Township Administrator, Township Administration Office, Thantwe Township
3. Officer in Charge, Inspection Gate 60 Ban Gone Tan Thantwe
4. Officer in Charge Bayda Inspection Gate THantwe Gwa road
5. Office Copy
6. File
To
Chairman U Maung Lwin
Trustee of the School
Nyinya Ayechan Village- Kama Maung Town

Subject: Request to allow prayers
Reference: The letter dated 8-6-2016 number 200/8-5/ Oo 6

1. As per instruction from the State Government, prayers in accordance with the religious belief of Islam are to only be conducted in the respective mosques and prayers at he religious schools which are not mosques are (absolutely) not permitted. The State Government has instructed to implement the order at different levels.

2. Therefore, request by members of the Islamic faith to allow prayers at the religious school situated in No 3 Ward of Nyinya Ayechan Village in Kama Maung Town is not permitted in accordance with the instructions from the State Government.

s/d The Head of the State Religious Affairs Department
(Htun Than, Director)

Copies to
The Office of the State Government, Kayin State, Hpa-An
Mon Ethnic Affairs Minister, Kayin State
The Administrator, Township General Administration Department, Kama Maung
The Head of Township Religious Affairs Department, Hpa-Pun Township
Office Copy/ file
Appendix 3
The Office of Township Administration
(The General Administration Department)
Shwe Pyi Thar Township Shwe Pyi Thar)
Letter No 433/3-5/2016( Ya PA Tha)
Date: 2016 June 6

To
U Mya Myint (Chairman)
Township Islamic Beneficiary Group
Shwe Pyi Thar Township

Subject: To find new houses

1. Reference is made to a request to allow prayers five times daily and to observe Ramadan during 20-5-2016 to 20-9-2016 in 11 homes including six homes which are not sealed and five homes which are sealed off as there is no mosque in Shwe Pyi Thar Township of Northern Yangon District, the Yangon Region Government with the letter number 4/8-3(5)/ Islam dated (4-6-2016) informed that permission is granted to conduct prayers in six unsealed homes for one month during Ramadan beginning from 3-6-2016 and prayers is not allowed in the five sealed homes.

2. With regard to the matter, I inform you to look for more homes and submit to this office promptly.

s/d On behalf of the Township Administrator
(Hein Wanna Htet, Deputy Administrator)

Copies to
Township Police Department, Shwe Pyi Thar Township
Township Immigration and Citizenship Registration Department, Shwe Pyi Thar Township
Office Copy
File
Timeline
26th July 1938  
First Burmese Muslim riot  
240 Muslim killed.

29th October 1961  
North Okkalapa Township, Rangoon

21st August 1983  
Nyaung Tone Township, Irrwadday  
4 mosque destroyed, 70 Muslim owned houses and shops were destroyed.

1982  
Ziphyu Thaung Village, Yay Township, Mon State  
A mosque was destroyed.

Mawlamyine City, Mon State  
Kyitephanae  
A mosque was destroyed.

March 1983  
Kyone Door Township, Karen State  
A mosque and about 100 Muslim houses were destroyed.

12th July 1988  
Taunggyi City, Shan State  
Imam of the mosque was killed and many injured. Some mosques and houses were damaged.

16th July 1988  
Prome Township, Pegu Division  
Several Muslim households were destroyed and looted.

19th July 1988  
Paung Ta Le Township, Pegu Division

1997 March and February  
Mandalay City  
Anti-Muslim violence.

28th August 1995  
Bamar Muslim Quarter (BaMaKa), (Near Kangyi Mosque) Yamethin Township, Mandalay  
44 Muslim owned households, near Shwesegone Pagoda were destroyed and 80 families were displaced.

20th to 30th May 2001  
Taunggu Township, Pegu Division  
Reprisals following destruction of Bhamian Buddha statute in Afghanistan. A Muslim family burned alive, and several mosques are still locked up today.

October 2001  
Prome Township, Pegu Division  
Two mosques damaged, and a hotel and many houses were destroyed.
February 2001
Sittwe, Rakhine State
Clashes between Muslims and extremist Buddhists in Sittwe, about ten Muslim house and several shops were destroyed. A 60-year-old and a 25-year-old Muslim men were killed.

October 2001
Pegu City, Pegu Division
A mosque damaged,

October 2003
Kyaukse Township, Mandalay
A Muslim family burned alive, including 2 children and one pregnant woman.

12th April 2012
Sine Taung Village Kachin State
A mob, including Buddhist monks, destroyed a mosque.

14th April 2012
Kanma Township, Magwe Division
A dispute between Muslim and business traders triggered anti-Muslim violence and 7 houses belonging to Muslims were destroyed.

3rd June 2012
Taunggup Township, Rakhine State
10 Muslim massacred by extremist Buddhist mob.

June, July 2012
Sittwe, Kyaukphyu and Rathedaung, Rakhine State
Anti-Muslim violence spread and hundreds of Rohingya and Kaman Muslim were massacred.

4th Oct 2012
Bogalay Township, Ayearwaddy
90 year-old Muslim Cemetery was destroyed

21st October 2012
Rakhine State
Second wave of anti-Muslim violence took place. Rohingya and Kaman Muslim were again targeted.

17th February 2013
Tharkayta Township, Rangoon
A madrassa was destroyed.

20th March 2013
Metikhtilar Township, Manadalay
Anti-Muslim massacre: nearly 100 Muslims killed, 12 mosques, 1,498 houses and five madrassas were destroyed.

22nd March 2013
Yone Pin Village, Ayelar
13 houses, a mosque and a madrassa were destroyed.

23rd March 2013
Ywar Tan Village, Yamething Township, Mandalay
53 houses and a religious premises were destroyed.

24th March 2013
Ywar Thit Village, Tat Kone Township
10 houses and a mosque was destroyed by a mob.

26th March 2013
Sit kwin Township
A Muslim owned café and a mosque was destroyed.

27th March 2013
Zi Gone Township, Pegu
14 houses and a mosque destroyed.

27th March 2013
Moe Nyo Township, Pegu
A mosque destroyed
28th March 2013
Pati Gone Township, Pegu
8 houses, 4 shops and a mosque destroyed.

29th March 2013
Gyopin Gauk Township, Pegu
Hundreds of Muslims forced to evacuate.

30th April 2013
Okkan Township, Rangoon Division
Anti-Muslim violence triggered after a Muslim woman hit a novice monk. Many Muslim villages were arson attacked.

2nd April 2013
Rangoon
A madrassa was arson attacked but the authorities deny it. 13 children lost their lives and two teachers have been jailed.

11th April 2013
Meikhtilar Township, Mandalay
The gold shop owner couple from Meikhtilar Township are sentenced to 14 years in jail.

4th May 2013
Pharkant Township, Kachin State
Muslim-owned shop was destroyed by an extremist Buddhist mob.

21st May 2013
Meikhtilar Township, Mandalay
Seven Muslim from Meikhtilar unfairly sentenced from 2 years to 28 years relating to anti-Muslim violence.

27th May 2013
Meikhtilar Township, Mandalay
Muslim ancient cemetery was destroyed.

28th May 2013
Lashio, Shan State North
Mosques, madrassas and Muslim houses and shops were arson attacked and destroyed by an extremist Buddhist mob.

29th May 2013
Mone Township, Pegu Division
A mosque and a madrassa was destroyed by an extremist Buddhist mob.

10th April 2013
Mizan village, Hpa an Tsp, Kayin State
One third of a Muslim cemetery was destroyed by a bulldozer.

5th June 2013
Okkan Township, Rangoon
2 Muslim women were sentenced for 2 years jail with hard labour. The verdict related to Okkan anti-Muslim violence. They were accused for causing the violence.

5th June 2013
Pu Rain village, Mrauk Oo Township, Rakhine State
Rohingya IDPs and local villagers had a dispute. Military and police shot and killed some Muslim villagers. Three women killed, 19 people were arrested and one of them died in the jail. There were sentenced from 8 to 18 years in jail.

6th June 2013
Yay Paw Taung, Thaung Gyi Village, Naung Lay Pin Township, Pegu
Three Muslim houses were destroyed by an extremist Buddhist mob.

30th June 2013
Thanwe Township, Rakhine State
Rakhine Buddhist mob destroyed ethnic Kaman Muslim houses and injured Muslims.
**20th November 2014**
Kangyi Mosque, Bamar Muslim Quarter (BaMaKa), Yamethin Township, Mandalay
Kangyi Mosque was destroyed by an extremist Buddhist mob after 6 years closure to worship.

**19 July 2014**
Bago
The 140 year-old ancient Pathi cemetery was destroyed.

**30 January 2014**
Myeik, Tanintharyi
The 85 year-old Tharyargone Muslim cemetery was destroyed.

**1 January 2015**
Ayetharyer Township, Taunggyi
The Kyiphukan cemetery was destroyed.